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The study is based upon abductive content analysis and a narrative literature review. The 
study provides an opportunity to understand what practical organizational and manage-
ment arrangements are required to implement and support responsibility. Research in the 
topic is needed since governance indices indicate that, despite administrative reforms 
through decades, public trust in governments has not risen. 
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ways since they describe technical rationality from different perspectives. The quest for 
greater efficiency, economy and effectiveness in public administration has given rise to 
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This is the translated version of the academic dissertation: "Vastuullinen julkinen 
johtaminen: Hallinto-oppien kommunikatiivinen arviointi". The study relies on the work 
of communicative rationality by Jürgen Habermas in assessing responsible public 
management and its many forms found in administrative doctrines. 
The reasons for this are quite simple. First of all, administrative science is lacking deeper 
philosophical discussion regarding its most profound principles. One theme for such 
discussion is rationality and its effect on administrative systems. This theme links 
administrative science to a larger context of social sciences, a link that is usually forgotten. 
The other theme for the discussion is administrative ethics and its relation to philosophy. 
Never before has there been so much research on this topic. However, scholars of the field 
rarely mention philosophers in their works. Problematically, this makes the field 
ambivalent to its very foundation – and quite technical as well. For example, I can happily 
declare myself as a philosopher, and I hope many other researchers of Public 
Administration can too. 
Also, there is a growing need for philosophers in administrative ethics in particular. For 
example, there is no deep understanding of the philosophical presumptions of this field of 
interest. Rather, Public Administration as a whole is founded upon administrative 
doctrines that lack scientific or philosophical rigor. This can be seen how the economic 
criteria (efficiency, economy, effectiveness) for evaluating ethical behaviour is a dominant 
discourse. However, many ethical problems are hard to grasp using economic language. 
This, in turn, can be seen how assessing the overall effectiveness of ethics policies is quite 
naïve. As a scholar of this field one may need to use this vocabulary at least partly, but 
hopefully in a critical fashion. 
In addition, some trends are in favor of democratic backsliding rather than deliberation. 
The relationship between public management reforms and ethics is not an easy task. Even 
though reforms in ethics policies are comprehensive than ever before, it can be questioned 
whether they contribute to the principles of good governance, but rather, to democratic 
backsliding and critical governance (Demmke et al. 2021b). 
For the sake of democratic systems, there is a need to assess administrative ethics in terms 
of both democratic principles and responsibility. Historically, through the talk of 
responsibility, we have been able to assess the role of public managers in democratic 
systems. Hence, public management, responsibility and the democratic system all need 
each other. If one of these elements is left out, there might be trouble. 
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Administrative ethics is troubled by obvious individualism. This is reflected, for example, 
in the way in which questions of administrative ethics are regulated in practice. The 
downside of individualism is that institutional factors for unethical behaviour remain 
obscured.  It is not surprising that unethical behaviour is mostly a question of finding a 
few “bad apples”. In this study, administrative doctrines are assessed against the 
background of what they claim about agency. As we will later see, the overall picture is 
paradoxical. Hence, instead of individualism, maybe there is a need for a more systemic 
approach to administrative ethics – an approach that can also take the complexity of public 
action into account. 
This, once again, requires a deeper insight into the philosophical assumptions of the field. 
More work is needed! 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Public action takes place in an increasingly complex and unpredictable environment, 
which makes it difficult to identify and implement responsible public management. 
According to Salminen (2016: 8), responsibility means following the rules and 
instructions, being accountable for one's actions to higher parties and acting correctly as 
an individual on the basis of honesty and trustworthiness. Responsibility is about how well 
an individual follows the rules and understands their role in their organization. 
Responsibility and administrative ethics, in general, are often explored as individual 
activities, although attention should also be paid to the organizational and systemic levels 
(Demmke et al. 2020: 93). This is the case, for example, with respect to institutional 
integrity (Kirby 2018). 
The assessment of responsible public management is ambiguous. Responsibility is based 
on the ethics of public management. It is conceivable that more attention will be paid to 
responsibility in the public sector than in the private sector. Responsibility concerns public 
administration and service systems as a whole, not to forget internal operations between 
organizations. In addition, public management is responsible for rapid societal change and 
react to the best of its ability. 
According to Plant (2018), the principle that public managers act responsibly has been 
central to the development of public administration since its inception. The reason for this 
is that responsibility has linked administrative ethics with the question of the role of public 
managers in the democratic system.  The keyword here is a democratic system, which 
cannot be underestimated as a representative of universal values in society. According to 
Mungiu-Pippidi (2020), ethical universalism is a key element of democracy and good 
governance: regimes that adhere to ethical universalism, emphasize equality, and treat 
individuals equally and impartially, regardless of their personal characteristics. 
At present, ethical universalism faces major challenges in the European context. 
Responsible public management is hampered by the moral relativism of postmodern 
societies that challenge traditional principles of public administration (Cooper 2006). 
”Whereas key phenomena of modernity are assumptions about universal values, absolute 
values and rationality, currently, trends are towards ‘moral relativism’ which puts into 
question important universal concepts such as ‘rule of law ’, ‘the principle of democracy’, 
‘universal human rights' and 'supranationalism'”(Demmke et al. 2020: 21; see also 
Demmke et al. 2021a). 
Ethical universalism is in trouble despite the fact that governments have invested 
considerable resources to improving ethical standards over two decades. However, the 
growth of ethical policies does not necessarily increase citizens' trust in government 
(Rosenson 2006: 137). On the contrary, recent governance indices show worrying trends 
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in the themes of democracy, inequality and politicization. For example, the Bertelsmann 
Foundation’s (2020) Democracy Index shows that several countries are moving towards 
bad rather than good governance. According to Gora and de Wilde (2020), the 
commitment to democracy and the rule of law is declining in European Union. In addition, 
the politicization of public services has increased (Bowman & West 2018). At the same 
time, citizens' expectations that public administration operates responsibly have increased 
year by year. 
Why is the situation troubling? There can be many reasons for this, of course. This study 
focuses on one of them. According to Dubnick (2011), there must be a clear basis for 
accountability that is not problematic by administrative reform waves. ”It is not 
accountability that is undermining our aspirations for an effective democracy but the 
reformist aspiration for an effective democracy that is undermining accountability. […] 
Simply stated, this paradox holds that any effort to improve accountability through 
reforms generates consequences that in fact alters and often undermines existing forms of 
accountability already in place ”(Dubnick 2011: 705–706). 
As Plant (2018) argues, the context of public responsibility must be reconsidered in a 
critical manner today. Through administrative reforms and doctrines, the context has 
changed over the decades and influenced the perception of what is regarded as a 
responsible action. Plant, therefore, raises a key question for research: what if the context 
of responsibility is wrong? What if the context does not emphasize, for example, ethical 
action, democratic values, strong public institutions, or integrity of governance? The 
responsibility of public management is hampered not only by the environment but also by 
public management reforms. The effectiveness of public management reforms has not only 
been questionable (Pollitt & Bouckaert 2011), but they have also produced new ethical 
challenges (Demmke & Moilanen 2012: 706). 
As a result of administrative reforms, the public administration often has to balance 
conflicting goals. Like Habermas (1996) argues, in ”the modern service administration, 
however, problems accumulate that require the weighing of collective goods, the choice 
between competing goals, and the normative evaluation of individual cases. These can be 
treated rationally only in discourses of justification and application that cannot be 
contained within the professional confines of a normatively neutral task fulfilment.” 
(Habermas 1996: 440.) 
In this study, the responsibility of public management is assessed through the forms of 
responsibility found in the administrative doctrines. The study examines responsibility 
through three administrative doctrines: bureaucratic theory, New Public Management 
(NPM), and New Public Governance (NPG). The responsibility of public leadership has not 
been previously studied through the principles of these administrative doctrines, despite 
the fact that they play a key role in shaping the behaviour of public managers. 
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Administrative doctrines can be used to understand the practice, but they do not have the 
explanatory function of theories. Therefore, the relationship between doctrine and practice 
differs from the relationship between a proper or “scientific” theory and practice. This 
study continues the idea of administrative doctrines as a set of beliefs that influence 
administrative discourse and practical public management (Hood & Jackson 1991: 17–18). 
Therefore, doctrines are based on unquestioned initial assumptions, nor do they represent 
scientifically verifiable principles, but rather rely on rhetorical choices (Frederickson et al. 
2012: 112). 
Every administrative doctrine has its own way of understanding responsible public 
management. According to the bureaucratic theory, administrative action is based on 
rational principles: legitimate governing means written rules and procedures (Weber 
1922). Despite its age, Weberian bureaucratic theory is still in force as a solution to the 
problem of globalization, where a strong state, maintaining legitimacy and helping citizens 
remain as key features of governance (Pollitt & Bouckaert 2011: 118–120). In addition, the 
Weberian governance model has found a clear link to economic growth (Drechsler & Kattel 
2008; Evans & Rauch 1999). 
New Public Management examines public administration in accordance with private 
sector principles such as cost-effectiveness and economy. NPM, as a neoliberal turn of 
governance, has contributed to the fact that public leadership is currently assessed 
primarily on the basis of economic criteria (Hood & Jackson 1991; Dahl & Soss 2014; 
Tiihonen 2008: 215–217). Because the doctrine has a right-wing background, the 
administrative doctrine has not, at least directly, appeared in the policies of left-wing 
parties. In the EU Member States, features suitable for one's own administrative tradition 
have been chosen from the theory selectively. (Hyyryläinen 2004: 76.) New Public 
Governance emphasizes network relationships, collaboration and partnerships (Osborne 
2010). Like NPM, NPG is based on market- and competition-oriented management 
relationships, while also emphasizing networking between different actors (Kickert et al. 
1997; Haveri & Anttiroiko 2009: 201). 
Procedural democracy 
The aim of the study is to evaluate the responsibility forms found in the administrative 
doctrines using the theory of communicative action of Jürgen Habermas (1984a, 1984b, 
1996), which is linked to democratic principles. The theory of communicative action 
follows the logic of procedural democracy, which means the implementation of universal 
discourse ethics in communication and dialogue (Habermas 1996: 6–7; Meisenbach 
2006). According to Habermas, procedural democracy creates new mechanisms for 
governance in which it is viewed from a deliberative perspective. "This implies a 
'democratization' of the administration that, going beyond special obligations to provide 
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information, would supplement parliamentary and judicial controls on administration 
from within." (Habermas 1996: 441.) 
Deliberative democracy was first written by Bessette (1980). Deliberation refers to the 
communication in an ideal speech situation where all participants in the discourse are 
allowed to present their own arguments (Raisio 2014; Mansbridge et al. 2012). In 
administrative science, Habermas' work is often combined with the topics of inclusion and 
deliberation (see, for example, Vartiainen et al. 2013). 
According to Habermas, the problem with old democratic theories is the assumption that 
democratic thinking should start from the subject. In such a case, the subject may mean, 
for example, an individual in a liberal sense or a collective subject in a republican sense. 
Habermas’ alternative to the old theories of democracy is to talk about democracy from 
the level of communication. Thus, it can be argued that procedural democracy is based on 
intersubjectivity. (Habermas 1996: 299; Thomassen 2010: 117–118.) 
Habermas’s attention to procedural democracy lies in the formal terms of communication. 
Thus, the focus is not so much on what is considered ethical: rather, the aim is to describe 
the intersubjective processes through which norms are produced (Meisenbach 2006: 40). 
Thus, procedural democracy is, according to Habermas, independent of ethical views 
(“this concept [procedural democracy] […] claims to be neutral with respect to competing 
worldviews and forms of life”) (Habermas 1996: 288). In Habermas’ thinking, democracy, 
rational communication, and discourse ethics are united by the pursuit of ethical 
universalism. This is shown, for example, by the principle of universality, which defines 
discourse ethics, according to which the acceptability of a norm is based on the fact that 
all participants in the discourse can accept it (Habermas 1990: 66). 
According to Forester (1983: 236), the theory of communicative action makes it possible 
to perform analysis on three different levels. First, it can be used for empirical analysis of 
structural assumptions in communication, interpretive analysis of meanings, and 
normative analysis of systemic distortions (Cukier et al. 2004). The forms of responsibility 
in administrative doctrines have not previously been assessed within the framework of 
communicative action theory. This is the primary contribution of research to the scientific 
debate. In addition, research is scientifically necessary because the forms of responsibility 
of administrative doctrines must be viewed through the ideal of procedural democracy. 
The talk of accountability needs to be returned to a level that is not based on seeking 
efficiency (Dubnick 2011). 
Administrative doctrines do not only convey information, but communicate political and 
moral meanings through their structures: they seek, for example, social acceptance, trust, 
and sacrifice (Forester 1980; Ahn 2009). Administrative doctrines communicate who a 
responsible public manager is, how he/she interacts with other actors, or from what 
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sources public responsibility is legitimized. In the study, arguments are assessed 
normatively through the terms of Habermas’ discourse ethics. 
No matter how complex a public administration takes place, its core lies in universal and 
democratic principles. Administrative doctrines communicate technical, political and 
moral meanings. The idea continues Plant's (2018) understanding of the importance of 
responsibility in the development of public administration: the procedural democracy of 
administrative doctrines influences the behaviour of public managers and, ultimately, the 
realization of responsibility in public institutions. 
1.1 Previous studies of responsible public management 
According to Dubnick (2011), administrative reforms have led to new forms of 
responsibility that call into question the existing forms responsibility. The situation is 
paradoxical in the sense that the new forms of responsibility aim to improve effectiveness. 
In reality, the matter has become considerably more complex. The responsibility of public 
management has been studied from many different perspectives. This fact reflects the 
complexity of the topic that sometimes seems even contradictory. Attention is paid to, for 
example, the relationship between responsibility and accountability (Mulgan 2000; Svara 
2007; Schillemans 2013), the dichotomy between compliance and integrity (Vogelsang-
Coombs 2016; Lawton 2013: 121; Lewis & Gilman 2005) as well as responsiveness to the 
needs of citizens (Sheaff 2002; Vigoda 2000; Bryer 2007; Löffler 2003). 
1.1.1 Responsibility and accountability 
In public management, responsibility and accountability are fundamental values 
(Salminen 2016: 7). The responsibility of civil servants is best reflected in accountability 
and responsibility for results (Hyyryläinen 2004: 164). In administrative science, the 
definition of responsibility and accountability has changed over time. In the past, 
accountability meant exclusively the external dimension of responsibility, such as control 
mechanisms towards the accountant. Now, responsibility mainly means the internal 
dimension of accountability. In this case, responsibility is understood according to a 
narrow definition, in which case the attention is paid to the ethical discretion of the 
individual. (Mulgan 2000: 557–558.) 
There are many definitions of responsibility (Svara 2007: 4). According to Salminen (2016: 
7), responsibility “means following the rules and instructions, being accountable for one's 
actions to higher parties; on the basis of honesty and trustworthiness”. The relationship of 
democratic governance to officials who have not been elected to their position on the basis 
of a vote is a matter of administrative responsibility (Plant 2018: 1). 
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Accountability is mainly focused on the specific task, its effective implementation and 
reporting to the accountability forums. Instead, responsibility is a much broader question 
than such task management. Public administration has an ethical responsibility to 
consider factors that are outside of its prescribed processes, but at the same time critical 
to the functioning of society. In doing so, public administration is socially responsible. 
Responsibility may even transcend public action and is not just about “managing 
expectations”. Responsibility must exceed the immediate expectations of public 
administration, as it must also prepare for unforeseen events that can jeopardize public 
action or the stability of society. 
Accountability can be found in a democratic, constitutional and learning perspective. 
According to the democratic idea, accountability controls and justifies administrative 
activity. Accountability links administrative activities to a democratic chain of delegation. 
A key evaluation criterion is how the accountability mechanism enables the ability of 
democratically elected bodies to evaluate and guide administrative action. The 
constitutional perspective sees accountability as a necessary factor in preventing the 
concentration and abuse of power. A key evaluation criterion is how accountability 
prevents the abuse of administrative power and privileges. The learning perspective 
emphasizes that governance works more efficiently and effectively through accountability. 
Its key evaluation criterion is based on how accountability arrangements encourage public 
administration to achieve better societal outcomes. (Bovens et al. 2008: 230–232.) 
The assessment of public performance assumes that the public organization and its actors 
are accountable to their principal. The problem here is the consideration of all 
stakeholders, i.e. “too many hands”. Responsibility and accountability should also be 
targeted at the right level. For example, government ministers rarely agree to take 
responsibility for activities that are the work of their subordinate agencies. (Lawton 1998: 
119.) 
According to Dubnick (2014), the types of accountability can be considered according to 
whether they are caused by external activities (moral pulls) or by own activities (moral 
pushes). These types show that there are many forms and mechanisms of accountability. 
As forms of external action, they can mean legal responsibility, answerability, or 
responsiveness. When evaluating the forms of accountability that have been achieved as a 
result of one’s own actions, we are talking about a legal obligation, obedience, amenability, 
and adaptability. (Dubnick 2014: 32–33.) Accountability is often associated with 
responsiveness to policymakers and the citizens. Responsiveness is close to controlling in 
the sense that they both seek to steer public administration according to the preferences 
of the people. More than responsiveness, control emphasizes the compulsion of external 
pressures on public administration. Responsiveness refers to the general sympathy of 
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officials for societal demands that may manifest themselves in the political decision-
making system or simply in the needs of clients. 
Cooper argues (2006) that the responsibility of civil servants is based on four areas, which 
are the individual, organizational culture, organizational structure, and societal 
expectations. Responsibility cannot be reduced to any of these levels, but all of them must 
be taken into account. At the individual level, the characteristics of responsibility are built 
on ethical decision-making, personal attitudes, morals, virtues, and professional values. 
Examples, norms and symbols are present in organizational culture. In the area of 
organizational structure, responsible management is defined by accountability, co-
operation and interaction, pathways in conflict resolution and forms of involvement. 
Finally, societal expectations are based on participation and influence as well as laws and 
policies. (Cooper 2006: 188–210.) 
Responsibility can be divided into objective and subjective dimensions. Objective 
responsibility is central to the reliability and predictability of public action. The public 
management must act in accordance with political decision-making, regardless of what he 
or she thinks of them personally. Objective accountability is very close to what is meant by 
accountability. Subjective responsibility is a psychological concept, as it can be described 
by a person’s loyalty and conscience. Thus, responsibility has an external (political) and 
internal (professional and personal) dimension. It can be argued that responsible public 
management takes both forms of responsibility into consideration. (Bertelli & Lynn 2003: 
260; Salminen 2016: 9; Salminen 2018: 70–71; Mosher 1968.) 
When considering responsibility, it is assumed that the moral subject is able to act 
ethically. However, there is no consensus about how responsibility is best achieved. The 
question is should the organization rely on the discretion of officials, or whether ethical 
implementation requires external control mechanisms (Vogelsang-Coombs 2016: 323). 
The issue is also close to looking at forms of accountability as a virtue or a mechanism: it 
considers whether accountability should be based primarily on the actor’s internal or 
external sources (Bovens 2010; Jackson 2009). 
It can be argued that public responsibility requires both internal and external mechanisms, 
such as a sense of responsibility or control. However, this does not remove the problem of 
accountability. The question of accountability is still based on three questions. (1) What 
are we accountable for? (2) To whom are we accountable? (3) How is accountability best 
safeguarded? The last question is the most challenging one, as ensuring accountability is 
not easy. Determining accountability is difficult, but it is even more difficult to monitor. 
(Denhardt & Denhardt 2007: 125, 128.) 
Accountability is an umbrella concept, as it contains conflicting definitions (Bovens 2008: 
226). Nevertheless, the importance of accountability should not be underestimated. 
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Accountability makes it possible to assess the effectiveness of public management, power 
relations and developments that might lead to inappropriate or unethical behaviour 
(Viinamäki 2017: 88). 
The accountable may be responsible for a variety of content, such as financial, procedural, 
or communicative content. These differences explain, at least in part, why the assessment 
standards for accountability vary. Accountability can take a vertical form, in which case it 
is based on a hierarchical relationship between the accountable and the forum that 
evaluates it. However, a hierarchical relationship is not necessary.  There is also a notion 
of social accountability that is not based on a formal obligation. Social accountability can 
therefore be called a voluntary form of accountability. (Bovens et al. 2014: 11–12.) 
Public managers have great freedom to apply their own ethical principles in decision-
making. Also, they should be able to distinguish the right solutions from the wrong ones, 
which requires an ability for judgement. Here, accountability refers to the methods and 
processes that set the values of administrative decision-making. However, this is very 
difficult as the public sector has become increasingly complex also with regard to values. 
This has meant that public responsibility requires a balance between competing values. A 
fair and critical assessment of different values and interests, in turn, requires rational 
judgement. (Bertelli & Lynn 2003: 260–262.) 
In the American research literature, accountability is a normative concept designed to 
provide tools for assessing the behaviour of actors. When a person or organization is 
accountable, the activity is considered virtuous. In the European literature, on the other 
hand, accountability is more limited and mechanistic: accountability is seen as a social 
mechanism, institutional relationship or arrangement in which the accountability of an 
actor is assessed by a forum. In this case, the accountability literature does not pay so much 
attention to the behaviour of actors, as in the interest of institutional arrangements per se. 
The question is therefore not if the actor is accountable, but whether the accountability 
forum retrospectively holds the actor accountable. An actor may face the consequences of 
unethical conduct, but not necessarily. The consequences might be very varied. The 
consequences can be formalized, such as fines, disciplinary measures or penalties. On the 
other hand, they can be based on unwritten rules. Sometimes the negative consequences 
are implicit or informal. (Bovens et al. 2008: 226–227; Bovens 2010: 946–954.) 
Accountability is seen as a social relationship or mechanism based on the requirement to 
explain and justify action. The accountability mechanism is thought to take place in a 
situation where the accountable party participates in different accountability forums. This 
is usually based on three steps. The first step is to share information, in which the actor 
justifies his or her actions to the forum, for example in the form of self-assessment reports. 
Reports can be based on results, financial metrics, or procedural problems. This is followed 
by a discussion phase in which the forum evaluates the performance of the accountable 
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party and asks questions to him or her if necessary. At the discussion stage, the 
accountable party is given the opportunity to answer questions and explain his or her 
actions. The debate and its intensity may vary depending on, for example, a personal 
performance appraisal or a parliamentary debate. The accountability forum is thought to 
end in a consequential phase when it will penalize, correct or reward the accountable party 
(if necessary). Accountability forums actually follow clear steps very rarely: the steps can 
take place at the same time or in reverse order. Also, it is possible that one step is 
completely missing. (Brandsma & Schillemans 2012: 954–955.) 
Baxter and others (2017) mention four accountability problems that have emerged in the 
empirical studies. It is challenging to combine ethical principles of accountability with 
existing practices because decision-making and ethical reflection are often done 
automatically and intuitively. Accountability may sometimes require factors that have not 
been taken into notice. Another problem with accountability is based on administrative 
activities in complex networks that require multiple overlapping accountability 
relationships. The third problem is based on the paradox of autonomous action. Here, the 
accountable party must comply with top-down administrative principles, standards and 
codes. On the other hand, a public manager cannot be considered a responsible actor if he 
has lost his autonomy and discretion. Finally, the accountable party strives to avoid 
penalties, leading to incomplete reporting and dishonesty. 
1.1.2 Accountability overload 
Accountability has been criticized for manufacturing and overloading. This means 
excessive accountability forms, which further bureaucratises public action. The frustration 
of public actors may be exacerbated by the fact that evaluation criteria are changing and 
might be impractical, unrealistic and unclear. (Bovens et al. 2008: 227–228.) Excessive 
monitoring and evaluation mechanisms lead to undesirable results, which ultimately 
erode citizens' trust in politics, political processes and institutions (Salminen 2016: 9). 
In order to lighten the overload, it may make sense to consider accountability through 
administrative problems. There are usually three types of problems that occur. The first is 
the most common, in which public officials do what they are supposed to do, but weakly 
or inefficiently. The problem is primarily managerial and can be solved through better 
supervision, training, or improved processes. Another and more difficult problem is the 
situation where public officials exceed their legitimate authority. Solutions can include 
increasing control in the public organization and compensating for damage. The third and 
most difficult problem is based on insufficient action or outright passivity on the part of 
public officials. For example, individual officials may avoid rather than actively participate 
in the development of their areas of responsibility. (Peters 2014: 212–213.) 
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In addition to accountability overload, there should be a mention of the accountability 
deficit, which has historically been a larger problem than now. In such a situation, civil 
servants have not had to justify their actions to different accountability forums. There are 
also situations where it has been difficult for policymakers to take responsibility for the 
unethical activities of ever-growing and increasingly complex agencies. (Bovens et al. 
2008: 229.) 
In response to talk about accountability overload, Dubnick (2011) has written about 
accountability as an ontological concept. In this case, accountability relationships are not 
secondary to governance. On the contrary, they are present in the very establishment of 
the social relationships that constitute governance. (Dubnick 2011: 707–709.) 
As we can see, the issue of responsibility is very complex. This is clearly shown in the 
accountability overload and the ever-changing forms of responsibility. In order to clarify 
the situation, the starting point of this study is to look at the responsibility forms on the 
basis of administrative doctrines. This also delimits the research problem. Each of the 
three administrative doctrines communicates responsibility following its own kind of 
logic. For bureaucratic theory, responsibility is something that is implemented in 
hierarchical arrangements; NPM understands it to be dependent on market-based 
arrangements; NPG, in turn, emphasizes the priority of networks in achieving 
accountability. If the administrative doctrines would be ignored, there would be not 
enough attention to the doctrinal principles that are underlying the different forms of 
responsibility. 
1.1.3 Technical rationality in the responsibility forms 
It is difficult to assess responsible public management without talking about 
administrative reforms (Dubnick 2011). Administrative reform is ultimately based on two 
goals, which are efficiency or equity: quite often these two goals conflict, with 
administrations having to seek compromise solutions (Lane 1997). 
In public administration, efficiency is generally viewed through rationality, which is 
defined against different backgrounds: rationality can be understood concerning, for 
example, human beliefs, taking into account not only the consideration of actual choices 
but also the interpretation of beliefs about the world (Vakkuri 2009: 11; Elster 1983). 
According to Jun (2006: 215), technical rationality is essentially anti-democratic, as its 
focus is on economic goals. Habermas also uses the term cognitive-instrumental 
rationality for technical rationality (Habermas 1984a: 8–11). In turn, equity can be viewed 
through communicative rationality, in which case it is related to universal discursive 
principles (Morris 2009). 
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Technical rationality is the mainstream of public administration: in recent decades, public 
activity has been assessed primarily through Efficiency, Economy and Effectiveness. In 
addition to these rather technical values, Menzel (2005: 25) emphasizes the importance of 
the fourth E, i.e. Ethics. In administrative ethics, the organizational behaviour is examined 
in an ethical framework (Simon 1997: 360). The task of administrative ethics is the 
application of moral and ethical principles in governance and decision-making in public 
organizations (see, e.g., Cooper 2001: 1–36). 
Technical rationality can be seen as a child of enlightenment thinking, a line of thought 
whose consequences have turned against itself. Here, technical rationality doubts 
everything beyond the limits of calculation and usefulness, and if it can proceed free from 
external shackles, nothing will stop it (Horkheimer & Adorno 2008: 24). However, public 
organizations are not meant for just financial gain – and their responsibility cannot be 
measured by economic indicators alone. For example, the values of democracy and 
objectivity are combined with the ethos of public service. Therefore, “technical 
responsibility” should be complemented by communicative rationality, which is based on 
the democracy of public action (Habermas 1984a, 1984b). 
In terms of communicative rationality, the technical rationality and the economic 
efficiency of public administration are problematic in the sense that they communicate in 
a distorted way: this, in turn, undermines the legitimacy of citizens toward public 
administration (Habermas 1975). Alternatively, communicatively rational actors follow 
ethical principles in discourse: this kind of ideal speech situation leads to undistorted 
communication, increasing understanding, trust, knowledge, and consensus among 
participants (Cukier et al. 2004: 239). Thus, the responsibility of public management 
within the framework of technical rationality is not sufficient if communicative rationality 
is left out of the discussion. 
Traditionally, organizational communication has been outlined through technical 
rationality. In the bureaucratic organization described by Weber (1980), communication 
occurs hierarchically downward, where there are usually two forms for conveying 
information: (1) information about an organization’s current or future situation, new 
organizational practices, decisions, and changes in operational practices; (2) information 
regarding the performance of tasks, in which case subordinates are technically instructed 
to achieve objectives in an effective manner (Hirokawa 1979). Katz and Kahn (1966) offer 
five types of downward communication, which are job guidance, job definition, procedures 
and practices, feedback, and indoctrination. Indoctrination refers to the process by which 
a person identifies with the activities and goals of an organization (Beyer et al. 2000). The 
success of modern organizations also requires upward communication, with critical 
feedback being particularly important (Tourish & Robinson 2006). However, upward 
Acta Wasaensia     14 
feedback is challenging in many organizations because of the, for example, silence of 
subordinates (Detert et al. 2010) or resistance (Kassing 2011). 
Communication in technical rationality can jeopardize the goals of public action. 
According to Adams and Balfour (2009), “administrative evil” is disguised as power 
mechanisms, such as administrative status and role or technical language use. This is 
especially the case with bureaucratic administration. However, the new forms of 
responsibility found in NPM and NPG pose their challenges. A culture of technical 
rationality leads to moral inversions, in which evil is communicated as something positive 
or constructive (Adams & Balfour 2009: 4, 9). When assessing responsibility, it is 
important to pay attention to what is not communicated in addition to what is – and why 
(Forester 1980). For example, communication of rules is typically intersubjectively 
constructed, politically supported, and legally sanctioned (Williams 2015: 587). Therefore, 
communication is always at least partly founded upon institutional factors. 
The administrative doctrines and their technical rationality have not been received merely 
positively. Both management and leadership have been criticized by researchers. In this 
respect, the best known “school” is Critical Management Studies (CMS). In addition to the 
work edited by Alvesson and Willmott (1992a), the work of Burrell and Morgan (1979), 
published in 1979, which was based on a critique of functionalism in organizational 
research, is considered to have been a key factor in shaping CMS. Management has been 
criticized since it became a big social factor at the turn of the 18th and 19th century. Smith 
(2015), for example, criticized the managers of a corporation for not being able to pay as 
much vigilance to the money of others as, for example, entrepreneurs to their own. Due to 
the broad theoretical pluralism of CMS, there is no way to distinguish critical from non-
critical research, although some criteria may include neglecting efficiency thinking, 
demonstrating organizational irrationality, and going through a philosophical and 
methodological debate. (Fournier & Gray 2000; Parker 1995.) 
The impact of CMS on the mainstream of management research has been small: although 
critical management research is empirical research, its theories, methods, and results are 
strongly tied to their field (Visser 2010). On the other hand, the same can be said about 
the mainstream of administrative science or its centricity on positivism (Autioniemi 2019). 
Although CMS, as its name implies, has shown its critique of management practices, 
criticism rarely translates into practice. (Foster & Wiebe 2010; Alvesson & Willmott 
1992b). 
In the study, administrative doctrines are assessed through communicative rationality. All 
three administrative doctrines convey communicative structures to management 
practices, staff, other organizations and stakeholders, and society through their activities. 
The doctrines differ in their structures and views about responsible public management. 
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For example, formality as a form of accountability is a priority for bureaucracy. For 
network management, formality would make responsibility more difficult.  
There is very little research on public management responsibility in terms of 
communicative action. The closest to the topic is Ahn’s (2009) Position and 
Responsibility, which is strongly based on the philosophy of Habermas. In his book, Ahn 
introduces the concept of positional self in describing the role and responsibilities of civil 
servants. Ahn argues that the positional self has a broader responsibility than the 
subjective self to act under the expectations of its formal position. The positional self, 
however, is not reduced to the responsibility of the formal position, but seeks its moral 
basis outside this. Thus, the positional self is a member of two worlds – a mediator of the 
cultural lifeworld and the administrative system. According to Ahn, such agency has two 
dimensions, the first based on subjectivity and the second on the instrumentality of 
organizational action. 
How, then, can the positional self find its moral basis in the lifeworld and transmit it to the 
system? According to Ahn, the positional self represents the democratic values and 
communicative rationality of the lifeworld, according to which he should act responsibly 
in his formal position in the system. The positional self becomes the moral self when it 
transcends its subjective dimension by acting following intersubjective moral norms. Ahn 
complements the positional self with Niebuhr’s theory that those in formal positions 
should approach their duties not only based on law but absolute justice (Ahn 2009: 119, 
233). 
Ahn’s work opens up the relationship between the lifeworld and the system from an 
administrative point of view. It also shows why this dichotomy is important for the 
responsibility of public management. Unfortunately, Ahn’s work is almost devoid of 
administrative literature, and its understanding of public administration is based on 
Weber’s theory of bureaucracy. Ahn draws attention to corrupt practices of money and 
power that are unethical in nature. However, administrative doctrines and different forms 
of responsibility can open up public management from a broader perspective. Therefore, 
it is important to apply Habermas’ communicative action theory not only to the identity of 
the public manager, but also to the administrative strata and discourses, which influence 
the public manager’s perception of himself/herself, his/her work, and his/her 
responsibilities. 
Responsible public management needs more philosophical debate. Failure to understand 
metaphysical background assumptions leads to problems in every discipline. Scott and 
Hart (2001: 420) present three of these problems for public administration. First, the 
public administration has implicit assumptions about human agency. Because these 
assumptions have not been reviewed in a critical light, administrative action has led to 
aimlessness and morally questionable consequences. Second, if the normative dimension 
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of public administration is reduced to the values of efficiency and other economical 
criteria, public administration is in moral bankruptcy. Third, due to technological 
developments, administrations are in a position to increase technical control. If public 
administration does not consider its actions morally, technical control can lead to negative 
consequences – and sometimes to a straightforward totalitarianism. 
1.1.4 Administrative reform impact to responsibility 
Three different waves can be found for administrative reforms. The first wave prevailed 
from the mid-1960s to the late 1970s, when public administration was developed through 
rational and hierarchical planning and cost-benefit analysis. The NPM, which began in the 
late 1970s and lasted until the late 1990s, emphasized the importance of private sector 
practices to improve efficiency. The last wave, which lasted from the late 1990s to the 
present day, has no prevailing model, but its key concepts include governance, networks, 
and partnerships. (Pollitt & Bouckaert 2011: 11.) During the 21st century, ethics has 
become a central topic in public administration (Menzel 2005: 25). 
Perspectives on administrative doctrines are intertwined in the practices of public 
management, and pure applications derived from them are not easy to find. Also, it is often 
thought that the doctrines should not be seen as mutually exclusive but as complementary. 
NPM, for example, is no longer a separate trend, as its principles have become part of the 
mainstream and core of modern governance thinking. (Kurkinen 2016: 145–146; 
Denhardt 2011: 149; Hyyryläinen 2012a; Salminen 2008: 71–79; Merilä 2008: 66.) 
The mixing of features of administrative reforms is parallel to the hybridization of 
organizations. Public organizations are not governed by principles based on a single 
doctrine, which complicates public responsibility. Indeed, a hybrid organization refers to 
a situation where different operating logics and values from both private and public sectors 
are present in the organization. In literature, hierarchies and market relations are often 
thought to form a kind of conceptual dichotomy – in reality, organizations use both forms 
to organize their activities (Johanson & Vakkuri 2018: 3–4; Karré 2011: 23–25; Skelcher 
& Smith 2015: 433–435). 
By definition, hybrid organizations seek to integrate the interests of civil society and the 
market, as well as to trade between community solidarity and resources (Jäger & Schröer 
2014). Criticism suggests that hybrid organizations represent economic and cultural risk 
for the public sector. The risk here is the loss of accountability in an increasingly complex 
management environment. However, it is argued that many negative effects can be 
prevented through active regulation and high professionalism (Brandsen & Karré 2014). 
No clear conclusions can be drawn about the effectiveness of the operational logics and 
governance mechanisms in hybrid organizations – rather, they lead to mixed 
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consequences that depend on, for example, the service sector, markets, and policy factors 
(Grohs 2014). For example, in social and health care, there have been difficulties in 
defining a hybrid organization, due to the diversity of theories and approaches. Hybrid 
organizations change their chameleon-like shape depending on who perceives them. 
(Powell & Castelli 2017.) 
1.2 Research questions 
The research questions are: 
1. How has responsible public management been taken into account in the 
three administrative doctrines, namely, bureaucratic theory, New Public 
Management and New Public Governance? 
2. How can the forms of responsibility highlighted in administrative 
doctrines be assessed using responsibility as understood in Habermas' 
communicative way as a starting point? 
Examining the forms of responsibility in administrative doctrines does not provide a 
description of how responsibility is realized in practice, but it does include notions of what 
kind of responsibility is possible and desirable. Therefore, the research provides an 
opportunity to understand what practical organizational and management arrangements 
are required to implement and support responsibility. They are not the primary research 
question of this study, but they can be completely excluded from the study design. 
In this study, Habermas' communicative action theory serves as a kind of theoretical lens 
for the evaluation of the notions of responsibility in administrative doctrines (cf. Reckwitz 
2002). The lens here refers to an interpretive frame of reference that allows certain 
empirical claims to be made and others to be excluded. It forms a heuristic tool that 
sensitizes to seeing and analyzing perceptions of responsibility in administrative doctrines 
in a particular way. It can be used to question the familiar and create new ways of thinking. 
Habermas’ theory of communicative action thus helps to say something about the forms 
of responsibility in bureaucratic theory, New Public Management, and New Public 
Governance that could not otherwise be stated. 
The choice of the research question is justified as follows. A key consideration for public 
responsibility is that administrative reforms have not improved public trust in the public 
administration. The abductive assumption of the study is that this is due to the efficiency-
centricity and technical rationality of administrative doctrines, as well as the neglect of 
procedural democracy. Therefore, the various forms of responsibility should be viewed 
through administrative doctrines, as they function as the underlying principles of these 
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forms. The different forms of responsibility in administrative doctrines are assessed in 
terms of communicative action. These criteria can be used to critically assess the 
procedural democracy (or the lack of) in administrative doctrines. Responsibility forms 
that emphasize efficiency are not only complex today – but also technicalize and 
undermine public responsibility. Ultimately, this manifests itself as a weakening of the 
legitimacy of the public administration. 
The study examines forms of responsibility in administrative doctrines through macro, 
meso, and micro levels (Bowman & West 2018: 26–27). In terms of public responsibility 
and accountability, consideration of all three levels is needed. The idea is to interact 
between these levels. For example, societal debate and political decision-making about the 
role of the public sector lead to changes in the values and practices of public organizations. 
Changes, in turn, can affect psychological agreements and responsible behaviour at the 
individual level. Demmke and Moilanen (2012: 706–708) provide three external factors 
that influence ethical issues in public management. The first of these is administrative 
doctrines and reforms (meso). Another factor relates to the subjective experience of 
organizational ethics and fairness (micro). The third factor is the economic dimension and 
financial cuts that may weaken the organizational culture (macro).  
 
Figure 1. Responsibility in micro, meso and macro levels (Bowman & West 2018: 26). 
Responsibility forms can be contradictory. The citizen can expect social justice, honesty, 
transparency and fairness from the public administration: instead, the public manager can 
consider independence, legality, economy and cost-consciousness as its core principles. 
(Salminen 2010: 34–35.) But who determines the order of priority? What is rational in a 
situation like this? Within the framework of technical rationality, the question cannot be 
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answered thoroughly. Its focus is on the efficiency of the operation and not on the choice 
of goals that guide the operation. Instead, the answer to communicative rationality is that 
importance is determined by the citizen involved in the deliberative dialogue. 
Administrative doctrines open up the issue of responsibility in different ways since they 
describe technical rationality from different perspectives. Each doctrine of administration 
seeks to improve the effectiveness of public action according to its logic. What one 
administrative doctrine considers rational is not necessarily within the scope of another 
doctrine. The same applies to responsible operations in public administration. The 
internal functioning of a public organization can best be viewed through bureaucratic 
management doctrine. It is more natural to approach the relationship of a public 
organization to contractual features such as outsourcing and tendering through market 
orientation. The operation of public organizations in networks is again determined 
through the NPG. 
The study is based on traditional literature research and aims to form a critical review. The 
traditional literature review is considered to be the most common form of literature review 
in the social sciences. The literature review is about a method and research technique that 
examines the research done. (Efron & Ravid 2019: 21; Salminen 2011: 1, 3.) The purpose 
of a traditional literature review is to analyze literature and produce a new view of it: where 
a systematic literature review often forms a quantitative synthesis, the synthesis of a 
qualitative literature review is qualitative (Gregory & Denniss 2018). 
The scope of the research questions is the reason why the traditional approach was chosen 
as the method of literature review. Nor are the questions explorable empirically, leaving 
meta-research as the only option. The traditional literature review is the recommended 
method when dealing with broad research questions rather than specific questions: in 
addition, the traditional approach is particularly suited to topics of specific problem 
management and historical development (Cook & Mulrow 1997; Green et al. 2006). The 
study assesses the responsibility of public management through historical developments 
represented by administrative reforms. The strengths of the traditional literature review 
are considered to be interpretation, critique, and deepening of understanding (Greenhalgh 
et al. 2018). 
According to Cook and Mulrow (1997), a traditional literature review may be better suited 
than a systematic literature review to research with little previous research on the topic. 
Also, the review can create analogies between two independent research areas and 
integrate them conceptually. Obviously, communicative theory and the responsibility of 
public management are two areas of research: the first of these represents social 
philosophy and the latter public administration. There is no research on the responsibility 
of public management as communicative action. 
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A traditional literature review aims to provide a comprehensive description of the 
phenomenon under study, which may lead to the classification of the phenomena. A 
traditional literature review provides a broad picture of the topic at hand and describes the 
history and development of the topic. This traditional literary study is commentary in 
nature. The traditional literature review is divided into three implementation methods, 
which are editorial, commentary, and overview. The purpose of a commentary review is to 
provoke discussion – meaning the literature review is not a strict method. (Efron & Ravid 
2019: 25; Salminen 2011: 6–7.) 
Due to its commentary nature, the study is normative. Rolin (2006: 16) writes that value 
freedom in traditional research is itself a normative position according to which the 
researcher should distinguish epistemic from non-epistemic values when assessing the 
acceptability of a scientific hypothesis or theory. Whereas epistemic values are represented 
by values of truth, consistency, and honesty, non-epistemic values consist of public interest 
or views of a just society. In addition to epistemic values, this study is also defined by non-
epistemic values, as it seeks to understand public administration from a normative 
perspective. Applied social science does not always meet the traditional ideal of value 
freedom. However, this does not mean that the social values of the researcher override the 
cognitive values of research (Rolin 2006: 33). Instead, it is a situation where societal values 
influence the interpretation and application of epistemic values. Rolin bases his position 
on Kuhn’s (1962) philosophy of science, according to which non-epistemic values influence 
the assessment of the acceptability of a theory. 
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2 PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE AND METHODOLOGY 
The task of the social sciences can be understood as raising self-understanding and self-
control of social systems. As part of the social sciences, administrative science uses social 
science research methods. At least two partially overlapping tasks can be defined for 
administrative science. According to the broader task, administrative science studies all 
types of organized activities of society, in which case the common denominator is 
administration. The narrower task again starts from the study of the special features of the 
public activities of the society. In this case, the common denominator is the public 
administration. (Salminen 2002: 19–21.) 
Today, the prevailing research approach in administrative science is based on quantitative-
statistical and behavioural-empirical starting points. Only a few journals in the field are 
based on, for example, a hermeneutic-qualitative extract (Frederickson et al. 2012: 162–
163). Administrative science follows the key ideals of the positivist scientific tradition, 
which are the objective observation of scientific research methodology, value neutrality 
and mathematically formed laws and theories (Kakkuri-Knuuttila & Heinlahti 2006: 133–
134). Nevertheless, positivist considerations criticize administrative science for the 
fragility of identity and lack of boundaries. However, this is not necessarily a weakness in 
administrative science. According to the opposite view, administrative science must be 
specifically conceived as an interdisciplinary field based on human practices. 
(Raadschelders 2010: 131–133; Shafritz & Hyde 2012: 10–11.) 
The debate in administrative science on public responsibility can be tentatively addressed 
through a debate between Herbert Simon and Dwight Waldo. How should the topic be 
studied? Where early administrative science sought the principles of governance from 
practice, Simon and his successors based their research on scientific principles. Simon’s 
research roots go back to the traditions of positivism and logical positivism, represented, 
for example, by Comte, Carnap, and the Vienna circle. Simon’s greatest critic of positivist 
science was Waldo: according to him, the problems of administrative science cannot be 
solved by logical positivism. Whereas the natural sciences are interested in the question 
“What is the matter?”, administrative science includes the sociological question “What 
should be done?” Waldo emphasizes administrative science as a democratic theory. 
According to Waldo, the main obstacles to the development of democratic theory are the 
positivist notions that efficiency is a value-neutral concept and that efficiency must be 
understood as the central concept of administrative science. (Waldo 1952; Simon et al. 
1952; Riccucci 2010: 10–12; Frederickson & Hart 2001.) 
This study follows the ethos of Waldo, as it is based on seeing administrative sciences as a 
democratic theory. The problems of administrative science indeed cannot be solved by 
scientific ideals. On the contrary, these ideals make it difficult for procedural democracy 
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to take place in public administration. What Simon’s administrative science considers 
rational is not necessarily rational in Waldo’s sense. The rationality of scientific ideals is 
instrumental or technical rationality that is fundamentally concerned with means and 
goals (Horkheimer 2008). It concerns the validity of procedures for more or less given 
goals, that is, self-evident goals and does not put much consideration on whether the goals 
themselves make sense. According to this study, responsible public management is 
inevitably an ethical question that cannot be answered objectively or value-neutrally. 
Attention is inevitably drawn to the rationality of the objectives of the public 
administration and not only to the rationale of the procedures. 
2.1 Abductive content analysis 
According to Tuomi and Sarajärvi (2018), theory and research framework mean the same 
thing in qualitative research in the sense that they both are based on concepts and their 
meanings. However, the research framework contains the methodology guiding the 
research and what is already known about the studied phenomenon (Tuomi & Sarajärvi 
2018). In any case, the importance of theory should not be underestimated. The 
cornerstone of qualitative research is the theoretical dependency of observations, 
according to which the research results depend on the observation method and the 
characteristics of the researcher. Thus, knowledge cannot be entirely objective, since it 
depends on subjective features such as the researcher’s understanding of the phenomena. 
The research is based on abductive content analysis. Content analysis can be deductive, 
inductive as well as abductive (Tuomi & Sarajärvi 2002: 98). Content analysis is text 
analysis in which documents are analyzed systematically and objectively (Tuomi & 
Sarajärvi 2018). Deductive based content analysis is based on an already existing theory 
or model. In inductive content analysis, the study proceeds from specific observations to 
the generalization of the phenomena at hand. (Saaranen-Kauppinen & Puusniekka 2006; 
Eskola & Suoranta 1998: 83). 
The abductive content analysis moves between deductive and inductive content analysis, 
where the goal is not to test a theoretical model, but to evaluate ideas for a new kind of 
thinking and interpretation in terms of a chosen theoretical framework. In abductive 
content analysis, the analysis of the data is initially done inductively, in which case the 
subcategories of the analysis are from the research material. Later, however, the 
theoretical framework and its upper categories are used in the analysis of the material. 
(Tuomi & Sarajärvi 2012: 96, 112; Puusa 2020.) In other words, abductive content analysis 
is based on examining the phenomenon, identifying themes and models, and examining 
them with means of a theoretical framework (Dudovskiy 2016). 
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The idea of abductive content analysis is that making observations depends on a guiding 
idea, which can be either an intuitive concept or a well-formulated hypothesis. Thus, 
content analysis is not entirely inductive, but neither is it completely deductive. With the 
help of the guiding idea, the observations arising from the data can be examined 
concerning the assumed important facts. (Saaranen-Kauppinen & Puusniekka 2006; 
Grönfors 1982: 33–37.) For this reason, abductive content analysis is suitable for creating 
a new theory or formulating an existing theory in a new topic (Dudovskiy 2016; Tuomi & 
Sarajärvi 2018). 
The abductive content analysis of this study is justified by the fact that the theoretical 
framework is based on Jürgen Habermas' communicative action theory, which is applied 
in a new context. Habermas’ thinking is by no means unknown in administrative science, 
but it has not been previously applied in the examination of public responsibility. The 
study evaluates the responsibility of public management at the macro, meso and micro 
levels based on research material, but the themes arising from them are analyzed through 
communicative action theory. The choice of abductive analysis is also supported by the fact 
that there is no purely inductive reasoning or analysis – research is always defined by the 
researcher's preconceptions and interpretations of the phenomenon under study 
(Saaranen-Kauppinen & Puusniekka 2006). The research is also not served by deductive 
content analysis, as its purpose is not to test the finished theory, but to formulate the 
theory in a new topic. 
As the name implies, abductive content analysis cannot be reduced to either inductive or 
deductive reasoning alone (Tuomi & Sarajärvi 2018). The analysis is not purely deductive, 
as the analysis is not based on deductive reasoning. On the other hand, abductive content 
analysis is not entirely inductive. Although it is based on inductive reasoning in terms of 
data, the theory is applied to assess the results. Whereas in deductive content analysis the 
research material is examined by applying a certain theory, in abductive content analysis 
the researcher approaches the material on its terms and only as the analysis progresses 
forces it to a certain theory (Tuomi & Sarajärvi 2018). Therefore, in abductive content 
analysis, there is no ready-made rule as to at what point the theory begins to guide 
reasoning. For this reason, Tuomi and Sarajärvi (2018) write that the analysis of the 
material is also about “the logic of invention”. 
According to Tuomi and Sarajärvi (2018), in abductive content analysis, “theory formation 
is possible when a guiding idea or clue is involved in making observations”. Abductive 
content analysis usually begins with surprising observations that are sought to be 
explained by the most probable cause (Timmermans & Tavory 2012). For this reason, 
abductive content analysis can be called conclusion-based reasoning (Tuomi & Sarajärvi 
2018). Karlsen et al. (2020) write that the abductive element of the analysis can serve as a 
preliminary premise of research, which is based, for example, on the researcher’s 
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prediction or preliminary review of the research literature on the phenomenon under 
investigation. 
In the study, responsible public management is examined inductively, i.e. material-based, 
through the forms of responsibility in administrative doctrines. A preliminary review of 
the research literature shows that the literature outlines the themes through the concepts 
of responsibility, accountability, responsiveness, compliance, and integrity. The deductive 
part of the study is represented by Habermas’ procedural democracy and discourse ethics. 
Because the research is theory-bound, its upper categories are predetermined. 
Although Habermas provides a way to understand discourses, he has not defined a strict 
methodology for the analysis (Cukier et al. 2004: 239). At the same time, this can be seen 
as a weakness and strength of his work, as it can be applied from different perspectives. 
For example, Cukier et al. (2004, 2009) have utilized four validity requirements in their 
research, which are clarity, honesty, legitimacy, and truthfulness. Instead, Fast (2013) has 
used three validity requirements instead of four in their study, which are truth/facts, 
rightness/norms, and truthfulness/sincerity. 
In this study, Habermas' discourse ethics is operationalized in the light of four upper 
categories, from which the forms of responsibility in bureaucratic theory, NPM, and NPG 
are examined. The four upper categories are derived from the ideal speech situation, 
namely, the principle of openness, the principle of freedom of speech, the principle of 
authenticity and the principle of reciprocity. Such a classification has been applied, for 
example, by Gillespie et al. (2014) who investigate communication gaps in health care. In 
this study, the four upper categories are supplemented by four validity requirements 
within the principle of authenticity, as all of these requirements are ultimately based on a 
view of the authenticity of discourse. 
The principle of openness. The principle means keeping the discourse open to 
arguments and objections, questions and answers. Everyone should be able to take 
part in the debate. Everyone should also be active – participation is not enough. 
Thus, the dialogue is based on an exchange of ideas between the participants. 
The principle of freedom of speech. Everyone must have the freedom to 
interpret and criticize statements, which leads to the elimination of unreflected 
prejudices from communication. Freedom of speech also means that participants 
have no power or knowledge or need to be diminished. 
The principle of authenticity. All participants should express their beliefs, 
wishes and needs. Discourse must also produce decisions that lead to practical 
action. The principle of authenticity also includes requirements for validity of 
discourse clarity, honesty, legitimacy, and truthfulness. 
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The principle of reciprocity. Participants have equal opportunities to be 
accountable and to hold others accountable. This also means that the role and 
authority of each participant can be taken into account in the discourse. 
Since Habermas does not provide an exact methodology for applying his thinking, it is 
worth elaborating why the four principles constitute the upper categories in this study. For 
example, the four principles of an ideal speech situation better describe the dynamics 
between the actors involved in the discourse than the validity requirements. All 
administrative doctrines have their perceptions of agency. In fact, agency is a very 
important issue in terms of accountability. It is not just a question of whether the claims 
communicated by administrative doctrines are clear, honest, legitimate, or truthful. It is 
also important to assess how the doctrines perceive accountability through openness, 
which is a key principle for the realization of communicative rationality. Like the claims of 
validity, the principles of the ideal speech situation also bring administrative doctrines 
closer to the validity of norms. 
Nevertheless, the authenticity of discourse must be viewed critically, both externally (from 
what preconceptions and motives doctrines present responsibility) and internally (how 
responsibility is understood in the discourse). For external authenticity, the requirements 
for validity are paramount. In this case, attention is paid to the motives and ideological 
starting points underlying administrative doctrines, which can affect communication in a 
distorting way. On the other hand, internal authenticity is based on how responsibility is 
constructed as an internal activity of the discourse. In this case, the focus is not on the 
authenticity of the background influences of the administrative doctrines, but on the 
authenticity of the agency they convey. 
The criteria for communicative action are rather ideal. Researchers applying 
communicative action theory understand that discursive ethical principles are constantly 
violated in practical discourse. However, this is not necessarily a negative side. The 
principles should often be seen as counterfactual ideals against which conventional 
communication can be viewed critically (Yuthas 2002: 144). The principles represent the 
validity of norms from which the forms of responsibility in administrative doctrines are 
assessed (facticity). The principles can be used to ask, for example, what kind of interaction 
or participation administrative doctrine understands as responsible – or how different 
values in the discourse are treated. 
The purpose of the study is not only that the theoretical framework would structure the 
research material. Utilizing the material, the study can also specify how Habermas' 
communicative action theory can be applied in administrative ethics and what 
communicatively responsible public management could mean. The strength of abductive 
analysis can be seen in the fact that there is a stronger interaction between data and theory 
(Coffrey & Atkinson 1996). Abductive reasoning sometimes combines material orientation 
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and ready-made models creatively, which is why something new can emerge as a result 
(Tuomi & Sarajärvi 2018). 
But what would responsible public management mean according to communicative 
criteria? A more detailed answer to the question can be found in the third chapter of the 
study. In any case, communicative responsibility is based on the openness of 
communication and dialogical interaction, in which actors are in an authentic and 
reciprocal relationship with each other. Responsible public management must not only 
take into account the rational demands of citizens. It should also contribute to the creation 
of public institutions based on an increase in communicative action in public 
administration. 
Overall, a positive and a negative definition of communicative responsibility can be given. 
This division is based on Berlin’s (1958) characterization of positive and negative freedom, 
where the former means freedom to something and the latter freedom from something. 
The definitions above for communicative responsibility are positive in nature, i.e., 
something that public management should move toward. Responsibility can also be 
defined in a negative sense. In this case, any pre-existing forms of responsibility are 
assessed in terms of an ideal speech situation. Thus, the aim is not so much to actually 
drive some form of responsibility – but rather to critically assess the prevailing forms of 
responsibility using the criteria of communicativeness. 
The negative definition of communicative responsibility is also an aim of this study. 
Communicative action theory does not provide an answer to what kind of norms should 
exist. Instead, theory can be used to evaluate the processes from which norms are formed 
(Yuthas et al. 2002). Also, Habermas describes his conception of procedural democracy as 
neutral and independent of competing worldviews, since his attention is focused on the 
processes of communication (Habermas 1996: 288). 
2.2 Process of the literature review 
In this study, the traditional literature review is based on five steps (Gregory & Denniss 
2018): (1) choice of topic and audience, (2) searching and re-searching for literature, (3) 
criticism of literature, (4) finding the logical structure of the research, and (5) evaluating 
the literature review. 
The first step is to choose a topic and an audience. The topic is the responsibility of public 
management assessed in terms of administrative doctrines and communicative action. It 
should be noted that communicative action theory is considered as one of the background 
theories of NPG. However, the study does not treat the theory as an internal dimension of 
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the doctrine. NPG might also contain elements that are problematic in terms of 
communicative criteria, and hence, require critical assessment. 
However, one significant question arises. Does not this study inevitably end up with NPG 
being closest to the communicative criteria? This is a good remark. Obviously, there are 
similarities between these two. After all, NPG is intended to increase deliberation in both 
government and society as a whole. Despite this, NPG is not equal to communicative 
action. NPG, like the other administrative doctrines, might lead to negative consequences 
in practice. Even though NPG adds more weight to the communication than other 
doctrines, this does not mean that this communication can be understood as valid in terms 
of discourse ethics. For example, deliberation in networks might not be authentic but 
based upon straightforward manipulation of the participants (Arnstein 1969). The study 
argues that network-like arrangements in terms of communication are such an important 
issue for the public responsibility that it cannot simply be ignored. 
The audience of the study is administrative and social scientists who are interested in the 
issues of public responsibility and administrative ethics. Second, the study is useful for all 
public managers or experts and scholars who lead and develop public administration with 
ethical issues in mind. The study seeks to provide a reflection on why the public manager 
leads how he/she leads, and what administrative principles affect his/her actions or 
responsibilities. 
The second step is searching and re-searching for literature. The primary sources of 
research are scientific articles, monographs, dissertations and edited volumes. Scientific 
journals include Public Administration, Public Administration Review, Public 
Management Review, Public Integrity, Journal of Public Administration Research and 
Theory, Administration & Society, Public Integrity, and Journal of Business Ethics. These 
journals are considered by many metrics (e.g., Impact factor, Google Scholar Metrics, 
JUFO) to be the leading scientific publications in the field. Therefore, articles published in 
these journals enjoy the largest attention among researchers, practitioners and experts 
alike. 
In this study, the research material has been retrieved using databases, which are EBSCO, 
Sage Journals Online, Emerald Journals, ScienceDirect, Wiley Online Library and Finnish 
Elektra. The research material has been searched for with the keywords “responsibility”, 
“accountability”, “compliance”, “integrity”, “responsiveness”, “bureaucratic theory”, “New 
Public Management”, “New Public Governance” and “Communicative action”. The same 
was done with Finnish equivalents. The source material has been tried to keep broad and 
interdisciplinary intentionally. This is because the issues of public responsibility are 
defined by different fields of interest, such as social theory, administrative ethics, and 
administrative doctrines. 
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The third step is based on criticism. The literature should not only be compiled but 
analyzed in a critical fashion. The synthesis of the literature review is based on the 
characterization by Efron and Ravid (2018: 184). This includes (1) material grouping, (2) 
source comparison and finding differences, (3) evaluating conflictual findings, and (4) 
adopting a critical perspective. The study synthesizes through the four principles of 
discourse ethics at the end of the main chapters. 
Qualitative research is based on the hermeneutic idea that human action is nothing 
without interpretation (Reiter 2006; Gadamer 2004). As Rennie (2012) argues, 
“qualitative research is hermeneutical, entailing application of the method of the 
hermeneutic circle to text about experience and/or action” (Rennie 2012: 385). Every 
interpretation of phenomena depends on historical and cultural dimensions. In addition, 
the hermeneutic idea according to which pure observation is impossible is followed by 
Habermas: “Everyday experience that can be transformed into scientific operations is, for 
its part, already symbolically structured and inaccessible to marine observation” 
(Habermas 1984a: 110). Thus, the requirement for “objectivity” of knowledge is 
questionable. 
Alasuutari (2011) introduces the factual perspective and the sample perspective to the 
qualitative data. This study represents the latter. The factual perspective understands 
research material as a reflection of reality. The sample perspective in turn sees the reality 
depending on the perspectives and values of different actors and discourses. Therefore, 
the perspective is based on social constructionism. Administrative doctrines do not only 
serve as “objective” or “value-free” descriptions of responsibility. As discourses, they also 
change social reality. Hence, arguments communicated by these doctrines should not be 
viewed uncritically as neutral or describing theories – and the language they use is not just 
conveying information. 
In philosophy, hermeneutics studies the interpretation and understanding of meanings 
(Heidegger 2000). In hermeneutics, the process of understanding never actually ends but 
deepens as a result of new interpretations regarding the world. This process is called the 
hermeneutic circle. (Tuomi & Sarajärvi 2003: 34–35; Laine 2001.) Also, the hermeneutic 
circle does not describe any particular research method. Rather, all human activity relies 
on this interpretive process (Heidegger 2000: 191, 193). However, understanding the 
conditions of the hermeneutic circle is also important for research and science. This is the 
case with misunderstandings and preconceptions, which should not affect, for example, 
the content analysis in a negative sense. Also, Karlsen et al. (2020) argue that the 
hermeneutic circle has similarities to abductive content analysis. To both of these 
approaches, the process of understanding is dependent on the interpretative horizon that 
gives meaning to phenomena and experience as a whole. 
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Figure 2. The hermeneutic circle 
Greenhalgh and others (2018) specify various forms of research within the literature 
review, such as probabilistic and hermeneutic understanding. Whereas the probabilistic 
truth is represented in a meta-analysis of a systematic literature review, the narrative 
literature review emphasizes the process of understanding based on interpretation 
(Verstehen). In this study, the literature review means critical reflection and in-depth 
interpretation. Greenhalgh and partners argue that a narrative literature review offers a 
more in-depth interpretation of the research phenomena than, for example, many 
methods in systematic literature research which are especially criticized for shallowness 
(Greenhalgh et al. 2018). 
The fourth step for the literature review is to find a logical structure. In addition to the 
introduction and conclusions, the logical structure of this study is based on the chapters 
“Responsibility and society”, “Bureaucratic theory and hierarchical responsibility”, “NPM 
and responsibility for results” and “NPG and accountability as network accountability”. 
The chapter “Responsibility and society” draws attention to the social and ethical 
framework for the responsibility of public management. This is represented by Habermas' 
philosophy and Schwartz's value theory. In addition to communicative action, the themes 
of the chapter are the democratization of public administration, the idea-based definitions 
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3 RESPONSIBILITY AND SOCIETY 
This chapter looks at public responsibility at the macro level, from a societal perspective. 
Thus, the focus is particularly on the systemic nature of public administration. The reason 
for this is quite simple. If the societal perspective is not taken into account, responsibility 
issues can be reduced to the technical management of processes and results. Effective 
management of inputs and outputs is of course of great importance – but in public 
administration, they also have a social dimension. Responsible public management is a 
subject that requires an ethical basis. Technical rationality provides an ethical basis for 
responsibility, albeit a minimal one. For example, an extremely efficient public 
administration may at the same time be extremely unfair and unethical. Also, through 
communicative rationality, a broader ethical basis for public responsibility can be defined. 
Hence, we suffer from the absence of "metaphysical direction." [...] Technological 
puzzle solving is not sufficient to set a sense of metaphysical direction in 
administration, unless we are willing to say that it is the purpose of administration. 
If we accept these kinds of standards as the criteria for judging the behaviour of 
administrative leadership, then the moral bankruptcy of administration is 
complete in terms of the inadmission of other ethical criteria, e.g. humanistic, 
theological political. (Scott & Hart 2001: 420.) 
Public management requires taking into account the ethical and metaphysical dimension 
so that public responsibility does not become reduced to management under technical 
rationality. Responsible public management cannot and must not be morally bankrupt. 
Technical rationality excludes the metaphysical and ethical questions of accountability, 
which it is unable to address: "its untruth lies not in its analytical method, but in the fact 
that for it the whole process is already decided in advance" (Horkheimer & Adorno 2008: 
46–47). 
3.1 Communicative rationality  
Communicative action is one of the main concepts of Habermas. In this study, Habermas' 
thought is examined particularly through works, Faktizität und Geltung (Between Facts 
and Norms) and Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns (The Theory of Communicative 
Action, Vol. 1 and 2). This study argues that communicative action follows Waldo's 
understanding of administrative science as a democratic theory. Communicative 
rationality constitutes a normative argument against the over-technicalisation of 
administrative science. For example, it opens up how public responsibility is not based 
only on organisational forms of responsibility but also on communicative conditions. 
According to Habermas (1984a: 8–11), rationality can be divided into two different forms: 
cognitive-instrumental rationality and communicative rationality. Cognitive-instrumental 
Acta Wasaensia     31 
rationality is based on the achievement of an instrumental goal or strategic action in which 
people are manipulated to act in the desired way. "A goal-directed action can be rational 
only if the actor satisfies the conditions necessary for realising his intention to intervene 
successfully in the world". (Habermas 1984a: 11). Thus, an action can be considered 
cognitively-meaningfully rational when the actor achieves the goal in the external or social 
world in an effective way. Indeed, Habermas calls cognitive-instrumental rationality 
“realistic”, as it assumes the world as an external state of affairs, in which interventions 
are made based on feedback. In the case of an instrumental objective, the intervention 
takes place in the external world. If, in turn, it is a strategic objective, manipulation occurs 
in the social world.  (Habermas 1984: 10–11.) 
In turn, the aim of communicative rationality is consensus (Habermas 1984a: 8). If an 
action leads to agreement between at least some of the participants, it can be considered 
as a communicatively rational action. Whereas cognitive instrumental action assumes the 
world outside the actor, in communicative rationality the world is understood as a shared 
lifeworld (Lebenswelt), which is mediated by the actors and the meanings they have given 
to the world. Thus, the objectivity of the world is something that is built on communicative 
criteria and the totality of different interpretations. Communicative rationality is based on 
'phenomenology' rather than 'realism', as its focus is on the conditions of communication. 
(Habermas 1984a: 12–13.) Rationality from a phenomenological point of view seems to 
refer to an ideal speech situation in which, in a free and equal discussion, “the best 
argument wins” (Huttunen 2014). 
3.1.1 Lifeworld as a foundation for communication  
To understand what Habermas means by communicative action, it is worth going through 
the concepts of the lifeworld and the system. The lifeworld derives from the 
phenomenology of the philosopher Edmund Husserl (2011). Communicative action relies 
on the lifeworld, which is made up of taken-for-granted background assumptions. The 
interlocutors meet each other through the lifeworld. They can critique and confirm validity 
claims, reconcile their differences and reach consensus. In this way, the lifeworld is based 
on implicit and holistically constructed knowledge, which can never be subordinated to 
propositional knowledge exhaustively. Hence, the lifeworld is intuitively present, familiar 
and transparent. Its assumptions must be met for an actual proposition to be meaningful, 
i.e. valid or invalid.  (Habermas 1984a: 335, 336; Habermas 1984b: 126, 131.) 
The fundamental background knowledge that must tacitly supplement our 
knowledge of the acceptability conditions of linguistically standardized 
expressions if hearers are to be able to understand their literal meanings, has 
remarkable propositions: it is an implicit knowledge that cannot be represented in 
a finite number of propositions; it is a holistically structured knowledge, the basic 
elements of which intrinsically define one another; and it is a knowledge that does 
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not stand at our disposition, inasmuch as we cannot make it conscious and place it 
in doubt as we please. (Habermas 1984a: 336.) 
The lifeworld sets the basis for a communicative situation. In this situation, the subject can 
express its views on the world and justify them from the pre-conditions that govern 
communication. These preconditions are linked to the lifeworld and historical factors. 
According to Habermas, the lifeworld is colonized by the system when traditional forms of 
life are segregated. In this case, the structural components of the lifeworld (culture, society 
and personality) are significantly differentiated. Here, the exchange relations between the 
lifeworld and the system are regulated by differentiated roles, such as being a client in 
administrative bureaucracies or being employed in workplaces. The monetary 
compensation of social rewards is mainly based on consumption and agency. (Habermas 
1984b: 356.) 
There is no doubt that the rationalisation of Western culture has had positive 
consequences. Citizens have the opportunity to express their personalities and judgement 
perhaps more widely than ever before. On the other hand, the negative consequences are 
also undeniable. It has led to a more complex society. It has also led to a shift of 
administrative mechanisms beyond the horizon of the lifeworld, which has undermined 
social openness. In addition to social integration, Habermas speaks of systemic 
integration, which competes with the principle of integration for understanding. This has 
disruptive consequences for the lifeworld. In social integration, the integration of the 
system of action is based on a common understanding, which is achieved communicatively 
or secured normatively. In systemic integration, integration takes place under non-
normative control of the system, independent of individual actors. Systemic integration is 
non-normative, i.e. it is not based on encounters between members of the lifeworld. Thus, 
from a systemic perspective, the lifeworld constitutes its subsystem alongside the economy 
and administration. (Huttunen 2014; Habermas 1984a: 342–343; Habermas 1984b: 115–
116.) 
In fact, in a highly segregated society, the lifeworld is reduced to a subsystem. However, it 
should be noted that the lifeworld always defines the social system as a whole. 
Fundamentally, the administrative and economic subsystems must be anchored to the 
lifeworld. (Habermas 1984b: 154, 173.) This is done through the institutionalisation of law: 
“Simultaneously, interaction contexts are juridically structured – that is, formally 
reorganised in such a way that the participants can refer to legal claims in the case of 
conflict – where previously the conflicts arising in them had been managed on the basis of 
habit, loyalty, or trust” (Habermas 1996: 75). 
It is quite understandable that for the economy and administration, for example, effective 
administrative doctrines are a necessity. However, the criticism regarding the doctrines 
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should not end here. The doctrines do not just simplify communication but reduce it to 
inputs and outputs such as rewards and punishments. Structural violence by the system 
means the systematic restriction of communication. Hence, the lifeworld is not required 
to coordinate action in modern society, as its role is weakened at the expense of efficiency-
oriented administrative doctrines. The worlds of economy and administration reduce the 
costs and risks of communication – and in doing so, mechanise the lifeworld. (Habermas 
1984b: 183, 187.) 
Also, communication about rationality itself and position in society is narrowed to a great 
degree. Reason has never really guided social reality, but now it has been stripped of all 
special inclinations and preferences so thoroughly that it has finally given up judging even 
human actions and lifestyles (Horkheimer 2008: 21). 
This is not all, however. Whether the system likes it or not, it cannot operate independently 
of the lifeworld. There must be a continuous connection between them. The economic and 
administrative worlds get their legitimacy from the processes of the lifeworld. If the 
reproduction of the lifeworld is disrupted, citizens will not give the administration the 
legitimacy it needs. Here, citizens may perceive the government as alien and irrelevant, 
and they may not be motivated to act following with its expectations. 
However, the disconnection of the system from the lifeworld does not necessarily lead to 
a disruption of the reproduction of the lifeworld. From the aspect of communicative 
rationality, the disconnection from the lifeworld is itself a positive thing. However, the 
problem is that the systemic mechanisms re-enter the lifeworld in a colonializing way. 
Habermas calls the colonization of the lifeworld a situation in which the processes of 
renewal and normative regulation of the lifeworld are replaced by the control relations of 
money and power. In the Western countries, this has meant the monetarisation and 
bureaucratisation of the normatively regulated areas of the lifeworld.  (Huttunen 2014.) 
There is a need to analyse administrative doctrines more closely as structures of 
communication. Administration can legitimise and renew its activities while extending its 
power in society. For example, it can systematically exclude different social groups from 
its decision-making. It may rely on seemingly neutral expertise, which limits public debate, 
political argumentation and social participation. These factors are often at the root of the 
administration's communication, or lack thereof. (Forester 1980: 276–277.) However, 
there is at least one big question. Namely, how can the tension between the lifeworld and 
the system be mitigated? 
Acta Wasaensia     34 
3.1.2 Facticity and validity  
In Between Facts and Norms (Faktizität und Geltung) Habermas (1996) examines how 
the rule of law can form valid norms. For Habermas, valid norm formation requires 
communicative action that is as free as possible from manipulation (Huttunen & 
Heikkinen 1998). To explain how this is possible, he uses the distinction between facticity 
and validity in his analysis.  
The concept of facticity concerns not only the written law but also the "unwritten" law and 
the means of action adopted in practice to apply the law. The facticity of a norm indicates 
its compelling force. If a person violates a de facto norm, he can be censored or punished. 
(Huttunen 2014.) "I understand 'action norms' as temporally, socially, and substantively 
generalized behavioral expectations. I include among 'those affected' (or involved) anyone 
whose interests are touched by the foreseeable consequences of a general practice 
regulated by the norms at issue" (Habermas 1996: 107). 
Huttunen (2014) uses the school and the curriculum as an exemplary institution for the 
reality of norms. The curriculum is not only composed of laws or regulations. It also 
consists of how a school should operate. In addition to the written curriculum and other 
administrative regulations, numerous de facto norms are not found anywhere in a 
declared way (Huttunen 2014). 
Now, let's think about the administrative doctrines through facticity. In terms of norms, 
public administration is based, first of all, on law and written law. However, it is not 
reduced to their imperative nature. Administrative doctrines consist of accepted 
management practices that seek to apply the law. They also set out, either explicitly or 
implicitly, what is considered responsible public management. Public responsibility would 
also justify a critical examination of the implicit norms found in the administrative 
doctrines. Otherwise, the unstated norms of these doctrines may affect public 
management in an unforeseeable way. 
According to Habermas, normatively significant communication in society can only take 
place through the law, which is based on communicative action: “In modern societies as 
well, the law can fulfill the function of stabilizing behavioural expectations only if it 
preserves an internal connection with the socially integrating force of communicative 
action” (Habermas 1996: 84). 
This cannot be done by living communication alone, which is regarded as inefficient from 
an economic and administrative point of view. "The circuit of lifeworld communication is 
interrupted at the points where it runs into the media of money and administrative power, 
which are deaf to messages in ordinary language; for these special codes not only have 
been differentiated from a more richly structured ordinary language but have been 
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separated off from it as well. [...] Law thus functions as the "transformer" that first 
guarantees that the socially integrating network of communication stretched across society 
as a whole holds together" (Habermas 1996: 56). 
The tension between validity and facticity can be explored as shown in Figure 3 below. 
Validity refers to the validity of a norm from the point of view of those concerned. The 
validity of a norm refers to a situation where a rational and free discussion between the 
parties concerned has led to a consensus on the validity of the norms of action. Thus, 
facticity is the very opposite of validity – since it refers to the laws, regulations and rules 
that are actually in force. The idea is that the closer validity and facticity are to each other, 
the closer the community is to an ideal state. In reality, the validity and the facticity of a 
norm never correspond. (Habermas 1992; Huttunen 2014.)  
 
 
Figure 3. The tension between validity and facticity (Huttunen & Heikkinen 1998, 
adapted).  
Since the facticity of administrative norms never equals validity, one may ask the 
following. What is the use of such a task of Sisyphus anyway? One answer for this is that 
perhaps society can never be a fully ideal democracy, but it is worth striving for. This, at 
least, is the normative assumption of research. The second question relates to the idea of 
democracy. Public responsibility has traditionally been considered through the politics-
administration dichotomy (Svara 2007: 4–5). Should not the principle of democracy be 
left at the level of politics – and out of public management? 
The answer to this could be next. Responsible public management cannot only mean being 
in line with the politics-administration dichotomy. For Habermas, procedural democracy 
VALIDITY
Consensus on the validity of norms 
between the participants of rational and 
free discussion
FACTICITY
The de-facto accepted binding nature of a norm, 
which guides people's expectations of action and 
is a prerequisite for social integration
Administrative principles, relationships and 
practices
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is about undistorted communication in society so that the reproduction of the lifeworld is 
best guaranteed. Obviously, this distortion does not follow the logic of the dichotomy. The 
instrumentality of administrative action does not obviate the need to evaluate it from a 
discourse-ethical point of view. On the very contrary, the process of colonization shows 
that the administration can formulate its principles (at least partly) for its action, which 
are disadvantageous to society as a whole: “If the discourse of experts is not coupled with 
democratic opinion- and will-formation, then the experts' perception of problems will 
prevail at the citizens' expense. However, every difference of interpretation of this sort 
must, from the standpoint of the public of citizens, be seen as further confirmation of a 
systems paternalism that endangers legitimacy" (Habermas 1996: 350–351). As Habermas 
writes, it is ultimately also a question of the legitimacy of the administration since it is 
connected to the reproduction of the lifeworld. 
Therefore, the public manager is a representative of two worlds – the lifeworld and the 
system of technical rationality. The separation of administrative action from subjective 
considerations represents, in part, the disconnection between these two worlds. This 
means that responsible public managers should be aware that they should not only 
implement the technical objectives of administrative action, but also the moral norms that 
emerge through communicative rationality (Ahn 2009). 
Habermas' work can be best understood through the themes of modernity, rationality, its 
universal nature – and perhaps its downfall. Still, all is most definitely not lost. In terms 
of pessimism and optimism about modernism and rationality, Habermas is somewhere 
between Durkheim and Weber. He simply analyses the sources of the crisis and offers 
remedies. For Habermas, rationality opens, structures, enables – and on the other hand – 
it imposes, tears apart, obscures (Hoffrén 1999: 287). The contradictory nature of 
rationality is also central, if not the most central, for administrative science. 
Administrative structures that are intended to reproduce a functionally complex and 
rational society produce negative consequences for society. This highlights how both 
public administration and administrative science are the projects of modernity and its 
belief in rationality.  
What criteria, then, should be used to assess the communicativeness of administrative 
doctrines to bring the facticity and validity of norms closer? To answer this question, it is 
necessary to go through Habermas' discourse ethics. 
3.1.3 Discourse ethics and ideal speech situation  
According to Habermas, the validity of a norm is based on the principle of discourse. A 
norm is valid if it is accepted by all participants in rational discourse. The principle of 
egalitarianism can also be found within the principle of discourse. Consensus on norms 
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emerges from open discussion. Discourse is also guided by the principle of 
universalization: only those norms are acceptable that can be accepted by all participants. 
The acceptability of a norm is judged by all the consequences that would result for them 
from following it. Communicative discourse, based on the principles of discourse, 
egalitarianism and universality, produces intersubjectively generated norms which, for 
Habermas, are universally accepted. Habermas argues that any norm can be critically 
tested against these principles. (Habermas 1990: 66; Hoffrén 1999: 289, 292–293). 
From these principles, more general criteria for communicative discourse can be derived. 
The principles of discourse and universality imply a relationship between participants, 
whereby each participant recognises the right of each participant to accept or not to accept 
norms. Thus, the terms of communication involve a kind of minimal ethic. They require 
egalitarian neutrality of political and moral norms. This, in turn, has implications for the 
system of rights and fundamental rights. The legitimacy of law is based on the legal 
institutionalisation of the conditions of communication and the guarantee of private and 
public autonomy that it provides for citizens. The consequence of the intrinsic rationality 
of communicative action is that political and administrative authority must be derived 
from the people and their communicative power. Citizens legislate for themselves in a 
discursively constructed process of opinion and will formation. (Habermas 1990: 197; 
Hoffrén 1999: 296–297.) In such a situation, the norm can be considered valid. 
Citizens are often critical of government communication, which is of course their implicit 
responsibility. Administrative systems can be effective, but only in limited areas: “Hence 
they depend on affected clients as citizens to instruct them about their external costs and 
the negative effects of their internal failures” (Habermas 1996: 350).  
The above principles of discourse ethics can be put into more practical terms through an 
ideal speech situation. According to Habermas, an ideal speech situation is one in which 
ideal conditions prevail, and the best argument wins. These conditions are not constrained 
by power or ideology. Although Habermas later stopped talking about the ideal speech 
situation, the idea is considered a permanent feature of Habermas' work. (Huttunen 2007; 
Huttunen 2014.) 
An ideal speech situation contains four conditions or "postulates". For this study, they will 
be referred to as “principles”. These are the principle of openness, the principle of freedom 
of speech, the principle of authenticity and the principle of reciprocity (Habermas 1980: 
86; Huttunen 2014). The principle of openness is based on the idea of keeping the 
discourse open to claims and counterclaims, questions and answers. Also, every 
participant must be allowed to take part in the discussion. According to the principle of 
freedom of speech, the freedom to interpret and criticise claims leads to the absence of 
unreflected biases that would interfere with communication. In this case, each participant 
is allowed to question any claim in the debate. The principle of openness and the principle 
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of freedom of speech allows for a communicative action in which the principle of 
authenticity and the principle of reciprocity is put into practice. In this case, each 
participant expresses his or her beliefs, wishes and needs in the debate (principle of 
authenticity). In addition, participants have equal opportunities to be accountable and to 
demand accountability from other participants in the discussion (principle of reciprocity). 
Furthermore, no participant should be prevented from exercising the rights represented 
by the preceding rules. 
Other definitions of the ideal speech situation have been offered. For example, discourse 
ethics has been further developed by Björn Gustavsen (1992). The democratic dialogue he 
characterises is applied in communicative action research and the organisation of work 
conferences (Lehtonen 2004). Gustavsen's democratic dialogue can be presented 
according to the following rules: 
1. The dialogue is based on an exchange of ideas between the participants. 
2. Everyone concerned must be able to participate in the debate. 
3. The opportunity to participate is not enough. All participants must be active. 
4. All participants are equal. This means reducing power and knowledge differences 
between participants. 
5. The genuine experiences of all participants are justified. 
6. All participants must understand what is being discussed. 
7. All the arguments raised on the subject under discussion are legitimate and cannot 
be dismissed without sufficient scrutiny. 
8. Opinions are expressed orally, not just on paper. 
9. Each participant must accept that other participants may have better arguments 
than him/herself. 
10. Each participant's job role and authority, etc. can be discussed. 
11. The dialogue must produce decisions that can lead to concrete action. (Gustavsen 
1992; Stansbury 2009; Lehtonen 2004: 17-18.) 
The meaningfulness of discourse is generally assessed by four criteria, which are the 
requirements for clarity, sincerity, legitimacy and truth. First, the discourse must be clear 
and coherent. From the point of view of the public administration, there can be no 
contradictory objectives in its activities. The debate must be based on honesty, i.e. on the 
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fact that the discourse means what it says. The public administration must do what it 
claims to do. The debate must take place in the right context. The words and meanings 
used for the public administration mean what they should. The discussion must be 
truthful. It also should be based on facts, not on lies or opinions. (Forester 1980: 278; 
Hyyryläinen 2014: 299.) 
The validity of the discourse is called into question if the fulfilment of any criterion is 
doubtful. The facts on which arguments are based may not be reliable or they may be 
arbitrarily weighted. There is not always consensus on the meaning of the concepts used. 
Words can rarely match actions. Discourse may be complicated by contradictory elements. 
(Hyyryläinen 2014: 299.) From the perspective of public administration, the validity of 
discourse goes back to the legitimacy, i.e. the credibility of public administration in the 
eyes of citizens. 
Through the lens of communicative action, public responsibility is a communicative 
phenomenon that can be explored through the following example questions. Is the public 
manager's communication clear so that everyone understands what he or she is doing? Are 
the terms used in the debate exclusively technical? Is the public manager's speech based 
on honesty, or does he mislead? Does he or she exploit the goodwill and lack of information 
of his or her listeners? Is the speech legitimate and appropriate to the context? Does the 
public manager abuse his or her professional status when taking into account the 
involvement of the person concerned? Is communication based on truth or is it false? Is 
there evidence for the public manager's claims? What do the other participants say? 
Communicatively responsible public management 
In terms of communicative rationality, the responsibility of public management is best 
ensured by critically assessing the communicativeness of administrative doctrines. But 
what can be considered as communicatively responsible public management in practice (a 
positive definition of communicative responsibility)? Communicative responsibility is 
close to Dubnick's (2011) mention of accountability as an ontological concept. In this case, 
accountability relations are understood as the creation of the fundamental relations of 
society, thus constituting governance in general: “Governance takes place within 
accountability spaces and we need to give priority to research that maps that space as a 
first step towards understanding the nature and potential of accountable governance” 
(Dubnick 2011: 704).  In this study, this ontology of accountability is explored through 
Habermas' philosophy. Using discourse ethics, a normative basis for the ontology of 
accountability relations in governance can be provided by the criteria of communicative 
action. 
Communicatively responsible public management subscribes to the view of the integrity 
perspective that public agency is determined by societal and collective values, not to forget 
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the public sector ethos. Since public managers have great freedom to apply their value 
orientations in decision-making, they should be expected to be capable of high ethical 
reasoning. The neutrality of public managers does not, therefore, imply value relativism – 
or that public managers do not have any values. On the contrary, in communicative terms, 
neutrality is based on the will-formation of procedural democracy and its processes. 
Seeing accountability as mechanistic compliance can further undermine the value 
foundation of public administration because it focuses on formal and instrumental 
communication. In an increasingly complex society, institutions have imposed formal 
mechanisms and norms. In this case, the technical control through money and power 
replace the processes of reproduction of the lifeworld. The control is based on 
bureaucratisation, which can undermine citizen trust in the public administration. Thus, 
in addition to individual integrity, communicatively responsible public management is a 
matter of improving institutional integrity. Administrative doctrines should not focus too 
much on individualistic presumptions, since communication is always dependent on the 
nature of public institutions. 
Emphasising moral reasoning, rather than just preventing unethical behaviour, is a way to 
improve the ethical culture and climate of public administration. The standards of 
communicatively responsible public management are based on social responsibility.  
However, the validity of norms depends on their communicativeness. Communicatively 
responsible public management pays attention to the principles of clarity, honesty, 
legitimacy and truthfulness. The argument is that openness and transparency towards the 
public will, in the long run, enhance the legitimacy of public administration. 
The key accountability relationship that defines governance is the horizontal relationship 
between the public administration and the citizen. Naturally, this means increasing 
horizontal accountability mechanisms. The democratic perspective of accountability 
emphasises accountability as a controlling and justifying function of the public 
administration. 
Finally, communicatively responsible public management takes into account a dialogical, 
language-based and dialectical approach. However, new organisational practices in 
governance (such as contracting, outsourcing, networking) can undermine dialogue and 
transparency in public action. New practices should therefore be assessed not only in 
terms of economic efficiency but also through communicative rationality. 
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3.2 Responsibility as democratisation  
Communication is partly determined through culture. This is also true of the system of 
rights. It is up to citizens themselves to claim and develop their rights in a given social 
context. (Hoffrén 1999: 297.) Shalom Schwartz's (1999, 2005) theory of values empirically 
shows how the democratisation of public administration affects equality, social justice and 
the universality of values in society.  If public management does not pay attention to 
democracy, it may not only erode the legitimacy of public administration but also the value 
base of society. Hence, there is an undeniable social dimension to public responsibility.  
According to Schwartz, there are common values independent of cultural factors. The 
words that describe these values have roughly the same meaning in different languages 
and cultures. Cultural values express implicitly or explicitly shared abstract ideas about 
what is good, just and desirable in society. These cultural values form the basis of the 
norms through which social institutions such as the family or the political system operate. 
For example, leaders may refer to shared cultural values when justifying their actions in 
an organisation. (Schwartz 1999.) Schwartz identifies seven types of cultural values that 












Figure 4. Types of cultural values (Schwartz 1999: 29)  
Figure 4 shows that these cultural values operate in tension with each other. This can be 
broken down into three different cultural tensions. According to Schwartz, the 
fundamental issue that affects all societies is the relationship between the individual and 
the group. This dimension is generally described by the dichotomy of individualism and 
collectivism. A collectivist evaluation of the relationship may argue that the individual's 
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view embeddedness, which emphasises the importance of the group over the individual 
and the permanence of social relations rather than change. Schwartz calls the primacy of 
the individual, in turn, intellectual and affective autonomy. Intellectual autonomy refers 
to the autonomous freedom of individuals to pursue their own ideas and intellectual 
orientations. Affective autonomy, on the other hand, implies the freedom of individuals to 
achieve positive experiences, for example in the form of pleasure or exciting and varied 
life. (Schwartz 1999: 26–27.) 
By hierarchy, Schwartz means a cultural orientation that highlights inequalities in social 
relations and power. The opposite of hierarchy is egalitarianism, where people perceive 
each other as morally equal and as individuals sharing basic human needs. Individuals 
socialised into egalitarianism have a universal interest in the well-being of all – their values 
transcend mere selfish interests. The third and final theme that concerns all societies is 
the relationship of humanity to the natural and social world. One response to this is based 
on the control and transformation of the world according to individualistic preferences or 
group preferences. By this Schwartz means mastery, a cultural orientation that emphasises 
control promotes values such as ambition, success, daring and competence. The opposite 
of mastery is harmony, which highlights unity with the environment. The cultural type of 
harmony includes, for example, the value of nature conservation (Schwartz 1999: 27–28). 
Egalitarian universalism is concerned with the welfare and well-being of all people, which 
is reflected in the pursuit of social justice and equality. However, universalistic values are 
not equally inclusive in all societies, as their meaning varies from one society to another: 
one can therefore speak of societies with a broad or narrow moral universe. In societies 
with a large moral universe, universalistic values cover all groups in society. Conversely, 
in narrow societies, the values are thought to apply only to a small community, i.e. a group 
of close people. (Schwartz 2005: 217.) 
Why does the scope of universalistic values in societies vary? Schwartz has explored this 
through three different cultural characteristics that increase or decrease the scope of 
values. These are (1) a cultural orientation that highlights egalitarianism, (2) a cultural 
orientation that emphasises the commitment of individuals to social groups, i.e. a 
restriction and orientation to the inner group, and (3) the degree of democratisation of 
governance, i.e. the nature of the administrative system. (Schwartz 2005: 226–227.)  
Ethical universalism is a core principle of good governance: however, populism and ethical 
particularism are challenging universalism in political arenas (Mungiu-Pippidi 2020). 
This may have long-term consequences for the implementation of various forms of 
accountability, such as the prevention of corruption. With respect to good governance, 
neutral public administration is preferable to highly politicised governance (Dahlström & 
Lapuente 2017).  
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In an egalitarian society, there is a strong orientation towards equality. Citizens are 
socialised to experience each other as equals, which also implies a commonality of 
interests. Schwartz argues that a stronger cultural orientation towards equality is likely to 
be related to the extent of the moral universe. In an egalitarian society, citizens agree to 
cooperate voluntarily to manage interdependencies. Moreover, citizens are interested in 
the well-being of all. (Schwartz 2005: 224–226.) Examples of egalitarianism include 
market orientation and individualism, which can generate moral conflicts and dilemmas 
in society (Sandel 2012). 
Schwartz refers to the phenomenon of restriction and protection by the inner group, where 
the culture maintains the status quo and limits the solidarity of the inner group. In this 
case, individuals have collectively attached individuals who identify with the ingroup, 
participate in a common way of life and pursue common goals. The ingroup has clear 
boundaries with outsiders. The assumption is that society's orientation towards cultural 
protection is linked to the narrowness of the moral universe. The second hypothesis is that 
societies' protectionism is reflected in the value space by mixing of universalism values 
with benevolence or other moral values that are oriented closer to the immediate circle of 
individuals. (Schwartz 2005: 226.) 
The third and final factor influencing the scope of the moral universe is the nature of the 
political system and the degree of democracy. Democracies are characterised by the 
promotion of individual rights, freedom and equality. Democracies require every citizen to 
take responsibility for political participation. A high degree of democratisation means 
more rights, freedoms and responsibilities for citizens. In its ideal form, democracy does 
not segregate ethnic, religious or political groups, nor does it give them special rights, 
obligations or disadvantages. Thus, the structure and ideology of democracies contribute 
to the expansion of the moral universe of citizens. Conversely, in a less democratic political 
system, some groups are privileged and others are less privileged, which indicates a 
shrinking moral universe. (Schwartz 2005: 226–227.) 
According to Schwartz (1999: 31), Finland, for example, is an egalitarian society in terms 
of cultural values, i.e. one that promotes social justice and equality. Finland is both morally 
broad and democratic. Also, in the Finnish state administration, the principles of legality 
and responsibility have a very high status (Moilanen 2016). It can be argued that in an 
ethically universalistic country public responsibility is of great importance for the 
legitimacy of public action. 
By moral scope, Schwartz means values such as equality, broad-mindedness and social 
justice, which represent a separate value component of universalism. Thus, they are not 
confused with the value components of benevolence, tradition or conformity to tradition. 
Instead, the degree of democracy refers to the extent of civil rights (e.g. freedom to speak, 
Acta Wasaensia     44 
write and assemble) and political rights (e.g. the right to vote, to stand for election). 
(Schwartz 2005: 225.) 
3.3 Idea and ideology-based public administration  
Changes in administrative systems are shaped by historical and ideological issues. 
Administrative doctrines do not emerge in a vacuum, as they are influenced by ideological 
assumptions and historical ideologies (Abel & Sementelli 2007).   These changes are linked 
to the exchange between the lifeworld and the system. How the state is perceived affects 
the responsibilities of public management. 
Responsible public management fundamentally presupposes the existence of the public 
interest and the state. The public interest can be conceptualised in terms of two arguments: 
(1) the public interest is based on social institutions that transcend individual preferences; 
(2) the maintenance of these institutions has historically required the state. Different 
characterisations of the public interest reflect a belief in the state as a solution to social 
problems. This can be elaborated through the concepts of the pro-state and the pro-
market. Of these, the pro-state is understood as a phenomenon of the public interest that 
requires a large state. For the pro-market, the public interest implies the relative freedom 
of individuals, markets and civil society from the state. (Autioniemi 2017: 7–9.) 
Historically, the responsibilities of the state have changed in waves – and will probably 
continue to do so. In the early modern period, the mercantilist state regulated trade and 
commerce, and its responsibilities were framed in terms of civil society and freedom. In 
the 17th century, state intervention was viewed more critically than before and economic 
activity was thought to be based on the natural order. The same idea prevailed in early 19th-
century liberalism, with its emphasis on the freedom of enterprise. However, at the end of 
the century, the idea of a broader responsibility for the state emerged as freedom of trade 
and industrialisation led to the impoverishment of some sections of the population. Night-
watchman state was now rivalled by the service state, which was also influenced by the 
emergence of socialist movements. (Vartola 2005: 35–36; Salminen 2002: 35.) 
The Finnish nation-state, in the form of Snellman's doctrine of nationalism, is strongly 
defined by Hegelian philosophy. With Snellman, a disciple of Hegel, the concept of 
bureaucracy also came to Finland. At the end of the 19th century, Finnish state thinking 
was based on etatism, or state-centrism, which remained the dominant principle long after 
independence. (Vartola 2005: 17–18.) Liberal and Hegelian state thinking can be 
distinguished: whereas for the former market relations mean freedom and state coercion, 
for the latter the opposite is true. 
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In the liberal tradition, civil society refers to an arena of interaction between equal citizens 
based on mutual agreement, where the state is given the right to exercise power. While 
citizens pursue their economic interests, the action is ultimately for the good of society as 
a whole by an invisible hand. In the liberal tradition, politics is about reconciling interests. 
In the Hegelian framework, the principles that define civil society and the economic 
activity that takes place within it are not imposed by the people themselves, nor are the 
interests that take place within civil society shared. The Hegelian critique of the liberal 
tradition is based on the view that the order of civil society depends on the active 
intervention of the state. The economic interests of citizens are seen in the Hegelian 
tradition as the opposite of the common interest. Only in the state is the moral agency and 
freedom of citizens possible. (Hautamäki 1996: 32–33; Smith 2015; Hegel 1821; Beiser 
2005: 249.) 
Because of its Hegelian background, the spirit of the Finnish nation-state is one of supra-
individuality. The pre-Hegelian Enlightenment individualistic view of the state or nation-
state perceives their value only indirectly or relatively in terms of the benefits they bring 
to the individual. Hegel strongly opposed this view. In Hegel's philosophy, the individual 
is a member in a larger, supra-individual context. Also, the rational and objective world 
spirit is in its highest form in the state. Snellman formed the view that the essence of the 
state consists in the nationality, the national spirit. (Grotenfelt 1927; Hegel 1817; Beiser 
2005: 244–245; Pulkkinen 1983: 73–74.) 
Although Hegelian philosophy defends individualist rights and liberal values, it differs 
from the liberal tradition in four ways. Hegel challenged the economic doctrine of classical 
liberalism, according to which market freedom would benefit all parties. For Hegel, 
advocating the freedoms of civil society also meant the control of market forces by the 
state. While full laissez-faire is an untenable position, markets should not be over-
regulated. Second, Hegel opposed the general doctrine of classical liberalism, according to 
which the responsibility of the state is exclusively to safeguard natural rights and market 
freedoms. Hegel argues that such a doctrine leads to a decentralised society of individuals 
pursuing their own self-interest, which also leads to the disappearance of the public 
interest. Third, Hegel calls into question the social contract theory, since the identity of the 
individual is based on society and the state – meaning there are no independent agents “in 
the state of nature”. Fourth, Hegel does not accept the liberals' strictly negative conception 
of freedom, whereby freedom is made possible by the absence of external restraint. (Beiser 
2005: 229-230; Hautamäki 1996: 33.) 
According to Habermas, liberal and statist approaches have different views of the 
democratic process. According to the liberal view, the democratic process takes the form 
of competing interests alone. Trade-offs are compensated through universal and equal 
voting rights, the representative composition of parliamentary bodies, decision-making, 
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rules of procedure, and so on. Such rules are ultimately justified in terms of fundamental 
liberal rights. (Habermas 1996: 296.) 
In contrast, the state-centered or republican approach is based on the view that the 
constitution is designed to restrain the government through normative provisions such as 
fundamental rights, separation of powers and statutory control. In addition, the 
constitution motivates the state to take into account different societal starting points and 
value judgements. According to Habermas, this view is based on an unrealistic assumption 
of a civil society capable of collective action. The state-centered approach is not so much 
oriented towards the rational formation of political will but towards the balancing of the 
government. (Habermas 1996: 297–298.) 
The procedural democracy advocated by Habermas is based on intersubjectivity, which is 
neither market- nor state-centered. Discourse ethics allows for the formation of rational 
opinions on socially relevant issues that need to be regulated. According to Habermas, 
deliberative politics is not based on the collective action of citizens, but on the institutional 
processes from which deliberation is possible. Procedural democracy understands the 
constitution as a question of how to institutionalise the structures of communication 
generating democratic will formation. Similarly, the liberal model does not depend on the 
democratic sovereignty of citizens who are deliberating. Rather, its focus is on the 
constitution, which guarantees individual starting points for the pursuit of happiness. 
(Habermas 1996: 297–298.) 
According to Habermas, the basis of the democratic process lies in deliberative politics. 
Fair outcomes are achieved if the flow of relevant information and its proper treatment is 
not obstructed. According to this view, rationality is no longer based on universal human 
rights or the ethical content of a particular community, but on discursive ethical principles 
whose normativity rests on consensus-building. This normativity derives from the 
structure and forms of communication. (Habermas 1996: 296–297.) 
Thus, procedural democracy does not follow the logic of the market nor the state: “At any 
rate, this concept of democracy no longer has to operate with the notion of a social whole 
centered in the state and imagined as a goal-oriented subject writ large. Nor does it 
represent the whole in a system of constitutional norms mechanically regulating the 
balance of power and interests in accordance with a market model" (Habermas 1996: 298). 
3.4 Responsibility as good governance  
Responsibility is also about good governance. The concept was originally coined by the 
World Bank (1992). Good governance is a process whereby rules and well-functioning 
institutions are used to promote democracy, human rights, order and security. Good 
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governance is an institutional component of economic, social and political performance. 
Governance is linked to its concrete manifestations, such as public management and 
governance reforms. (Tiihonen 2008: 18, 39; Nag 2018.) 
The right to good governance is a fundamental right and part of European administrative 
law. A specific feature of this right is the individual and the binding nature. Everyone can 
invoke good governance in his or her own case and expect it to be implemented in practice. 
For example, according to the Constitution of Finland (section 21), everyone has the right 
to have his or her affairs handled properly and without undue delay by the competent 
authority established by law. This implies respect for fundamental procedural rights, such 
as publicity, the right to be heard and the right to appeal. (Mäenpää 2002: 4–5.)  
Mäenpää (2002) mentions principles of good governance in the Finnish framework. First, 
administrative action must not be based on improper or otherwise alien criteria 
(objektiviteettiperiaate). It must be based on impartiality and objectively justifiable 
criteria. Second, public action must be proportionate, generally in accordance with the 
principle of reasonableness (suhteellisuusperiaate). Also, powers can only be used for the 
purpose for which they are defined or otherwise intended (tarkoitussidonnaisuuden 
periaate). Public action must not be based on discrimination or favouritism on grounds 
such as origin, religion, sex, age, political or social beliefs, trade union activities or other 
similar grounds (yhdenvertaisuusperiaate). In addition, public authorities need to take 
into account legitimate expectations protected by the rule of law 
(luottamuksensuojaperiaate). In other words, individuals should have the right to rely on 
the actions of public authorities under certain, justified conditions. (Mäenpää 2002: 127–
131.) 
The United Nations has adopted eight principles of good governance: (1) participation, (2) 
rule of law, (3) transparency, (4) responsiveness, (5) consensus orientation, (6) equity and 
inclusiveness, (7) effectiveness and efficiency and (8) accountability (UNESCAP 2009). 
Good governance has often been associated with the principles and values associated with 
democracy, which in Western countries is mainly understood as measures to improve 
citizen participation and empowerment. This means transparency in political decision-
making and governance – not to forget responsiveness and accountability, of course. Thus, 
good governance is approached in a context where governance values vary according to 
the sector in which they are applied. Administrative values are also influenced by 
international debates and pressures for reform, which means that traditional 
administrative values such as fairness, equality, objectivity and transparency are changing. 
These values are being challenged by market-oriented approaches such as competition and 
privatisation. In this changing context, values are increasingly following those of the 
private sector. (Viinamäki 2008: 67–68.) 
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The principles of good governance may be lacking concreteness. Also, it might be hard to 
disagree with the principles as such. Habermas criticizes legal principles for their abstract 
nature. Instead, the legal dimension should above all refer to the concrete conditions for 
the creation of laws and norms (Habermas 1996: 265). This implies a critique of the 
communicative structures of public administration and an examination of the procedural 
conditions of democracy. In practice, it can mean listening to marginalised groups and 
concretely exercising formally equal rights of participation. In discourse ethics, the 
rationality of legal decisions does not only mean the appropriateness of the arguments 
used but the structures of the argumentative process (Habermas 1996: 226). 
3.5 Conclusions 
Public responsibility is based on the question of the common good. The question of what 
is socially just is partly an ideological question. The question covers a wide range of 
questions, such as the size and financing of the public sector, the production of public 
services and the relationship between the public and private sectors. 
Administrative reforms have influenced the development of public administration 
throughout history. One key factor in this is the social transformation of rationality into 
technical rationality (Horkheimer 2008: 32–33). On the other hand, public administration 
is not reformed on pragmatic or technical grounds alone. It is also influenced by the values 
of each society and culture. These values are the starting points from which social 
institutions such as the administrative system operate. 
According to Schwartz (2005), the extent of the moral universe of a society is influenced 
by the nature of the political system and the degree of democracy. Public administration 
influences the moral universe of a given society. Technical rationality and structural 
violence can lead to the diminishing of the moral universe in society. Bad or critical 
governance leads to the privileging of some groups and the marginalisation of others, to a 
reduction in the participation of citizens and to a reduction in their rights, freedoms and 
responsibilities (Schwartz 2005: 226–227). 
Responsible public management should be normative towards social institutions. 
Habermas argues that communicative action is procedurally democratic by virtue of its 
inherent conditions. If normative conditions are violated, the conditions of 
communicativeness and the ontological foundations of the intersubjective agency are 
violated. On this basis, communicatively responsible public management highlights the 
views of increasing equality and democratisation of governance. Applying the moral theory 
by Schwartz, responsible public management should dismantle unnecessary hierarchies 
and inequalities in power and social relations. Hence, public management promotes 
egalitarian and universalistic principles in its action. 
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The technical rationality of government produces structural violence that undermines not 
only the democratic will formation or the rationality of the legal system but the 
communicative basis of rationality itself. This is a central problem for this study. The 
problem is related to the realisation of social justice. Since communicative rationality is 
based on the democratic will formation and the rational action of the citizens, they have 
the freedom and responsibility to demand responsibility from their government. Also, the 
citizen is entitled to remind the public administration of the relationship between the 
lifeworld and the system. The lifeworld does not rely on the system, but the system and its 
subsystems rely on the lifeworld. The administrative system must be created not 
independently of the citizens, but from within their will formation. In this case, the validity 
and facticity of the norms of public administration are close to each other. 
What can be concluded from this? Communicative rationality can be considered 
phenomenological, as it is based on a shared lifeworld (Huttunen 2014). Public 
administration and its doctrines of governance should not be assumed to be objective 
expertise but should be approached with a hermeneutic or understanding approach. They 
are states of affairs whose existence is influenced by citizens through their own actions, 
understandings and preconceptions. Public administration is not necessarily rational for 
the reason that rationality is a force outside humanity. Instead, the rationality of 
government is something whose conditions each citizen can judge from his or her very own 
social being. 
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4 BUREAUCRATIC THEORY: RESPONSIBILITY AS COMPLIANCE 
We are simple clerks who can barely understand an identity card and who have 
nothing to do with your business except to guard you for ten hours a day and get 
paid for it. (Kafka, The Trial) 
Peters (2014) mentions four accountability arrangements: hierarchy, reciprocity, 
competition and contrived randomness. Of these, hierarchy is probably the most familiar 
instrument for public administration. In public administration, it is assumed that the civil 
servant is accountable to his or her superiors in the organisation. More generally, civil 
servants are held accountable to the minister and the minister in turn to parliament. 
Reciprocity refers to the mutual observation and control of civil servants and public 
organisations. At the most basic level, it can mean mutual evaluation between civil 
servants. Critics argue that reciprocity adds unnecessary duplication and administrative 
inefficiency. On the other hand, reciprocity is necessary for accountability. A third 
accountability mechanism is competition, whereby competing in a (quasi-)market 
increases organisational efficiency and accountability for results. Finally, organised 
randomness means an external review or audit. (Peters 2014: 217–221.) All these forms of 
accountability are present in the administrative doctrines. Of the accountability-
enhancing arrangements, the hierarchy is most strongly implemented by bureaucratic 
responsibility, which we will discuss in this chapter. 
The word “bureaucracy” is thought to have been first used by the physiocrat Jean de 
Gournay in 1759. By bureaucracy, he meant the disregard of the citizen by royal officials 
for the exercise of power and their focus on pursuing their own interests. Of course, 
bureaucracy has also been used in a positive sense. Hegel was the first to use the term to 
refer to a civil service whose central function was to look after the public interest. (Vartola 
2005: 17.) 
4.1 Weber's definition of bureaucracy  
Bureaucratic responsibility cannot be assessed without Max Weber's theory of 
bureaucracy. The theory was part of Weber's sociology of management or governance and 
became the founding theory of public administration globally: many call it the world's first 
organisational theory (Vartola 2011: 28). Weber presents his theory of bureaucracy in his 
posthumously published Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, Grundriss der Verstehenden 
Soziologie (1922). 
Weber's aim was not to create a theory of management or the best possible organisation 
but to define the sociological model of bureaucracy.  According to Weber, the phenomenon 
of bureaucracy must be understood in logical-historical terms. The ideal model of 
bureaucracy is based on the reproduction of rational ideals in society.  The triumph of 
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capitalism through Protestant ethics required a rational legal system to regulate trade and 
the economy. It also organised state systems and citizenship in the context of public 
administration. Furthermore, capitalism required a predictable, reliable system of 
governing and administration that obeyed its rulers. The legal norms of the rational-legal 
system of governance were goal- or value-oriented in nature, applying to all those 
governed. Every citizen was in principle on an equal footing, which meant that privileges 
and systems of favouritism were, in principle, abolished. (Vartola 2005: 18–20.) 
Thus, the capitalist system has historically demanded responsibility from public 
administration. Weber argues that only Western countries knew the state as a political 
institution with rationally regulated constitutions and rights. Here, public administration 
is governed by rational and prescribed rules and laws implemented by professional civil 
servants (Weber 1980: 12). 
According to Weber, bureaucracy is the most socially rational and efficient of the three 
forms of authority: traditional, charismatic and bureaucratic authority. Traditional 
authority is defined by the position of the leader in the community, while charismatic 
authority is defined by the character of the leader. Bureaucratic authority, in turn, is based 
on written rules and formal accountability. Bureaucracy is characterised by prescribed and 
formal areas of executive authority, which are prescribed by law or administrative 
regulations. The hierarchy of offices is based on a strictly regulated system whereby lower 
offices are managed by higher ones. The worker is required to work full time and 
continuously. Management requires in-depth training and is based on written documents 
so that the rules are general, stable, exhaustive and easy to learn. Weber meant two 
different things by saying that bureaucracy is the most rational and efficient form of 
government. First, bureaucracy was the most rational and efficient in the historical sense. 
No other culture had been able to create, for example, a form of government that was as 
reliable, predictable or precise. Second, bureaucracy was a rational instrument for 
disciplining citizens, since it was created to guarantee the internal and external security of 
society. The primary functions of the state are related to internal order, security, 
combating external threats, warfare and tax collection. (Weber 1922; Allen 2004: 100; 
Vartola 2005: 18–22; Hood 1976; Peters 1996.) 
Habermas criticises Weber for neglecting the relationship of bureaucratic administration 
to social integration, which tends to instrumentalise communication between 
administration and society: “According to Weber, the constitutional state does not [...] 
draw its legitimation from the democratic form of the political will-formation of citizens. 
Rather, [...] administration is bound by law and has a 'rational' construction” (Habermas 
1996: 73). Weber's characterisation of bureaucratic administration is based above all on 
predictability and efficiency, i.e. technical rationality, which serves the triumphal process 
of capitalism. Historically, this has certainly been the case. On the other hand, the analysis 
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should take into account the impact of public administration on social integration, to 
which it has played a major role. Historically, a complex society has required more 
differentiated functions, such as the norms of bureaucratic administration (Habermas 
1984b: 175). 
4.2 Politics-administration dichotomy  
Responsibility in bureaucratic theory is based on the dichotomy of politics and 
governance, which can be defined as follows (Svara 2007: 37, adapted): 
1. Politicians are not involved in administrative activities. 
2. Civil servants do not participate in politics. 
3. Civil servants assume a role of neutral expertise, with responsibility limited to the 
effective implementation of policy-making. 
4. It is assumed that civil servants do not exercise discretion. If civil servants were to 
exercise their discretion, political practices would be subject to interpretation 
(which, in turn, is understood as a negative thing). 
Communicatively speaking, the dichotomy has certain problematic aspects. The 
assumption that civil servants do not exercise significant discretion leads to a situation 
where the lack of discretion instrumentalises the communication of public administration 
and contributes to a crisis of legitimacy. If responsibility is understood as the idea of 
effective implementation of policy-making, something is most certainly missing. In 
communicative terms, responsibility in governance is also a form of communication, 
which can be eroded by efficiency. Thus, the technical neutrality of public officials can 
contribute to systemic colonization. 
The strict definition for the dichotomy between politics and administration 
underestimates the discretion of civil servants. Civil servants have a duty to serve not only 
politicians and their aims but also the citizens. This indicates a sense of normativity. 
However, civil servants cannot be moral agents if they are treated as neutral. Because they 
are controlled by others (that is, politicians and higher public officials), they cannot make 
moral judgments nor act accordingly. Moral decision-making can be further undermined 
by large public organisations where individuals have no control over the course of events 
in the bigger picture. On the other hand, organisational roles may not be so clearly defined 
that there could be no room for individual choice. (Svara 2007: 37–38.) 
Bureaucratic responsibility relates to official status, duties and compliance with 
organisational and regulatory requirements. The stronger the hierarchy in an 
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organisation, the more likely it is to be bureaucratically accountable. (Isosaari 2008: 205.) 
Control-based accountability has a strong influence on hierarchical structures. Control is 
actually a prerequisite for bureaucratic organisations. Professionalism and control-based 
accountability reflect the tension within bureaucratic structures about accountability as a 
virtue or mechanism (Bovens 2010). The former understands accountability more as a 
virtue, while the latter as a mechanism. 
However, the traditional bureaucratic interpretation of responsibility is slowly receding 
for it relies too much on formal sanctions and simplistic accountability relationships. 
Instead, the focus has shifted from the correctness of policies and processes to the focus 
on results and effectiveness. (Viinamäki 2017: 87–88.) 
At the heart of control is the objective that actors must act in accordance with higher 
instructions. Where necessary, they can be punished to improve the effectiveness of the 
control. In a broader sense, control means that politico-administrative actors justify their 
actions, take responsibility for their actions and accept sanctions where appropriate. In 
any case, accountability does not always mean simply a mechanism of control – rather, it 
is often identified with the control itself. The challenge of democratic governance is to 
create the necessary structures within which the unethical behaviour of civil servants can 
be curbed. In this sense, accountability involves all institutions that seek to control or limit 
administrative power. In this context, we are talking about the separation of power, the 
constitution or the ethical codes. (Mulgan 2000: 563–564.)  
Accountability can be understood as a means by which civil servants manage multiple 
expectations. These expectations can be both internal and external. Romzek and Dubnick 
define four forms of accountability in bureaucratic theory: bureaucratic, legal, professional 
and political accountability. Of these, professional and political accountability have a low 
degree of control, while bureaucratic and legal accountability have higher. (Romzek & 
Dubnick 1987: 228–230.) In bureaucratic accountability, the civil servant is subject to 
active control. Legal accountability refers to legal norms and regulations. The idea is that 
legality produces just outcomes. In contrast, political accountability is based on the 
politics-administration dichotomy. 
Professional accountability is common in bureaucratic organisations. It seeks to take into 
account both the expertise and the client, with work guided by the ethical code of the 
profession and a commitment to professional morality (Isosaari 2008: 204–205). 
Professional accountability is based on the technical expertise of actors, whereby external 
control is seen as an inappropriate means of accountability. Within professional 
accountability, it is understood that the accountability of experts ultimately rests on 
political-administrative authority and the implementation of democracy. The 
discretionary power of these authorities over experts' decisions is exercised at a general 
level and is not based on strong control mechanisms. Professional accountability can be 
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achieved through peer review. This is the case in the medical and legal professions. 
However, peer review raises questions about the role of the public in the process.  (Mulgan 
2000: 558–559.)   
The political accountability of senior civil refers to a number of factors. First, they have to 
do what ministers ask them to do. As was stated before, the dichotomy between politics 
and administration indicates the primacy of political accountability, i.e. the loyalty of the 
public administration to political decision-makers. At the same time, senior civil servants 
must take into account professional and managerial principles based on their profession 
and expertise. Naturally, the action must be in accordance with the law. (Salminen & Ikola-
Norrbacka 2009: 52.) Political accountability emerges in the representativeness of the 
highest decision-making bodies in public organisations. Hence, it is only reflected within 
the organisation to the extent that employees feel accountable to citizens. (Isosaari 2008: 
204–205.) 
On the other hand, professional accountability is not an unproblematic when viewed from 
the perspective of legitimacy and trust in governance. Professionalism represents a culture 
of expertise that can appear alienating from the public perspective. As Habermas writes, 
in “consequence of this professionalization, the distance between expert cultures and the 
broader public grows greater. [...] cultural rationalization brings with it the danger that a 
lifeworld devalued in its traditional substance will become impoverished” (Habermas 
1984b: 326). Both control and professional accountability reproduce the colonization of 
the lifeworld, as they both rationalize and mechanize the norms of governance (Habermas 
1984b: 326–328). 
For a long time, the prevailing idea was that civil servants were bound by the law and the 
authority of the state. This led to the idea of legal accountability and the primacy of 
regularity over integrity. In Germany, the idea goes back to Hegel's vision of the state 
standing above society and citizens with its rules of justice. (Demmke & Moilanen 2012: 
699; Hegel 1821/1972.) Similarly, Snellman brought Hegel's ideas on state-centrism to 
Finland (Grotenfelt 1927). 
At least the following principles or precepts, which are close to bureaucratic theory, can be 
given for public responsibility (Svara 2007: 28). First, the public manager should put 
public interest before self-interest, show service and be worthy of citizens' trust. Since the 
public manager must uphold the law, he or she must also be committed to procedural 
fairness and a democratic process. A responsible public manager must be responsive to 
the aims of politicians and neutral in assessing policy options. Thus, according to Svara 
(2007), responsiveness to citizens is only indirectly exercised through political actors. 
There is a strong link between responsibility and predictability in public management 
(Isosaari 2008: 76–77; Lawton 1998: 7). Within an organisation, accountability is the 
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obligation to act following the requirements of the task (which are known beforehand). In 
managerial roles, accountability is combined with delegation, i.e. the allocation of 
authority and responsibility to employees lower down in the hierarchy. This, in turn, 
increases predictability. Institutional practices shape the implementation of accountability 
in public organisations. In bureaucratic theory, such practices include hierarchy and 
accountability to higher levels – civil servants are expected to show obedience to orders. 
(Dubnick 2014: 31–33; Dubnick 1998: 77–79.) 
However, there is a big question as to how simple obedience and compliance with 
regulations can guarantee that public action is accountable. Bureaucratic theory offers few 
answers to this problem. Weber (2015) distinguishes between the ethics of attitude 
(Gesinnungsethik) and the ethics of responsibility (Verantwortungsethik). The ethics of 
responsibility is based on technically correct procedures, not on ends per se. In contrast, 
in the ethics of attitude, the free agent can decide both the end and the methods for 
realizing it (Kim 2019). 
4.3 What about the responsiveness to citizens?  
The characterisation of the politics-government dichotomy raises the question – what 
about the citizens? Does not the dichotomy overemphasise the dependence of the public 
administration on political decision-making? Do the people not act as the ultimate 
justifiers and of public administration (Habermas 1984b: 82–83)? 
It is important that responsibility is considered in relation to citizens, alongside political 
decision-making and the common good. In many situations, citizens are dependent on and 
vulnerable to public decision-making. It can also be argued that citizens are the "leaders" 
of civil servants. Citizens often have reason to expect that they will be treated equally and 
receive the service to which they are entitled. Serving the public interest means that 
responsible public management takes into account not only the service provided but also 
the demands of society (Svara 2007: 4–5, 37–38; Frederickson 1997). 
The cynical response of bureaucratic administration to this could be next. Responsiveness 
to citizens' needs can be counterproductive. The reason is that the needs of citizens are at 
odds with the common good (or what is portrayed as the common good). However, there 
is a clear consensus that the policy process must take into account the needs of users of 
public services. Public administrations are more passive in addressing the needs of their 
“customers” than companies, as customers of public services do not necessarily have the 
possibility, for example, to change their service provider. (Vigoda 2000: 165–167, 169, 
173.) 
Acta Wasaensia     56 
This cynical response is problematic for communicative action, increasing tension 
between the lifeworld and the system. As Habermas scholar and translator Rehg says: 
“[T]he political system (and the administration in particular) must not become an 
independent system, operating solely according to its own criteria of efficiency and 
unresponsive to citizen's concerns” (Rehg 1996: xxxi). This lack of responsiveness to 
citizens is reflected, for example, in the way bureaucratic theory understands public 
organisation as a hierarchically determined action, potentially undermined by the outside 
demands. However, today public administration is assumed to cooperate with other 
sectors, citizens and organisations. This, inevitably, means recognising different value 
orientations. 
Public trust in governance in the West is fragile. One might think that the purpose of good 
governance would be to bring citizens closer to public action and its actors. In this case, 
responsiveness to citizens is the lifeblood of governance. Accountability mechanisms are 
also essential for the virtuous operation and control of public action. Accountability can be 
described as a democratic chain of delegation at the end of which the people decide or 
decide not to change policy, at the latest at the time of elections. Thus, the ultimate 
accountability forum is the citizens as part of the democratic will. (Bovens 2010: 954–955.) 
But how does bureaucratic theory demonstrate its accountability to the people? Bryer 
(2007) writes about dictated, constrained and purposive responsiveness in bureaucratic 
governance. None of these forms of responsiveness is very effective in terms of 
responsiveness to citizens. Dictated responsiveness refers, for example, to a situation in 
which elected politicians direct public policy. Here, communication takes place through 
command, explicit or implicit pressure, or charismatic or coercive influence. This is 
particularly evident in hierarchical structures and in the dichotomy of politics and 
administration. Constrained responsiveness, on the other hand, means that administrative 
action is constrained by different bureaucratic norms, structures and cultures. In this case, 
responsiveness is based on technical or rule-based practices and professional norms that 
shape action in a rational way. It is quite obvious that the attention of citizens does not 
play a major role in this form either. In purposive responsiveness, civil servants act on the 
basis of professional or public goals. In this case, responsiveness is based on collectively 
or individually chosen objectives and their realisation in public action. In this form, 
citizens can influence public administration in the form of collective objectives. (Bryer 
2007: 483–486.) However, even in this form, responsiveness is indirect towards citizens. 
Bryer's responsiveness forms show that the bureaucratic definition of responsibility is 
highly technical. A technical definition of responsibility is a definition of who is responsible 
for what within the framework of formal criteria or norms. Therefore, responsibility is 
linked to economic and/or legal criteria. (Anttiroiko 2004: 23–24.) If one is not willing to 
reduce accountability to the proper and efficient performance of administrative tasks, it 
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makes sense to broaden the definition. At least from the citizen’s point of view, this aim 
should be of the highest priority. 
4.4 Criticism of bureaucratic theory  
The bureaucratic theory has been criticised both from within and outside organisational 
practices, at the micro and macro levels. Bennis (1967) argues that bureaucracy is unable 
to respond to the problems that will challenge the organisation of the future, many of its 
features being outdated. This claim has proved to be true. According to Bennis, 
bureaucracy faces four societal threats: (1) a broader conception of the human being in the 
organisation; (2) rapid and unpredictable change; (3) an increase in the size of 
organisations which cannot be sustained by traditional organisational efforts; (4) the 
complexity of modern technology which requires highly specialised skills. All these threats 
are worthy of attention in the context of implementing responsibility. Perhaps the greatest 
problem is that bureaucracy is not based on a realistic concept of agency. 
Many of the origins of administrative ethics can be found in the Minnowbrook Group and 
the New Public Administration, an administrative doctrine that has been influential since 
the late 1960s. (Frederickson et al. 2012: 131–132, 161–162.) The Minnowbrook Group 
considered that traditional public administration was unable to respond to the social or 
political challenges of its time. The task of the new public administration is to change the 
structures and dominant policies that systematically oppose social equality (Frederickson 
1971). 
According to the Minnowbrook Group, bureaucratic structures undermine responsibility 
for a number of reasons. First, public administration cannot be neutral or objective, as 
bureaucracies think, but must adhere to ethical principles. In addition, public 
administration should be more adaptable and sensitive to changing social, economic and 
political circumstances. Bureaucratic practices and techniques are not only often 
dehumanising and instrumentalising, but also inefficient. According to the Minnowbrook 
Group, cooperation and consensus are better ways to improve effectiveness than the 
simple exercise of authority. Bureaucracies are also characterised by simple survival, 
which makes it easy for them to change their objectives. (Frederickson et al. 2012: 132.) 
Criticism of bureaucracy has been extended to street level. According to Lipsky (1980), 
public sector workers who deliver services often shape administrative practices. Lipsky 
calls teachers, police officers, social workers as street-level bureaucrats who have the 
power to provide, or not to provide, public services to citizens. Thus, they play a major role 
not only in shaping practices but also in making public action accountable. The wide 
discretion and resource management of street-level bureaucrats make them key power 
players in administrative decision-making. Street-level bureaucrats are in direct and 
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personal contact with citizens so that they make decisions on the ground, targeting 
individuals. The poorer the citizen, the more direct influence the street-level bureaucrat 
has on him or her. 
Bureaucratic responsibility has obvious problems. When reviewing these criticisms, it is 
important to remember that bureaucracy was not originally designed to be citizen-oriented 
and service-oriented: as the service functions of government increased, so did the criticism 
of bureaucracy (Vartola 2009: 33). 
Because of its hierarchical nature, bureaucracy runs a high risk of immorality, as 
psychoanalyst Erich Fromm writes: “Those below, the bureaucratic character will hold in 
contempt, those above, he will admire and fear” (Fromm 1977: 392). According to Fromm, 
the horrors of bureaucracy are particularly problematic in the context of the increasing 
mechanisation of administrative activity, which has had historically disastrous 
consequences. 
In bureaucratic theory, responsibility is based on three principles: respect for the law, the 
pursuit of the public interest, and the integrity and impartiality of officials, which create 
trust in public action. However, the bureaucratic responsibility is simple and hardly 
representative of reality. It is best suited to a situation based on repetitive and predictable 
tasks. Today, a large proportion of public tasks require expertise and are based on more 
complex job descriptions. Flexibility alone is not enough. At the same time, civil servants 
are expected to be more involved in policy processes. This means taking into account new 
forms of accountability. For example, the policy process is defined as the process of 
reforming administrative, economic and legal elements and systems that create value for 
society. The role of civil servants in the policy process is not as simple as traditional 
bureaucratic theory suggests. It is also important to consider for what purposes and how 
public action is used. (Bourgon 2007: 9–12; Harisalo et al. 2007: 13, 25; Viinamäki 2017: 
84.) 
4.4.1 Neo-Weberian state as a renewal of bureaucratic theory  
There was talk about the death of bureaucratic administration as early as the 1960s – and 
in the 1970s bureaucratic organisations were expected to disappear by the end of the 
millennium (Vartola 2005: 7). Despite its critics, the bureaucratic theory has not 
disappeared from the doctrines of administration. On the contrary, bureaucratic 
administration is here to stay – although in a somewhat modernised form. Pollitt and 
Bouckaert (2011) write about the Neo-Weberian State (NWS) in their book about public 
management reforms. This model is especially represented by continental European 
modernisers of governance. 
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What, then, is so Weberian about NWS? Similarities can be seen in the many different 
forms of responsibility and accountability found in the NWS. First of all, it sees the state 
as the main actor reconciling problems of globalization, technological change, 
demographic change and environmental threats. Therefore, the state is seen responsible 
for many fundamental questions of today’s society – not to forget the global perspective. 
In addition, NWS has elements of democratic accountability since it sees representative 
democracy as the legitimating element of the state. In terms of legal accountability, 
administrative law acts as an upholder of the fundamental principles of the relationship 
between the citizen and the state and as protectors of public services. The idea of public 
accountability, in turn, is in the preservation of the idea of public service where public 
service has its own specific status, culture, terms and conditions. NWS also has new 
features, such as an orientation away from internal bureaucratic compliance towards the 
external needs and aspirations of citizens. This is done from a professional culture of 
quality and service, rather than from the creation of market mechanisms. In NWS, 
representative democracy is complemented by various means of consultation and direct 
input from citizens. It also emphasises the management of administrative resources and 
the modernisation of key laws for better results, rather than just the correct process 
following. The professionalisation of the public service is key. The bureaucrat is not just 
an expert in his or her field, but a professional manager who is attentive to the demands 
of citizens (Pollitt & Bouckaert 2011: 118–119). 
According to Pollitt and Bouckhaert, NWS was from the outset, not a doctrine or a 
normative vision but a description of the status quo. However, the model has been applied 
normatively. NWS is a vision of a modernised, efficient and citizen-friendly public 
administration. It represents a strong state that seeks to help citizens and maintain 
legitimacy. In this sense, the model can be seen as a defence of previously corporatist states 
such as Germany, France, the Netherlands and Sweden against globalising neoliberalism. 
Even if governance reformers consider themselves anti-Weberian, reforms like NWS are 
reformers of the Weberian tradition rather than its destroyers. (Pollitt & Bouckaert 2011: 
119–120.) In any case, NWS is advocacy of bureaucratic responsibility and a large state. 
Thus, it does not seek to abolish the bureaucrat's sphere of responsibility, but to modernise 
it. Bureaucratic compliance remains – but is complemented by professional values and a 
citizen-oriented approach. 
NWS has acquired a normative meaning in middle-income and less developed countries 
in two different ways. First, it serves as a critical reminder that bureaucratic 
administration must exist in the background before modernising governance. 
Bureaucratic responsibility serves as a backbone for subsequent attempts at 
administrative reform. This is particularly the case in developed countries, where 
accountability in public administration can be undermined by corrupt practices. Second, 
there is a clear link between sustainable economic growth and bureaucratic 
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administration. The link between capitalism and bureaucracy was already written about 
by Weber. NWS seems to be a good model of governance for a society seeking innovation, 
for example. (Drechsler & Kattel 2008; Evans & Rauch 1999.) 
 
Figure 5.  "How well does your agency's work reflect the values of the government?" 
(n=939) (Moilanen 2016: 18)  
As stated, despite the critique, bureaucratic administration has not vanished but has been 
modernised. Figure 5 shows that the values of traditional bureaucratic organisation, such 
as expertise, impartiality and independence, are still present in Finnish public 
administration. It is also noteworthy that in the graph the principle of legality is combined 
with responsibility – which is a traditional way of conceptualising responsibility in 
bureaucratic theory. Also, NPM forms of responsibility, such as economy and efficiency, 
play a lesser role than the forms found in the bureaucratic theory. In any case, 
responsibility is part of traditional administrative values. Through it, citizens have the 
opportunity to see how political leadership meets citizens' expectations and what the 
administration has achieved in practice. Similarly, in the fight against corruption, 
Transparency International identifies responsibility as one of its core values. In Finland, 
as a Nordic country, responsibility is an official value of public administration. This is also 
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4.4.2 Vicious circle of bureaucratic compliance 
In bureaucratic theory, responsibility first and foremost is approached as a duty. In a sense 
of duty, civil servants seek to implement the values of public administration, such as 
objectivity and transparency. At the same time, there is a demand for new forms of 
responsibility since citizens have increasingly high expectations of public administration. 
However, bureaucratic responsibility alone is not sufficient, as it focuses on the renewal of 
hierarchical relations. Attention should be paid to a shared responsibility between 
different organisations, actors or sectors. Social accountability implies that public 
administrations should benchmark their competencies against other countries and 
communicate this to their citizens. Another issue is how to encourage citizens to 
participate more actively in society. (Bourgon 2007: 11–12.) 
 
 
Figure 6. Risks of bureaucratic compliance  
What then, are the negative consequences of bureaucratic administration with regards to 
responsibility? The vicious circle (which is based on the findings of the literature review) 
of bureaucratic compliance is illustrated above. Bureaucratic communication follows the 
objectification of its rules and principles. The management of a public organisation is 
primarily based on the creation of hierarchies, whereby forms of responsibility emphasise 
control and acting according to rules. The problem with control-based responsibility is that 
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with the result of diminishing personal responsibility This leads to an objectification of 
rules, i.e. unreflective compliance with authority and obligations. 
Hence, it is of no surprise when Habermas (1984b: 307) writes the following about Weber 
and the bureaucratic organisation: "Weber is full of admiration for the organizational 
accomplishments of modern bureaucracies, but when he adopts the perspective of 
members and clients, and analyzes the objectification of social relations in organizations 
as depersonalizing, he describes the rationality of bureaucracies that have been cut loose 
from vocational-ethical attitudes, from value-rational attitudes in general, and have 
developed their own internal dynamics, in terms of the image of a rationally operating 
machine." Bureaucratic administrations strip agency of its ethical principles and clothe it 
with their internal practices. The result can be a rationally operating but ethically 
irresponsible machine, not defined by the ethical attitudes of its members. 
The more objectified the authority and obligations, the more the organisation will avoid 
responsibility. The vicious circle of bureaucratic responsibility leads to overall 
ineffectiveness and possibly corruption – which in turn is sought to be eradicated by 
increasing control and hierarchy. Bureaucratic responsibility and its dependence on 
technical rationality is aptly described by Jun: "Policy makers and planners believe that 
technical rationality is easy to apply in a hierarchical administration [...] It therefore 
reinforces itself so that it seems like the only way to accomplish organizational activities 
rationally." (Jun 2006: 249). A bureaucratic administration easily sees that the best way 
to increase the effectiveness of an organisation is to further increase its rationality (in 
technical terms). In this case, public management is unable to address the irrationality of 
technical rationality that increases ineffectiveness rather than effectiveness. 
4.5 Tension between rules and agency  
The central problem with the bureaucratic theory is that the objectification of regulations 
and their faceless implementation are detrimental to responsibility. Civil servants have to 
balance in a contradictory situation of being controlled and being independent to make 
decisions (Svara 2007: 35–36). The above-mentioned vicious circle of bureaucratic 
compliance is based on excessive control and the objectification of rules. However, 
bureaucratic governance is defined not only by compliance, but also by professional 
accountability, which is in tension with control. Habermas writes of the problem as 
follows: 
To the degree that economic and administrative operations are bureaucratized, 
however, the purposive rationality of actions (or at least the systemic rationality 
of their output) has to be secured independently of the value-rational judgments 
and decisions of organization members. Organization themselves take over the 
regulation of actions, which now need to be anchored subjectively only in 
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generalized utilitarian motives. This freeing of subjectivity from the 
determinations of moral-practical rationality is reflected in the polarization of 
"specialists without spirit" and "sensualists without heart." (Habermas 1984a: 352.) 
Habermas quotes Weber when writing about specialists without spirit and sensualists 
without heart. By this, they both mean a rational transformation of culture, in which the 
action of the individual working in organisations is independent of his/her identity. In this 
kind of situation, organisational control and objectified rules also supersede professional 
assumptions. On the other hand, even professionalism, because of its technicality, is not 
an unproblematic form of accountability since it can also downplay the possibility for 
subjective responsibility (Habermas 1984b: 326–328). 
According to Habermas, in modern societies, the rationality of administrative action is 
separated from the subjective value orientations of the members of the public 
organisation. Therefore, the faceless following of rules does not require agency.  This 
inevitably raises the question of responsibility in the public organisation. How can 
organisational regulation succeed if the subjective dimension is removed from the picture? 
Habermas criticises Weber's theory of bureaucracy precisely for its lack of agency since no 
organisation can function without a subjective element. “This purposive model [...] cannot 
explain the fact that it is not only (or even chiefly) by way of the purposive-rational action 
of members that organisations resolve problems of self-maintenance” (Habermas 1984b: 
306). 
In public management, bureaucratic behaviour is often associated with deontological 
ethics and adherence to universal rules (Svara 2007: 27-28). At the same time, it should 
be noted that deontological ethics is based on the motivation and freedom of the actor 
(Kant 1990). According to Kant, only a free agent can be obliged to act ethically. This 
means that the moral law must be independent of external and contingent factors 
(Kannisto 2014).  Otherwise, the moral law would be influenced by something external and 
would not be based on freedom. Thus, administrative action should give civil servants 
enough room for autonomous will formation. The requirement of freedom of the actor also 
creates another consideration, which is that responsibility cannot be viewed only from an 
individual perspective. Namely, if the individual has not been free to act responsibly, 
attention should be paid to the norms and practices surrounding the individual at the 
institutional level. 
Historically, the combination of deontological ethics and bureaucracy has led not only to 
responsibility but also to atrocities. For example, Adolf Eichmann is known as the 
organiser of the Holocaust in the Nazi Party during the Second World War. In defending 
his actions at trial, Eichmann claimed that he had simply acted according to bureaucratic 
and deontological ethics. Eichmann is a figure of banal evil who does not appear to be a 
monster in the traditional sense of the word. What is banal is the unreflective and faceless 
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adherence to rules and obligations. Hence, Eichmann can be called “the perfect 
bureaucrat” (Arendt 1965; Parvikko 2008: 210–213; Frederickson & Hart 2001: 359–
360). 
In public administration, deontological ethics emphasise the highest level of management, 
which has the authority to make decisions. Moral rules and ethical standards serve as 
reference points for the actions of individuals. Thus, they can compare their behaviour 
with the rules and standards to assess whether their actions are "right" or "wrong". 
(Hyyryläinen 2010; Svara 2007: 10–11.) The problem with bureaucratic administration, 
on the other hand, is how following rules become faceless and independent of the agency. 
Sometimes acting according to rules can be a way of escaping moral responsibility for the 
consequences of one's actions, which is of course contrary to deontological ethics. Indeed, 
philosopher Hannah Arendt writes how Eichmann considered himself a Kantian for whom 
it was important to stick to his duties: “This was outrageous, on the face of it, and also 
incomprehensible, since Kant's moral philosophy is so closely bound up with man's faculty 
of judgment, which rules out blind obedience.” (Arendt 1965: 136.) 
Thus, deontological ethics is not reduced to a rule-based approach. For example, 
Habermas' discourse ethics is based on duty since it requires the participant in discourse 
to follow a general rule that determines the validity of any norm (Miller 2002). In Kant's 
ethics, this is the case with the categorical imperative (Kant 1990). The best-known 
formulation of the categorical imperative is: “Act only according to that maxim whereby 
you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law” (Kant 1990: 421). 
According to the formulation, the subject must, in accordance with a certain principle, 
consider whether it can be hoped that everyone will act in accordance with the principle. 
For example, Svara (2007: 15) lists the ethical responsibilities of public administration as 
serving the people, pursuing the public interest and avoiding conflict and personal 
interest. Dutiful ethical responsibilities would also include taking responsibility for one's 
own actions, which can lead to whistleblowing and reporting wrongdoing. Thus, 
deontological principles can work against the compliance-based nature of bureaucratic 
action in a situation where duties and rules are in conflict. In this case, duties have a higher 
authority than rules. 
4.5.1 More rules, more integrity – or something in between?  
How can bureaucratic responsibility be increased? Or, to put it more concretely, how can 
the objectification of rules and their faceless implementation be overcome?  In the classical 
literature, at least five mechanisms can be found: encouraging responsibility, disciplinary 
techniques, economic indicators, legally binding guidelines and professionalism 
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(Friedrich 1946). In the classical literature on management science, four basic elements of 
managerial accountability are still valid and can be used to outline a guideline. These are 
judgment, accountability, balance and rationality. 
The problem can be further assessed by looking at the dichotomy between compliance and 
integrity. Each of these perspectives has its own assumption about moral agency, which 
ultimately distinguishes them. The compliance orientation assumes that the action of the 
civil servants is based on selfish interests and that his/her integrity cannot be trusted. In 
the integrity orientation, the civil servant is a social being guided by values, principles and 
the ethos of the public sector. The differences between these trends are further specified 
in the table below: 
Table 1. Compliance and integrity (Lawton 2013: 121; Paine 1994: 113, adapted) 












Adaptation to external standards 
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low road 
 
Prevention of unethical 
behaviour 
 
An individual driven by 
economic self-interest 
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A social being guided by values, 
principles and public sector ethos 
 
Practice: 
Methods and tools 
 
 
External control, training in 
rules and guidelines, reduction 





Internal control, ethics training, 
communication and deliberation, 























Law, criminal law 
 
 
Lawyers, compliance officers 
 
 
Top-down standards, reporting 
violations, leading 
investigations, overseeing 
inspections and monitoring, 









Mission statement, values, social 
responsibility 
 
Managers, ethics officers 
 
 
Bottom-up development of 
organisational values and standards, 
coaching and communication, 
integration of organisational systems 
and culture, consulting, assessment 
of values and performance, 
identification and resolution of 
problems and dilemmas. 
 
Ethical decision-making, ethical 
values and facing dilemmas 
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Table 1 shows the different ways in which the compliance and integrity perspectives 
influence organisational practices. While the compliance perspective emphasises 
hierarchical, top-down standards, the integrity perspective highlights the bottom-up 
development of organisational values and standards. The compliance perspective sees it 
as difficult to develop values from the bottom up, as its assumption on agency is based on 
economic self-interest. Thus, the perspective does not see that individuals have a major 
role to play in the development of values in the organisation. This is reflected in training 
and coaching, where the compliance perspective relies on standards and guidelines, and 
the integrity perspective on ethical decision-making. In terms of control, compliance is 
external, integrity is internal. 
In general, the integrity perspective is associated with accountability as a virtue and the 
compliance perspective with accountability as a mechanism. The debate between Friedrich 
and Finer (Finer 1941; Friedrich 1935) is a good example of this. It is noteworthy that the 
competing positions of Friedrich and Finer can be located inside the bureaucratic theory. 
Thus, the administrative doctrine does not have a single answer to the conflict arising from 
this dichotomy. According to Friedrich, responsibility does not just mean blind compliance 
with rules but professional standards such as objectivity and independence. However, 
individual officials cannot be held personally responsible for their actions, as the ultimate 
responsibility lies with the public organisation. Also, public administration should pay 
attention to publicising their activities and educating the public. The opposite of 
Friedrich's argument is Finer's compliance approach. According to Finer, responsibility is 
based on the threat of reprimand and punishment of the official – in the worst case, 
dismissal. (Finer 1941; Friedrich 1935; Plant 2018: 3.)  
Historically, the tension between Friedrich's and Finer's perspectives reflected change and 
the end of the dichotomy between politics and administration (at least in some respect). 
This is because administrative functions were increasingly complex and could no longer 
be explained as purely mechanistic or detached from politics. However, this gave birth the 
new problems. For example, if these functions required discretion, how could the 
democratic nature of decision-making be taken into account? (Denhardt & Denhardt 
2007: 121.) 
While the low road emphasises laws and regulations, the high road relies on the 
responsible behaviour and values of the individual (Bowman & West 2018: 167). But is 
there a choice to be made between the two? Not necessarily. A fusion road can be placed 
between them, adopting features from both directions. Fusion road offers civil servants 
the opportunity to reflect, decide and act independently with professional values in 
unethical situations (Lawton et al. 2013: 123; Lewis & Gilman 2005: 15–17; Vogelsang-
Coombs 2016: 323–324; Paine 1994.) It can be argued that integrity requires reflection, 
compliance requires conformity. Reflection refers to a critical self-assessment of one's 
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motives and preconceptions. As such, this kind of reflection is close to hermeneutics 
(Heidegger 2000; Gadamer 2004). 
Nor is the emphasis on integrity an entirely unproblematic position in terms of 
responsibility. The integrity approach can also produce a paradox, which proceeds along 
with the following logic (Nieuwenburg 2007). Public integrity can be seen as a positive 
thing, as it improves public trust in public administration. However, the relationship 
between integrity and trust is not simple. The problem arises when integrity requires a 
public manager to report wrongdoing, which can lead to a loss of trust in the eyes of 
citizens. On the other hand, reporting is necessary because it is a prerequisite for the 
integrity of the public manager. 
It is also paradoxical that a public manager can be considered a "good" manager while 
committing immoral acts. Public managers are also affected by the problem of “dirty 
hands”, whereby they make utilitarian decisions that are acceptable but, as such, unethical 
(Waltzer 1973). The bureaucratic organisation can therefore easily be understood as a 
mechanical implementation of utilitarian objectives, which cannot take into account the 
unethicality of decisions taken in the face of “the bigger picture”. On the other hand, 
utilitarianism is not reduced to bureaucratic administration, but is present, for example, 
in the way NPM conceives of efficiency in terms of an ethics of consequence: economic 
efficiency requires large-scale calculation and maximisation. 
4.5.2 Three paradoxes of responsibility  
In the bureaucratic theory, the tension between compliance and faceless agency can be 
further clarified by the paradoxes of responsibility (Harmon 1995). These paradoxes are 
based on the questions of agency, freedom and the binding nature of rules.  
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Table 2. Harmon's responsibility paradoxes (Harmon 1995; Roberts 2002, 
adapted) 
Paradox Content Pathologies 
The paradox of 
obligation 
If civil servants are at the same 
time free to choose and obliged to 
act, they are not free. 
Alternatively, if civil servants are 
free to choose, their actions may 
violate their obligations, making 
freedom of choice irresponsible. 
Bureaucratic opportunism, 
i.e. neglect of obligations and 
pursuit of self-interest 
Objectification of authority 
and obligations, i.e. reflexive 
adherence to principles 
The paradox of agency If individuals subscribe to the 
view of their personal and moral 
agency, they deny their ultimate 
responsibility to others. 
Alternatively, if they subscribe to 
the view of the ultimate 
responsibility of others, they deny 
their own moral agency. 
Avoiding responsibility and 
looking for a scapegoat 
The atrophy and sacrifice of 
individual moral agency 
Avoiding individual 
responsibility 
The paradox of 
accountability 
If the accountability of civil 
servants reverts back to being 
instruments of political and 
administrative power, they have 
no personal responsibility for the 
results of their actions. 
Alternatively, if civil servants are 
involved in defining public goals, 
their accountability to higher 
authority is called into question. 
The atrophy of personal 
responsibility: civil servants 
do not sign up to the 
consequences of their actions 
if they are not accountable for 
public goals 
The erosion of political 
authority: if civil servants are 
given the power to set public 
goals, they are ultimately 
accountable only to 
themselves. 
These paradoxes return to the understanding of the role of the civil servant and produce 
pathologies in governance. The paradox of obligation is about the relationship between 
obligations and freedom of choice. The idea is that the obligations of an organisation are 
not based on the freedom of choice of civil servants. On the contrary, the freedom of choice 
of civil servants can be in conflict with the obligations of the organisation. The paradox of 
obligation produces bureaucratic opportunism and the objectification of authority and 
regulations. The paradox of agency, on the other hand, is about how personal choice is 
possible in the face of external obligations. For example, moral agency cannot be subjective 
if it is determined by external responsibilities. The paradox of accountability is about 
personal responsibility and its dependence on a higher authority. In this case, the 
instrumentality of officials is thought to be independent of personal responsibilities. On 
the other hand, high authority calls into question the ability of civil servants to 
independently assess their goals. (Roberts 2002: 658–660.) 
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The paradoxes of responsibility reflect the Weberian view of civil servants as specialists 
without spirit, i.e. subjective value judgements (as was mentioned earlier). Here, 
responsibility is influenced by external obligations and the instrumentality of 
administrative power, rather than by individual choice, agency and personal 
responsibility. This also has ethical consequences in terms of duty, since, according to 
Kant, only free agents are bound by the moral law. 
It should be noted that the paradoxes of responsibility are by their very nature extreme. 
For example, external obligation and freedom of choice are not necessarily in conflict. In 
the paradox of agency, on the other hand, the responsible agency can be thought of as 
having both personal and external elements – not either/or. Naturally, it is not always the 
case that responsibility in public management leads, for example, to the objectification of 
rules or bureaucratic opportunism. In modern public management, negotiation also has a 
role to play. There is plenty of room between the extremes. 
The civil servant is not just a subject of personal choice, moral decision making or 
responsibility. Nor, of course, is he or she an object of external obligation, responsibility 
or instrumentality. Administrative obligations are not purely external to the public 
administrator, since they are created as part of the democratic decision-making process, 
in which every citizen participates, at least as a voter. Nor is freedom of choice necessarily 
irresponsible from the point of view of administrative obligations. 
4.6 Communicative responsibility of bureaucratic theory  
4.6.1 Principle of openness 
In bureaucratic theory, one could argue that a civil servant is a faceless bureaucrat who 
follows slavishly objectified rules. The responsibility of a bureaucratic administration is 
hierarchical and rule-based. This has a number of consequences for why bureaucratic 
administration does not implement Habermas' principle of openness very well. First, the 
principle of openness is based on keeping the discourse open to arguments, questions and 
answers. Moreover, everyone must be able to participate in the discourse.  
Bureaucratic theory is based on the implementation of a task delegated by the political 
level, and in hierarchical structures, the interaction of actors is top-down and mechanical. 
Thus, in bureaucratic administration, the scope of action depends on the hierarchical 
position. The most optimal position is that of senior civil servants who control the public 
organisation on the terms dictated by political decision-making. Officials are expected to 
comply with the rules, i.e. to follow them properly. On the other hand, bureaucratic 
responsibility is also determined by professional values, which become more important 
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the higher the level at which a civil servant operates. However, its overall significance is 
less than compliance in an organisation characterised by technical rationality and 
machine-like mechanisms (Habermas 1984b: 307). 
According to the principle of openness, everyone should be active in the discourse, which 
is why mere participation is not enough. The problem with compliance is that officials do 
not have to be genuinely active outside the rules. In bureaucratic administration, there is 
actually very little room for activity. In hierarchies, there is no prerequisite for equal 
activity by participants. For reasons of efficiency, it is impossible to respect the principle 
of equal activity. Officials perform different tasks based on their position in the 
organisation. Therefore, there are precise definitions of appropriate and inappropriate 
administrative behaviour. This also means that there is little to no exchange of ideas or 
debate. From the citizen perspective, participation in the decision-making process of a 
bureaucracy is limited, mainly in terms of using public services or being a “subordinate” 
of the government. 
4.6.2 Principle of freedom of speech  
According to the principle of freedom of speech, everyone must be free to interpret and 
criticise claims, which leads to the elimination of unreflective prejudices from 
communication. Freedom of speech also means that participants have no difference in 
power or knowledge – or they must be narrowed. Bureaucratic administration easily leads 
to the objectification of rules that cannot be freely interpreted or criticised. The lack of 
reflection of rules further instrumentalises organisational communication. In hierarchies, 
technical rationality and instrumental values take precedence over other starting points, 
and diversity of opinion and values is not tolerated. 
There is no mechanism in bureaucratic governance to unlock unreflective rules or 
practices. Closer to a mechanism, again, are probably professional approaches of civil 
servants. A mechanism would require moral reflection, whereby the organisational 
behaviour would be influenced by non-systemic and instrumental norms. This would 
mean that management would take account of the existential context that underpins 
morality. The process of colonization makes such attention difficult. Habermas writes: 
"Organizations not only disconnect themselves from cultural commitments and from 
attitudes and orientations specific to given personalities; they also make themselves 
independent from lifeworld contexts by neutralizing the normative background of 
informal, customary, morally regulated contexts of action" (Habermas 1984b: 309). 
Bureaucratic administration is a hierarchical system with wide disparities of power and 
knowledge. These differences are justified by the fact that they allow for the delegation and 
implementation of tasks in an efficient way. In other words, power and knowledge 
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differentials are the lifeblood of bureaucratic responsibility. In a hierarchy, the 
subordinate is provided with the amount of information that is sufficient for the 
performance of his or her tasks. In this way, communication is not only efficient but also 
appropriate for the performance of the tasks. Hierarchy is based on the existence of power 
and knowledge differences and does not narrow them. 
In hierarchies, the expression of empirical opinions is limited and can even be viewed 
negatively. Communication requires technical clarity based on legislation, regulations and 
reporting. In a bureaucratic administration, action is justified by administrative efficiency 
and control and by legislation. In hierarchies, claims are formal and are presented 
following the functions of the administration and their legitimacy. The collective 
acceptance of ideas is generated through electoral arrangements and political decision-
making, whose will the hierarchy seeks to implement. 
4.6.3 Principle of authenticity  
Compliance and the objectification of rules undermine the principle of authenticity in 
bureaucratic theory. According to the principle of authenticity, all participants express 
their beliefs, desires and needs. Bureaucratic responsibility is seen as independent of the 
authentic views of the civil servants. The discourse should also produce decisions that lead 
to practical action. However, in bureaucratic administration, dialogue is limited and there 
is no dialogue that automatically leads to practical action. 
The principle of authenticity includes the requirements of clarity, honesty, legitimacy, and 
truthfulness of the discourse. Clarity is based on the demonstration of responsibility on 
the basis of coherence of principles. What are the principles on which the clarity and 
internal coherence of administrative doctrine are based? The concept of responsibility in 
bureaucratic theory is based on the unambiguity of laws and rules. When the standards set 
above are implemented, responsibility is achieved. In this light, responsibility is very 
procedural, as the focus is on the correctness of the measures. However, there is a 
contradiction between compliance and integrity approaches. 
Honesty, in turn, is based on demonstrating responsibility in practice. What are the means 
by which it is demonstrated, and do they achieve what they claim to do? Bureaucratic 
theory suggests that responsibility is enhanced by things like reliability, predictability, 
honesty, coherence, continuity and integrity. However, history has shown that 
bureaucratic responsibility has not always been effective to prevent atrocities. 
Legitimacy is based on demonstrating responsibility in the light of public recognition of 
principles. How and on what basis does administrative doctrine legitimise its principles? 
Bureaucratic theory legitimises its action on the principle that the state legitimises itself. 
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The state is a systemic entity, binding on the basis of power and norms. The responsibility 
of a bureaucratic administration is to be a rational machine that carries out the will of the 
state and politicians. In the context of democratic ideals, public administration is 
understood as a means for the state to achieve collective goals. 
Truthfulness is based on whether the communicated principles of administrative doctrine 
correspond to reality. Differences in power and knowledge, objectified rules and lack of 
agency make bureaucratic governance difficult to achieve. If the norms governing action 
do not correspond to reality, so much the worse for reality. What matters most for 
bureaucratic responsibility is the efficiency of processes: whether processes have a greater 
impact on the environment is secondary. Bureaucratic administration is concerned with 
the effectiveness of the means to achieve the ends, not with the relationship between ends 
and goals (Habermas 1984b: 209). Moreover, the principles of bureaucratic theory rely on 
the goals of the state and the public sector. The question arises as to what is meant by 
public interest. In this case, a question should be asked: does the public administration 
actually fulfil the needs of citizens and the public interest?  
4.6.4 Principle of reciprocity  
According to the principle of reciprocity, participants in the discourse should have equal 
opportunities to be accountable and to demand accountability from others. This also 
means that the role and authority of each participant can be subject to assertion. However, 
hierarchy makes it impossible to have an arrangement whereby those at a lower level 
demand accountability from those above them. Differences in power and knowledge can 
lead to negative consequences where officials follow unreflective rules of which they have 
no precise knowledge of the consequences. This also undermines the capacity of the public 
administration to learn new and substantial information. It is impossible to learn from 
mistakes if there is no knowledge of their existence, or if the knowledge remains at lower 
levels of the public organisation. 
4.7 Conclusions 
In public administration, forms of responsibility are often justified through ethics 
(Renouard 2010; Svara 2007). Hence, it is of no surprise that the field of interest involves 
many philosophical questions such as the following. Are civil servants autonomous in 
deciding their actions, or are they bound by an external source? The question is not just 
empirical – but perhaps first and foremost theoretical. Or, what is ultimately meant by 
responsibility? According to Finer (1941), public managers are responsible to the political 
level and cannot independently choose the principles of their actions. However, should 
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this always be the case? And does a responsible public manager always respect the rules 
and obligations imposed on him or her?  
The answer to this may be no. It is still difficult to give general answers to these questions. 
However, a responsible public manager can assess his or her performance in a conflict 
situation by asking the following questions (Leys 2001). What is always and everywhere 
good? And what is not necessary? What do citizens want? What are the subjective views of 
the public manager? Which choices may seem less important in the future? 
The central tension of bureaucratic responsibility is based on the relationship between the 
technical rationality that arises from administrative compliance and subjective value 
judgements. This tension is fundamental since it raises the question of the paradoxical 
nature of responsibility and agency. If a public manager is not free to act according to his 
or her value orientations, how can he or she be considered responsible?  The compliance 
and integrity perspectives, that are close to this question, understand responsibility from 
different perspectives. Also, the concepts of responsibility and accountability reflect how 
the topic is approached from both internal and external dimensions. 
One thing is for certain. Only the actions of the morally responsible can be assessed 
ethically (Talbert 2019; Thompson 2001). However, this insight does not lead us very far. 
Moral responsibility can be difficult to demonstrate in a public administration where 
decision-making is influenced by a wide range of actors. For example, the responsibility of 
public management is challenged by three structural issues (Thompson 2001). The first is 
the view that no single individual can bring about an organisational outcome. The second 
is based on the distinction between individual intentions and collective outcomes. The 
third challenge lies in role expectations, where individuals act responsibly from their 
limited job description – but the overall organisational output does not reflect 
responsibility. 
The control perspective has long dominated administrative ethics. At its heart is the legal 
nature of public action. The control perspective emphasises the importance of 
organisational directives, rules and prohibitions that govern public action, as well as the 
importance of laws and regulations that govern public action. However, public 
organisations are increasingly expected to be able to adapt to new ways of working, without 
losing sight of the citizen's perspective. Simple compliance with the law should not become 
a comfort zone for civil servants that ignores the real needs of citizens. (Hyyryläinen & 
Ikola-Norrbacka 2013: 270.) The control perspective is often unable to take into account 
the continuous expansion and socialisation of responsibility. 
Today, it is seen that control based on reward and punishment is a weaker tool for 
developing individuals than performance-based assessment. The sense of responsibility of 
staff can be developed by involving them in the decision-making process of the 
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organisation. If the views of staff are listened to, the staff will be more active in solving 
ethical problems. (Svara 2007: 137–138.) Increased control and sanctions can increase the 
perception that bad behaviour is more common and acceptable in an organisation than it 
is perceived to be (Schulze & Frank 2003). 
Public HR policy is in a state of flux due to the destandardisation of public administration, 
which may have unpredictable consequences for the responsibility of public management 
(Demmke 2019). Motivating and engaging staff in the public sector can be slowed down 
by the fact that organisational communication still follows bureaucratic elements. The 
structure and formal policies of public organisations can act as a barrier to dialogue 
between staff groups. Changing this would, in turn, require a substantial administrative 
reform. (Strandman 2009: 209.) 
A key influence on bureaucratic theory is the politics-administration dichotomy. However, 
there is some dispute about how well the dichotomy has been implemented historically in 
administrations. Svara (2007) proposes a counterweight to the politics-administration 
dichotomy in the form of a reciprocity model, which he argues is more historically valid. 
This model accepts the distinction between politics and administration, but also the shared 
and overlapping functions. In this way, responsibility takes on a new shape. Political 
decision-makers and civil servants base their actions on clear distinctions based on 
different values and formal positions. Politicians exercise political control over the 
administration, while civil servants participate in the policy process. Hence, the 
relationship between politicians and civil servants is based on reciprocity and 
interdependence. (Svara 2007: 42.) 
Based on the reciprocity model, Svara (2007) has defined the following obligations for civil 
servants. Civil servants must uphold the law, respect political authority and recognise the 
need for accountability. On the other hand, they should be loyal to the goals of the public 
organisation. Their responsibilities also include serving the people, upholding the public 
interest and supporting the democratic process. This may mean that maintaining the 
public interest may lead to conflict with political decision-makers. On the other hand, civil 
servants must take responsibility for their actions by being independent and committed to 
professional values and competences. Even when conflicts with politicians arise, civil 
servants must be honest about the ways in which they interact with politicians. Officials 
should also encourage policy-makers in the discharge of their responsibilities. (Svara 
2007: 42–43.) From all of this, it can certainly be argued that public management is not 
without obligations. 
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5 NPM: RESPONSIBILITY AS ACCOUNTABILITY FOR RESULTS  
According to Hood (1991), the rise of New Public Management (NPM) was influenced by 
four administrative megatrends at the time. These were the slowing of state growth, 
privatisation, the development of automation (especially in information technology), and 
the increasing internationalisation of public management and policy-making. 
In the 1980s and 1990s, the dismantling of socialist systems left only one path for the 
development of governance – the liberal democratic market economy. The spread of 
Western administrative practices was made possible more rapidly by international 
organisations such as the European Union and the OECD.  (Hyyryläinen 1999: 25–26; 
Kuusela 2001: 28–29.) 
In the second half of the 1980s, the bureaucratic theory was in crisis – new management 
techniques were needed to do things in a more cost-effective way. The public-private 
dichotomy was interpreted in terms of a politically liberal and economic model. Many 
industrial states found that the growing public sector, bureaucratic mechanisms and 
public authorities were unable to solve economic or social problems. Critics called for an 
end to market and social regulation and the decentralisation of power and government. 
The problems of bureaucracy and public administration were quite easy targets for critics. 
Criticism was directed at the dysfunctions of bureaucracy, such as blind rule-following, 
risk-aversion, dogmatism, the bureaucratisation of society and the growing asymmetry of 
power and authority in bureaucratic organisations. Reformers sought to eradicate the 
authoritarian hierarchical system represented by the traditional bureaucracy. However, 
this was nothing new, as such. Already after the Second World War, Weber's ideal of 
bureaucracy was seen as outdated, with the management doctrines that defined huge 
organisations taking over. (Tiihonen 2008: 207–208, 210–211.) 
At the turn of the millennium, administrative reforms were based on following the example 
of successful companies. The idea was that a single administrative sector would form a 
business-world-like concern, with a ministry as its main unit. On the other hand, many felt 
that it was not appropriate to merge organisations in the private or public sector. Instead, 
information processing was seen as a way of improving regional, provincial and territorial 
cooperation. For example, during the so-called “managerialist” period, Finnish 
administration was seen in relation to successful companies. If its management is not 
efficient, competent or effective, it was not good. (Vartola 2005: 7–8.) 
Whereas in the bureaucratic theory the responsibility of the public manager is focused on 
the correctness of processes and procedures, the NPM made public managers accountable 
for results. As a principle of NPM, accountability is close to what is meant by the concept 
in the private sector – that is, managerial accountability and result orientation. 
Accountability is defined by economy, efficiency and effectiveness. From an NPM 
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perspective, the economic criteria of accountability are a response to the need to improve 
the legitimacy of public administration. The objective is that taxpayers feel that they are 
getting value for money in the form of services provided by public services. (Lähdesmäki 
2003: 76–77.) Hence, public action has mainly been assessed in terms of economic values. 
However, at the same time, the importance of ethics is also emphasised (Menzel 2005: 25). 
However, the relationship between NPM and administrative ethics is far from clear. For 
example, NPM reforms have undermined the public service ethos and its implementation 
in the public sector (Lawton 1998: 58). The public service ethos refers to a moral outlook 
and state of mind: the public service ethos is the antithesis of the private sector in that it 
is based, at least ideally, on notions of selfless and altruistic work and the pursuit of the 
public good (Frederickson 1997; Salminen & Mäntysalo 2013). 
According to Denhardt and Denhardt (2007), both the bureaucratic theory and NPM 
simplify the subject of responsibility. Whereas in bureaucratic theory, officials are directly 
accountable to politicians, in NPM accountability is measured by efficiency, cost-saving 
and responsiveness to market forces. Also, there are other expectations and needs of 
citizens that bureaucratic theory and NPM simply cannot meet. These include democratic 
principles such as ideals of citizenship and the public interest. (Denhardt & Denhardt 
2007: 119–120, 131.) 
In Hegelian philosophy, the state seeks to control the negative consequences of the market 
(Hegel 1821; Beiser 2005: 249). Through NPM, the situation is another way around. With 
the application of private-sector-influenced administrative doctrines, market principles 
are now applied in public administration. These changes have influenced what civil 
servants consider to be responsible behaviour. As Habermas writes: "To the degree that 
the economic system subjects the life-forms of [...] employees to its imperatives, 
consumerism and possessive individualism, motives of performance, and competition gain 
the force to shape behaviour."(Habermas 1984b: 325) 
For NPM, market exploitation, individualism, performance, and competition are key 
factors in accountability in public administration. On the other hand, for Hegel, the 
domination of market forces implies a fragmented society of selfish individuals. This 
supremacy implies a public organisation of selfish civil servants in public administration, 
leading to opportunistic behaviour and the erosion of the public sector ethos. 
5.1 Market-liberal ideology of NPM  
Each EU Member State has taken features of NPM that are appropriate to its own tradition 
of governance. Because the doctrine is based on right-wing ideology, its principles are not 
mediated as such in the policies of left-wing parties (Hyyryläinen 2004: 76). Naturally, the 
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ways of implementing reforms change from context to context. In Finland, political 
ideology has generally not been sufficient to bring about changes in public administration. 
Hence, in-depth reform of the administration is so strongly resisted that these kinds of 
projects are considered to succeed only in extreme situations (Vartola 2005: 109). 
The market-liberal background of NPM can be found in terms of new right and 
neoliberalism, whose central theorist since the 1970s was F.A. Hayek. Neoliberalism does 
not represent classical liberalism, since it believed that the state should be taken over to 
create markets, rather than simply being demolished. Whereas classical liberalism 
advocated the withdrawal from the state to natural freedom, the new right conception of 
freedom was based on European tax avoidance and anti-statism. In Europe, the 
relationship between liberty and the state differs from the United States because of the 
long tradition of taxation of European kings. Following Hegel, freedom is realized in the 
state.  Thus, state-based social policy is not only a feature of the Nordic model, but of much 
of Europe. To put it bluntly, while the American seeks freedom from the state, the 
European seeks freedom from the market. (Yliaska 2014: 72–75.) 
5.1.1 Justice according to Nozick 
When considering the ideological background of the NPM, Robert Nozick's theory of 
justice should also be taken into account, as he laid the groundwork for the right-wing 
administrative reforms of Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher (Häyry 2000). Nozick's 
Anarchy, State and Utopia (1974) is partly based on a critique of Rawls's (1988) theory of 
justice. According to Rawls, the aim of a responsible public administration pursues social 
and economic equality. Nozick disagreed strongly with this idea. 
The early chapters of Nozick's work deal with the problem of the state in anarchism, i.e. 
whether the state should be established at all (Nozick 1974: 4–25). Nozick writes, contrary 
to the view of traditional anarchists, that a minimal state can be established without 
violating rights. His conceptions of the responsibilities of the state relate to limited 
functions concerning violence, theft, fraud and the enforcement of contracts (Nozick 1974: 
101–119). All other functions of the state violate individual rights, which are the most 
fundamental of rights. Thus, re-distribution of wealth and taxation, in general, are 
restrictions on liberty and, hence, are problematic in nature. According to Nozick, the state 
should not use its public power to help citizens: to help the disadvantaged, individual 
charity is sufficient. Contrary to Rawls, economic and social inequality is not problematic, 
but a consequence of the inherent capacities of individuals. 
For those used to the welfare state, Nozick's philosophy may seem incomprehensible. 
What about the sick, the disabled or the elderly in society? What if there is not enough 
charity? Also, who has the ultimate responsibility to care for the underprivileged (if not 
Acta Wasaensia     78 
the state)? Should not the better-off, if only for their own sake, take into account the need 
to prevent the sharp division of society in the face of threats of unrest and violence? In the 
West, the moderate right has favoured the line that social policy can prevent and control 
social conflict. (Häyry 2000: 171–172; Russell 1987.) 
The libertarian perspective of Nozick blurs the relationship of citizenship to the system, 
the economy and governance. For Nozick, the focus is not on the citizen but the individual 
– stripped of the practices and institutions of life, not to mention the intersubjective nature 
of all communication (and communicative rationality). The so-called “inviolability” of 
individual rights leads to a paradoxical situation in which the rights of individuals are in 
fact violated by removing the social and intersubjective roots of human agency (cf. 
Habermas 1984b: 59–60). This is because individuals are dependent on intersubjectively 
identified normative qualifications through which they reproduce and coordinate the 
common lifeworld (Huttunen 2014). Otherwise, there would be disturbances in social 
integration. 
At the same time, Nozick fails to problematise the mechanisms of social inequality and the 
inequalities generated by free markets. According to Nozick, this is due to the arbitrary 
nature of societal decision-making. On the other hand, decision-making is always more or 
less uncertain, and this should not eliminate the need to take account of injustices. 
Similarly, Habermas stresses that communication should be free of power relations, 
whether or not economic inequalities are the cause. 
5.1.2 Minimalist corporate social responsibility 
The minimalist definition of responsibility can be thought of in terms of corporate social 
responsibility and Milton Friedman's view that the ultimate responsibility of a company is 
to increase its economic profit. In Friedman's view, spending money on (socially) 
responsible activities is wrong for the core business. This is because responsible activities 
are based on promoting social and other public values, not on maximising owners' profits. 
Friedman argues that only natural persons are capable of being responsible: therefore, 
companies themselves cannot be responsible actors. If a company's assets are used for 
purposes other than ensuring the best possible return, this would be using the assets of 
others to promote the public interest and would mean hidden taxation. In addition, 
customers would suffer as a result of the public interest activity, as it would be reflected in 
the higher price of the product or service. Employees would also be effectively paying for 
the activity. (Friedman 1970; Talvio & Välimaa 2004: 26–27.) 
Arguably, this minimum definition for responsibility can be applied to the public 
administration so that its responsibility means the maintenance of the economy in the 
most efficient way. Of course, public organisations are not characterised by the pursuit of 
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profit. However, after the NPM reforms, performance management has an undeniable role 
in modern public management. Also, this is not only a question of applying management 
practices, but also of transmitting values to the sector. Continuing with the minimum 
definition, public organisations should keep their focus on their core activities and on 
serving their customers. In terms of the core business, other pursuits are detrimental to 
the public organization's finances, to the effective service of customers, and to the 
conditions of employees within the organization. 
Relying on libertarianism (and right-wing ideology in general), the NPM reforms blur the 
debate on administrative ethics, since individualism and resource orientation reproduce 
the primacy of a technical and economical definition of public responsibility. However, 
despite their ideological background, many defenders of NPM think that the doctrine is 
politically neutral. Concerning ideology, for example, Scandinavian countries are typically 
understood as social-democratic and managerial systems (Hall 2013; Pollitt & Bouckaert 
2011). These traits do not appear contradictory in practice. Moreover, it can be applied to 
very different kinds of organisations. In other words, NPM is easily adaptable. The 
question arises, however, what then makes the doctrine distinctive? It has been argued 
that NPM can be understood as an umbrella concept, as it contains contradictory elements 
to improve the efficiency of public administration. (Hood 1991: 8–9.) 
5.2 NPM principles of responsibility  
NPM includes at least the following key principles (Hood 1991; Hood 1995: 95–98, 
adapted): 
1. Public management must be practical and based on discretionary control by 
organisations 
2. Outcomes rather than processes: explicit standards and indicators are used to 
assess public performance 
3. The public departments are being broken down into smaller and more manageable 
units 
4. Competition is seen as a solution towards lower costs and better standards 
5. Management practices are adopted from the private sector 
6. Saving resources – public organisations must do more with less than before 
From a communicative point of view, the above principles can be criticised on the 
following grounds. First, simple austerity is not a key driver of accountability. Rather, 
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public organisations must move away from technical and economical criteria towards a 
more dialogical approach to citizens and the rest of society. Moreover, the management 
practices adopted by the private sector do not communicate in the way that public 
administration does or should. The benefits of managerial autonomy also depend on the 
objectives being pursued. Seeking competition may be a solution towards lower costs, but 
at the same time, it undermines the communicative nature of public management and 
increases the systemic values of the economy in public action. This is reflected, for 
example, in the rise of measurement and standards in governance. 
NPM reforms in most OECD countries were based on different theoretical backgrounds 
and practical needs (see e.g. Hall 2013; Hood 1995: 99–106; Aucoin 1990: 134–135). Shick 
(2001) has identified four models behind the administrative doctrine. First, the doctrine 
can be understood as a market model, where markets are seen as efficient and bureaucratic 
monopolies as inefficient. Second, the doctrine has a general idea of management, i.e. 
“management is management” regardless of the sector. The idea of the doctrine is that 
freeing managers from predetermined inputs and operational processes improves 
organisational efficiency. The third model is program strategy. Here, the key to reforming 
the modern state is the efficient allocation of public resources to achieve the state's 
fundamental goals. The incremental strategy, on the other hand, is based on general 
prudence and a sequential approach. Therefore, changes are made cautiously only when 
options open up. (Shick 2001: 136–139.) 
As will be seen, NPM is not a simple and easy-to-grasp set of ideas. In some respects, NPM 
appears to be a contradictory package, as is the case with the management ethos and the 
tightening of political steering. Many advocates of NPM have acknowledged that there are 
contradictions between the approach and the trends that influence it. The reconciliation 
remains to be seen in practical governance reforms (Lähdesmäki 2003: 51; Aucoin 1990: 
129–130). 
5.2.1 Technical rationality in NPM 
NPM combines the ideas of rational management and market exploitation, reflecting the 
market liberalist background of the doctrine. The idea of NPM is that rationality in public 
management is linked to economic productivity thinking (Vakkuri et al. 2012: 142–143). 
According to Habermas, the market-liberal view of administrative power is based on 
rational choices, as it is equated with competition in the market: “If represented by the 
liberal model of market competition, a contest of power is determined by the rational 
choice of optimal strategies” (Habermas 1996: 273–275). However, the problem with the 
market-liberal perspective is what Habermas sees as the normative core of practical 
reasoning, which focuses only on strategic choices and apparent value neutrality. 
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However, an all-encompassing theory of rationality can never be achieved (even for public 
administration) if it is based on economic thinking and productivity. Problematically, the 
starting point of technical rationality excludes different forms of responsibility that reject 
economic logic (Horkheimer & Adorno 2008: 46–47). It can be argued, for example, that 
an economically rational input-output system can be simultaneously efficient, colonizing 
the lifeworld and undermining the legitimacy of public administration. 
NPM considers performance accountability as an important criterion for governance. In 
the context of rational management, NPM is close to Neo-Taylorism. On the other hand, 
NPM differs from Neo-Taylorism in the sense that it seeks to change the culture of 
management instead of just focusing on methods of efficiency. Achieving as much as 
possible with as few resources as possible is one formulation of the principle of efficiency, 
which is at the heart of management theory – alongside the emphasis on hierarchical 
organisation and managerial functions. What is new, however, is the way in which efforts 
have been made to limit or outright reduce the growth of public finances. Governance is 
more often viewed through the lens of new trends in institutional economics. (Pollitt 1993: 
186–187; Hyyryläinen 2004: 49–50, 52.) These theories have implications for how NPM 
understands responsible actors or activities and how they can be managed at all. Indeed, 
post-NPM public management makes use of outsourcing and the associated 
contractualisation of public activities (Lane 2000: 224). 
NPM is a strong advocate of managerialism, a belief, which is represented by the rarely 
tested idea that better management solves economic and social problems. Hence, 
improving efficiency requires increasing the autonomy of public management (Pollitt 
1993: 1–2; Aucoin 1990: 117–118). For example, Osborne and Gaebler (1992) distinguish 
steering from rowing: bureaucratic management is fertile ground for the former but 
destructive for the latter. They offer ten values for entrepreneurial public management: 
competition, citizen empowerment, performance, mission, customer service, problem 
prevention, making money rather than spending it, decentralisation, market practices and 
intersectoral cooperation (Osborne & Gaebler 1992: 20). 
5.3 Theories defining NPM  
In the relationship between NPM and responsibility, it should be noted that the former 
has been influenced by economic views such as transactional theory, principal-agent 
theory and public choice theory. Managerialism is also based on economic principles. The 
aspects of these theories are present in what NPM considers to be a responsible action. For 
example, the principal-agent theory is based on the lack of trust between principal and 
agent. The contribution of the underlying theories that influence NPM (public choice 
theory, managerialism, principal-agent theory and transaction cost economics) can be 
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illustrated in the table below. These influences are discussed in more detail in the following 
subsections. 
Table 3. Influences of NPM (Lähdesmäki 2003: 52, adapted) 
The impact of public choice theory on 
the formation of NPM 
The impact of managerialism on the 
formation of NPM 
• A better administration is always 
smaller 
• The idea of the civil servant is 
summed up in the idea of 
bureaucrats wasting taxpayers' 
money 
• The call for stronger political 
guidance in the administration 
• Citizens are seen as consumers 
making choices 
• Generalisability of management 
• The idealisation of leadership 
• Focus on results and cost-
effectiveness 
• Rewarding staff based on 
performance 
Influences of principal-agent theory 
on the formation of NPM 
The impact of transaction cost 
economics on the formation of NPM 
• Differentiation of the roles of 
subscribers and producers 
• Self-interest and respect for the 
agreement 
• The problem of trust 
• The principal's role is to encourage 
and supervise the agent, to engage 
the agent 
• Positive attitude towards the market 
and competition 
• Operating in the market itself entails 
costs 
• Outsourcing and privatisation of 
public services 
• Attention to transaction costs in 
management studies 
5.3.1 Public choice theory 
Public choice theory approaches its field of research from a methodological individualist 
perspective: individuals make decisions in different situations according to their own 
preferences and aims. Public choice theory's conception of the individual as a rational 
agent (homo economicus) maximising the utility function has its origins in neoclassical 
economics. (Buchanan & Tullock 1962; Arrow 1951; Tullock 1987.) Through its 
methodological outlook, the theory challenges the traditional view of the civil servant as a 
pursuer of collective values. Naturally, this has implications for how public accountability 
should be understood. For example, is it even possible to think about accountability in a 
broad sense if the civil servant is primarily a selfish one? 
Within the public choice theory, there are differences in what is rational for actors. In any 
case, the theory moves the rationality of public action away from collectivism towards 
individualism. Downs recognises altruism as one of the motivations of actors alongside 
self-interest. He argues that individuals in different situations have a variety of ways of 
acting rationally. The analysis of Niskanen, in turn, highlights how the actions of a rational 
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bureaucrat lead to socially negative consequences. For example, the bureaucrat seeks to 
increase his or her budget to increase influence, which increases the size of the public 
sector and reduces efficiency. (Hyyryläinen 2005: 12; Downs 1967: 85–85; Niskanen 1971: 
47–48.) 
According to public choice theory, there is no guarantee that public decision-making will 
benefit everyone. The problem is compounded by the lack of an optimal organisational 
structure and processes in the public sector. There are no unambiguous indicators of 
public sector performance, making it difficult to assess the performance of agencies and 
individuals. In addition, the public choice theory assumes that public organisations are 
overly protected from competition. (Boyne et al. 2003: 6–7; Aucoin 1990: 116–117.) 
Public administration under public choice theory is based on five criticisms. (1) Only 
individuals are capable of rational choices. (2) Public administration should be efficient 
and small. (3) Public administration should favour competition and private modes of 
production. (4) Public organisations should be put in competition with each other. (5) An 
economically optimal size for the public sector should be found. (Salminen & Ikola-
Norrbacka 2009: 111; Aucoin 1990: 119–120; Niskanen 1971: 227–230.) 
It is the thinking of homo economicus that leads NPM to take the minimal agency found 
in the bureaucratic theory to its logical conclusion. Habermas writes about the agency of 
experts in organisations as follows: “To the extent that methodical-rational conduct of life 
gets uprooted, purposive-rational action orientations become self-sufficient; technically 
intelligent adaptation to the objectified milieu of large organizations is combined with 
utilitarian calculation of the actor's own interests” (Habermas 1984b: 323). 
According to Habermas, the behaviour of experts is based on instrumental goals rather 
than on ethical obligations. Experts see these goals as individualistic opportunities for 
money and career advancement (Habermas 1984b: 323–324.) Although the responsibility 
of bureaucratic theory is primarily a matter of compliance, the doctrine is also influenced 
by professional accountability and the ethos of public service. These influences serve a 
broader understanding of responsibility in public administration than individualism. 
The individualistic and economic conception of agency also leads to what NPM (Tiihonen 
2008: 215–217) has later been criticised for – namely, atomism (Habermas 1984b: 209). 
Economic rationality does not provide a mechanism for coordinating action between 
different actors. Unlike markets, where self-interest can serve the public interest, public 
action can hardly be described by the mechanism of the invisible hand (Smith 2015). 
Another significant problem with the public choice theory is that it leads to a Hobbesian 
state of nature in the social context, "the war of all against all" (Habermas 1996: 336–337). 
This is the logical conclusion of the individualistic approach. First of all, the public choice 
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theory cannot explain how strategic actors are able to maintain their social relations 
through their rational decisions. Furthermore, it is implausible to assume that all social 
behaviour is strategic in nature and that it can be explained in terms of individual-centred 
utilitarianism. "If people always engaged in opportunistic behaviour when they could get 
away with it, civilization as we know would not exist" (Habermas 1996: 337). This remark 
can be applied more specifically to public administration. If the behaviour of civil servants 
were based on opportunism, public administration as we know it would simply not exist! 
People are driven not only by opportunistic behaviour but also, for example, by honesty 
and a sense of duty (Habermas 1996: 337). 
5.3.2 Managerialism  
In addition to public choice theory, NPM is influenced by managerialism, which is seen as 
improving the accountability and performance of government. Today, it can be claimed 
that the impact of managerialism on modern public management has been significant. For 
example, the characteristics of managerialism are listed as professionalism, freedom of 
action and accountability. Also, managerialism is expressed in terms of ideology, 
organisational practices and efficiency-oriented, individual-centered management. 
(Viinamäki 2008: 47–48; Hood 1991; Pollitt 1993.) 
Habermas writes of a market-liberal conception of politics that has similarities with NPM 
managerialism: “politics [is] normally the business of managers and bureaucrats whose 
behaviour matches the liberal description of strategic market competition steered by 
personal interests” (Habermas 1996: 277). As a market-liberal doctrine, NPM also sees 
public administration as the domain of managers, whose behaviour is best described by 
the strategic nature of their actions, their market orientation and their personal interests. 
Managerialism can be divided into Neo-Taylorist and general management. 
Managerialism is inspired by the principles of Taylorism, or scientific management, which 
include improving work efficiency, measuring performance, rewarding performance and 
linking human resources to productivity. An important Taylorist principle is the view of 
management as a science. Hence, management can be applied to all human activities and 
includes certain universal principles and rules. (Hood 1995: 96–97; Taylor 1911; Fayol 
1916; Lähdesmäki 2003: 49; Pollitt 1993: 177). 
Like Neo-Taylorism, NPM is focused on increasing efficiency, which is also a key element 
of responsibility. On the other hand, what distinguishes NPM from Neo-Taylorism is its 
emphasis on the quality of public service delivery. (Pollitt 1993: 186–197.) Other Neo-
Taylorist features of NPM include, for example, increased control and cost allocation in 
line with private-sector practices; accountability for results, i.e. the achievement of 
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predetermined goals; individual reward and sanctions for errors and underperformance. 
(Keraudren & van Mierlo 1998; Aucoin 1990: 121.) 
Taylor's work is based on Bentham's philosophy. Therefore, it is not surprising to find 
Benthamian features in managerialism. In this case, we can speak of responsibility as 
austerity. Bentham, for example, thought that public management should be approached 
through the principle of frugality, i.e. cutting costs and doing more work with fewer 
resources (Hood 1991; Bowrey & Smark 2010). According to Bentham, good public 
management is related to two aspects, namely, the nature of the public service and the 
universal notion of good management as frugality (Bentham 1843: 28). 
In addition to Bentham, managerialism has other utilitarian and consequentialist starting 
points. The consequentialist manager pursues the maximum pursuit of the public good: 
this means choosing the action in decision-making that ensures the greatest possible 
aggregate welfare or benefit (Svara 1997; Mill 2000: 16–20, 24; Bentham 2000: 31; Svara 
1997). In this way, responsibility is easy to conceptualise, for example, in the marketplace. 
On the other hand, Goodin (1998) sees utilitarianism as a philosophy particularly suited 
to public administration. This is due to utilitarianism's emphasis on maximising welfare, 
as public managers rarely have the resources to consider all the details in their decision-
making. However, Goodin's argument for the applicability of utilitarianism to public 
management is more technically rational (it is efficient) than substantively normative. For 
example, the utilitarian view of justice pays no attention to how the sum of well-being is 
distributed among individuals or to how individuals distribute their well-being over time 
(Rawls 1988: 25–27). However, these are key questions for public administration that 
need to be addressed. 
5.3.3 Principal-agent theory  
After decades, the view of public administration as a strictly public and monopolistic 
system has changed to a multifunctional arrangement. The public sector's own activities 
and cooperation with other actors are now almost as important. This cooperation is 
commonly conceptualised in terms of principal-agent theory, where the principal hires the 
agent to act in accordance with his interests (Hyyryläinen 2004: 49–50). 
The principal-agent theory is based on the assumption that the principal has an interest in 
holding the agent accountable for his or her actions. The theory assumes that a rational 
agent will seek to exploit information asymmetry arising from the relationship. In other 
words, the agent cannot be considered as an accountable agent in the absence of control 
by the principal. Thus, the principal seeks to control and enforce the compliance of the 
agent with aims and norms. However, this does not imply that the principal spends a lot 
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of time and resources on this effort. Ultimately, sanctions and other harsh control 
mechanisms are costly methods for the principal, who may opt for more indirect means of 
control to assess the accountable party. The principal-agent theory also relies on the 
assumption that the principal is interested in the performance of the delegated task or that 
he or she seeks to correct the accountable person and his or her actions. Research suggests 
that principal-agent problems generate additional costs for both principal and agent. For 
the principal, the costs consist of incentivising and controlling the agent. For example, 
incentive rewards imply a cost that would otherwise be spent on other activities of the 
public organisation and on ensuring that the organisation's employees act in the 
organisation's best interests (Schillemans 2014: 198–199; Hyyryläinen 2004: 49–50, 59–
61; Arrow 1985: 38–39). 
The principal-agent theory is in many ways the opposite of what Habermas (1996: 119) 
characterises as the communicative action of participants. In principal-agent theory, 
coordination is based on the interest of the principal; in communicative action, 
coordination is based on the consensus between the participants. The principal-agent 
relationship also depends on the reward received by the agent and the realisation of the 
principal's interest. The relationship between communicative agents is based on openness 
and dialogue. Whereas principal-agent theory emphasises the realisation of interests, 
communicative action highlight the emergence of consensus. Moreover, the assumptions 
of the principal-agent theory are independent of the extrinsic motivations of the actors – 
in communicative action, the opposite is the case, and external incentives are secondary. 
Habermas writes: 
Communicatively acting subjects commit themselves to coordinating their action 
plans on the basis of a consensus that depends in turn on their reciprocally taking 
positions on, and intersubjectively recognizing, validity claims. From this it follows 
that only those reasons count that all the participating parties together find 
acceptable. It is in each case the same kinds of reasons that have a rationally 
motivating force for those involved in communicative action. By contrast, the actor 
who simply decides as she wishes is not concerned whether the reasons that are 
decisive for her could also be accepted by others. In the case of purposive-rational 
behavior, agent-relative reasons suffice. (Habermas 1996: 119–120.) 
How the principal-agent theory can be applied in the public sector is a question of its own. 
Nevertheless, its application in public accountability is common. At the very least, 
information asymmetry is evident, which may undermine accountability. In Finland, for 
example, civil servants are, as a rule, highly educated and knowledgeable. Either we simply 
have to rely on the loyalty of the civil service to policymakers and the public, or we have to 
create a system of incentives and controls to prevent opportunistic behaviour. 
(Hyyryläinen 2004: 65; Gailmard 2014: 90–91.) The application of different policy options 
relies on the notion of agency and its capacity for responsible action. 
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The relationship between principal and agent is probably closer to a situation where 
different sectoral actors cooperate. In recent decades, public-private partnerships (PPP) 
have become more common in public administration. For once, they require more than 
just smart purchasing from public managers. For example, the life-cycle model requires 
different public and private actors to trust each other in projects that can last for decades 
(Forrer 2010: 477–478; Johanson et al. 2012: 219, 231–232; Greve & Hodge 2010: 149–
150). 
The life cycle model is based on two promises. First, private sector contributions will ease 
the pressure on public finances. In addition, public services offer more value for money. 
The shift from bureaucratic governance to collaborative arrangements makes it more 
difficult to assess traditional accountability since it is increasingly difficult to identify who 
is ultimately responsible for what. Also, accountability to politicians is also becoming more 
complex, and new forms of accountability alone will not be sufficient to remedy the 
situation. Collaborative arrangements will be judged by results-oriented accountability 
mechanisms. Hence, their focus will be on governance performance, not on whether they 
operate fairly or in accordance with laws and standards. (Willems & Van Dooren 2011: 
524–525.) Unfortunately, little empirical research has been conducted on how 
accountability is implemented in outsourced functions of government (ter Bogt 2018: 3–
4). 
5.3.4 Transaction cost theory  
Transaction cost theory is based on the view that market activity is not costless – it also 
takes time and money. The different types of costs can be broken down, for example, as 
follows. First, the buyer has to find a suitable seller on the market who has the specified 
goods or services (search costs). Next, they have to find out whether the product or service 
is what they are looking for (information costs). In addition, the buyer has to agree, for 
example, on quantity, price, quality and delivery terms (contract costs). Finally, the 
contract has to be put into practice (implementation costs). Naturally, some of these costs 
are ex ante, others ex post. If the up-front costs are compromised, it is likely that more 
resources will have to be devoted to solving problems afterwards. It is also likely that 
higher up-front costs will lead to lower ex-post costs. In terms of overall costs, the issue is 
not straightforward. However, the scale of the acquisition plays a major role in terms of 
legitimate transaction costs. In a large investment, a small mistake can lead to large losses. 
(Hyyryläinen 2004: 55; Coase 1993; Demsetz 1993.) 
Transaction cost theory and principal-agent theory are united by the idea that social 
institutions and arrangements in markets and hierarchical organisations are understood 
as the most efficient solutions to economic problems. In other words, the historical, social 
and political factors that contributed to their emergence are secondary to efficiency. There 
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are also differences between the two theories. The transaction cost theory and the 
principal-agent theory are distinguished by views on the organisation and the rationality 
of the individual in pursuing self-interest. Transaction cost theory is guided by the 
expediency of the organisation, although this would mean abandoning the idea that 
rational agents pursue their own interests. In principal-agent theory, this assumption is 
most essential – leading to the theory's abandonment of the most appropriate organisation 
possible. At the same time, they emphasise the role of contracts in the organisation's 
internal (with management and owners) and external (with business and partners) 
relationships. (Hyyryläinen 2004: 53–54; Hood 1995: 94.) 
5.4 Blurring of accountability  
NPM perspective emphasises accountability, which means holding public managers to 
account for a wide range of issues. These include democratic and legal activities; 
responsibilities concerning governance and its different levels; publicity, media and 
information; professional activities; values in communities and society; service to citizens. 
Assigning accountability can be problematic, as activities may be dispersed across 
different organisations. Also, measuring and evaluating the achievement of accountability 
are difficult objectives. The problem with performance measurement is that it emphasises 
measurables rather than actual needs. In addition, measurement is difficult to measure 
accurately. There is a risk that accountability will degenerate to a level where it is mainly 
about monitoring and sanctioning. (Viinamäki 2008: 50–51.) 
At the same time, NPM reforms have led to a reduction in hierarchies and a weakening of 
accountability in governance. Measuring moral action has always been difficult, but as 
hierarchies have been reduced, it has become even more difficult (Dicke & Boonyarak 
2005; Demmke 2019). NPM sees accountability as something easy to measure, and that 
individuals respond positively to performance measurement. Both of these assumptions 
have been questioned. (Dubnick 2014: 29–30.) 
In the context of NPM accountability, performance measurement is thought to improve 
the accountability of civil servants. However, measuring performance becomes 
challenging when outputs, outcomes and their relationship are unclear. Performance 
accountability is most easily measured in a situation where both outputs and outcomes are 
simply observable (Jennings & Haist 2004). Accountability in public management is 
influenced by broad collective values, the realisation of which cannot be unambiguously 
measured through management of results. These values include public acceptability, 
transparency, collegiality, trust, expertise, impartiality and independence. The 
accountability of public management must be assessed primarily in the light of these 
values. 
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It should be noted that NPM conceptualises accountability from the economic world. 
However, the accountability issues in politics and public administration are different from 
those in economics. For example, a political leader is accountable to his or her electorate 
and citizens, a civil servant to his or her supervisor a higher administrative unit: a business 
leader, on the other hand, is accountable to shareholders or the board of directors of the 
company (Salminen 2016: 9; Salminen 2018: 67–68). 
These forms of accountability are based on different institutional arrangements. Mulgan 
(2002) defines accountability as a relationship “in which one party, the holder of 
accountability, has the right to seek information about, to investigate and to scrutinize the 
actions of another party, the giver of accountability” (Mulgan 2002: 3). Sullivan (2009: 
66) points out that the rights and obligations of the holder of accountability and the giver 
of accountability change from context to context. Hence, for this reason, accountability 
should be viewed in a sociological sense, where actors negotiate their identities, 
responsibilities and obligations with each other. Sullivan calls his model mutual 
accountability. 
According to Mattei (2007: 369), NPM has led to a decline in political accountability. 
Managerial accountability is characterised by a focus on value-neutral and economic 
management of administrative functions, rather than problematising wider societal issues. 
On the other hand, accountable public action should require integrity and moral agency 
from the individual civil servant up to the political-administrative level. Viewing 
accountability as a technical and neutral activity has reduced the capacity of political actors 
to exercise democratic control. This has been particularly the case in the UK, while in 
Germany managerialist reforms have been slowed down by the state-centredness of the 
country. (Mattei 2007: 369–371, 383.) 
One of the objectives of the NPM reforms has been to increase transparency and 
accountability in public administration. Accountability information can make public 
action more transparent and provide a basis for control. Against this information, it is 
easier to assess results when considering outsourcing or, more generally, public sector 
cooperation with other actors. The problem arises when accountability practices and 
performance monitoring are informal. In such cases, trust, shared values, autonomy and 
cooperation are important. Although well-documented accountability information is 
available, it is very rarely used as a means of increasing control. In outsourcing, there are 
few situations involving mechanistic, market relations and principal-agent theory. (ter 
Bogt 2018: 2–3; Mills & Koliba 2014: 4–6.) 
NPM has also led to the growth of stakeholder thinking in public administration. This issue 
is also linked to the accountability and responsiveness of public administrations. 
Stakeholders are used to assess and justify the performance and legitimacy of the public 
sector. The assumption is that the organisation will improve its performance, management 
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and results by interacting with the environment. It is also assumed that an organisation is 
effective when it is responsive to its stakeholders. Stakeholders can be both direct and 
indirect and can have very different expectations of the organisation's performance. In 
stakeholder thinking, organisations are resource dependent on their stakeholders. If the 
organisation does not meet the demands of its stakeholders, they will stop resourcing the 
organisation. In other words, organisations need to act responsively and innovate in 
response to the needs of their stakeholders. For example, public service provision can be 
subject to certain general criteria relating to the adequacy, targeting and quality of services 
and the correctness of solutions. (Viinamäki 2008: 57–58, 62.) 
Keeping customer and stakeholder thinking as accountability mechanisms poses its own 
problems.  Defining clients and stakeholders in the public sector is challenging because of 
the collective nature of financing the public service. Collectivity makes, in principle, all 
citizens customers of public administrations. However, accountability mechanisms will 
simply not work if they are understood too broadly. Moreover, the concept of the customer 
means very different things depending on the characteristics of the public service. For 
example, there is a difference between the "customer service" of a prison guard and that of 
a teacher. (Peters & Pierre 1998: 227–228.) In NPM, customer service is generally thought 
to improve the quality of public services and, ultimately, the legitimacy of the public sector. 
On the other hand, private sector management doctrines may at the same time lead to 
improved efficiency and reduced responsiveness and accessibility of services (Viinamäki 
2008: 65). 
As NPM gives public managers a wide degree of autonomy, the doctrine underlines the 
importance of negotiation. This also means reconciling the different actors' values and 
conflicts. Public managers seek to strike a balance between multiple and potentially 
competing for demands, making negotiation and conflict resolution skills important 
leadership qualities (Bryer 2007: 486–489.) On the other hand, negotiation can further 
blur accountability relationships. 
5.5 Criticism of NPM  
NPM has led to the adoption of new strategic methods in public administration. In 
management theory, it is thought that strategic market intervention ultimately increases 
the accountability of public management. Economically this may be true, but at the same 
time, private sector management practices reduce the accountability of public 
administration. “Buyers and sellers act 'strategically' rather than communicatively 
inasmuch as they make decisions according to their own interests and external market 
conditions” (Rehg 1996: xviii). Strategic methods undermine accountability and trust 
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between actors. Communicatively, NPM is not primarily interested in building consensus, 
but in economic benefits and accountability for results. 
Deregulation has led to the adoption of market mechanisms in public organisations, and 
many administrations have transformed themselves into independent public corporations 
or semi-public enterprises. This has reduced the core functions of the state and delegated 
responsibility for state management to lower levels. This delegation of responsibility 
makes it difficult to see the big picture and to be accountable. (Tiihonen 2008: 215–217; 
Hood 1995: 106–107; Aucoin 1990: 129–135.) 
5.5.1 Strategic action 
Communicatively, the problem with NPM is its dependence on accountability and 
negotiation, which reproduce the technical rationality and strategic action. "The practice 
of reaching understanding differs from that of bargaining with respect to its intended 
aim: the desired agreement is understood in one case as consensus, in the other as 
negotiated agreement or contract. In the former case, appeal is made to the consideration 
of norms and values; in the latter, to that of interest positions" (Habermas 1996: 140). 
According to Habermas, consensus can be reached through dialogue based on discourse 
ethics. Negotiation, on the other hand, is not based on the observance of norms or values, 
but the realisation of interests. This means that accountability for results is assessed 
through technical-economic criteria such as performance. There is a risk that performance 
accountability will not take into account norms that cannot be assessed within the 
framework of technical rationality. Since accountability for results is conceptualised in 
technical terms, normativity and rationality of action are mutually exclusive: coordination 
is then based on negotiation and compromise between strategically behaving actors 
(Habermas 1996: 338). The tools of NPM are instrumental or strategic: they mean either 
intervention in the world outside the actor or manipulation of people in the social world. 
5.5.2 Diminishment of public values 
NPM has been criticised in particular for its financial and results-oriented approach, which 
overlooks equality and equity in governance (Viinamäki 2008: 50). The reduced range of 
values in public management undermines the realisation of public values in society. In 
contrast to the private sector, the public sector is concerned with social welfare, equality, 
equal opportunities and the equitable distribution of public resources (Vigoda 2000: 167). 
The diminishment of public values in public management is partly due to the NPM 
arrangements, which approach accountability through the value of economy. Adherence 
to a general value approach is difficult in the context of outsourcing, which not only 
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undermines accountability and transparency, but also the concrete role and freedom of 
staff. Legal accountability and compliance with standards in an outsourced service is a 
particular challenge. Outsourcing can also make bureaucratic accountability more difficult 
if the public sector is unable to monitor contracts. Performance management makes 
political accountability for goals that are not based on the delivery of tasks more difficult. 
Such goals include, for example, legal transparency of information or freedom of 
information. They are central to the overall quality of governance, but are not a priority for 
the day-to-day tasks of public organisations. (Chan & Rosenbloom 2010: 15–17; Romzek 
& Dubnick 1987: 28.) 
The way how values have changed in public administration has had also a legal impact. In 
Finland, legal accountability has been hampered by the fact that the distinction between 
private law and public law is often blurred. In principle, the relationship between a public 
authority and a client can be a legal relationship under administrative law or a contractual 
relationship under private law. The problem is not limited to Finland. It has complicated 
legal accountability in countries that have undergone NPM reforms. For example, 
municipalities have delegated to private law entities activities which, broadly construed, 
can at least sometimes involve the exercise of public authority. There are still many open 
questions about outsourcing, such as how good governance principles are implemented at 
the different stages of outsourcing. This is a key issue when considering the implications 
and limitations of outsourcing in public administration. (Komulainen 2010: 33–34; 
Mäenpää 2002: 18; Chan & Rosenbloom 2010: 17.) 
5.5.3 Naïve managerial outlook 
Among the forms of responsibility, accountability is linked to the autonomy of public 
management and the responsibility to report to different bodies. NPM was once a 
proponent of this theme. The more autonomy given is to managers, the greater the 
accountability. However, NPM fails to address the question of how accountability can be 
enforced in increasingly complex relationships where public and private sector 
responsibilities are blurred. This is the case, for example, with outsourcing. The current 
accountability setup is very different from that of bureaucratic theory. Traditionally, 
bureaucracy has been guided by a sense of obligation, whereby civil servants are obliged 
to be open, honest, fair, objective and impartial. (Viinamäki 2017: 84–85; Chan 2010: 15.) 
The problem is how to ensure the accountability of the public manager while at the same 
time giving him or her greater autonomy and discretion. From the NPM perspective, the 
answer lies in performance. Accountability for results requires demonstrating 
performance, which is done by measuring and evaluating results. (Lähdesmäki 2003: 77–
78.) The idea is that public management can be given greater freedom as long as it is 
accountable, i.e. cost-effective. In other words, public managers are trusted in their ability 
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to act responsibly. However, this is in contrast to another NPM view, which often argues 
that public service delivery should be conceptualised through principal-agent theory and 
low-trust relationships (Hyyryläinen 2004). 
NPM relies above all on the ability of public managers to act in a performance-oriented 
way. The situation is not so simple with other actors. One might pose a difficult question. 
What makes public managers more responsible than other actors? This is probably an 
assumption, like the claim that accountability in the private sector produces more 
accountable behaviour in the public sector. From the NPM perspective, trust is distrust 
(Viinamäki 2017: 109). More freedom of action may, in fact, reduce responsibility 
(Lähdesmäki 2003: 79). 
In any case, NPM will place a stronger obligation on public management to demonstrate 
accountability. This is particularly the case for individual managers. On the other hand, 
performance management and the measurement of issues, implementation and delivery 
narrow the range of values in public management. The focus of management is on values 
that can be operationalised in terms of indicators and measurable quantities. 
Accountability and accountability are broader in content and form, but conceptually 
difficult and poorly operationalised. They therefore require particular attention. 
(Viinamäki 2017: 85–86.) 
5.5.4 Public-Private Partnerships 
According to Greve and Hodge (2010), the five main threats are contract complexity, 
conflicting roles of governance, partnership choice, partnership management and contract 
length. First, complex contracts make it difficult to achieve technical accountability, where 
the focus is on formal standards. However, the problems of public-private partnerships 
are not limited to technical criteria. The conflicting roles of government call into question 
the principle of communicative authenticity, whereby the integrity and consistency of the 
actor should be trusted. This is also reflected in the motives behind the public 
organisation’s choice of partnerships. In terms of partnership management, accountability 
is not something that lies solely in the hands of the public actor – the accountability of the 
private partnership should also be ensured. Finally, the length of the contract makes it 
difficult to predict the environment. The longer the contract, the more difficult it is to 
manage partnerships with different roles. 
Greve and Hodge (2010) present five threats to public governance posed by PPPs that 
undermine accountability and responsibility in public action: 
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Table 4. Threats to accountability (Greve & Hodge 2010: 153–155) 
The threat Details 
The complexity of 
contracts 
Public-private partnerships are based on complex contracts, 
usually of long duration. Understanding the contractual terms 
requires financial and legal expertise. Contract negotiations are 
often complex and rarely involve consultation with citizens or 
stakeholders. 
Conflicting roles for the 
administration 
Governments find themselves in many conflicting interests, such 
as public finance, economic development or political-ideological 
alignment. The finance minister can be both an advocate of 
privatisation and a steward of public finances. 
Choosing partnership Public-private partnerships are one form of governance among 
others. The choice of governance is not necessarily based on 
deliberation or on weighing strengths and weaknesses. 
Partnership 
management 
The challenge for governance is how to manage a private partner 
or its strategic agenda. Companies can neglect their 
responsibilities and mutually agreed contractual terms. 
Length of contract PPP contracts are difficult in the sense that their length usually 
varies between 30 and 40 years. It is therefore almost impossible 
to predict which environmental factors will affect public 
governance or the partnership over that period. 
A key feature of market-based management and partnership relationships is the 
reconciliation of public and private interests, which easily leads to a loss of control and 
public decision-making. The problem with NPM reforms is that market orientation 
dominates public management practices and detaches public management from the 
principles of community. Perhaps the ultimate justification for public administration is 
that it seeks to serve society and the wider public. Often the result is that the public sector 
is unable to, or even does not seek to, stabilise social development. (Anttiroiko 2004: 46–
47.) 
From the NPM outlook, citizenship is perceived through customer service and selfish self-
interest. Public organisations are primarily accountable to their customers, not to citizens 
as such. Responsible government provides appropriate services to its customers, where 
accountability is about satisfying individual preferences. As NPM seeks to outsource public 
activities, accountability will at least partly shift from the public sector to the private sector. 
The accountability of an outsourcing administration will be based on delivering services 
and goods in the most cost-effective way and satisfying customer needs. Accountability 
standards are lower in the private sector than in the public sector, as responsiveness to 
customers is different from responsiveness to citizens. Furthermore, accountability issues 
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are not limited to serving partnerships and customers. (Denhardt & Denhardt 2007: 131–
133.) 
5.5.5 Vicious circle of accountability for results 
What does responsibility mean in NPM? It means accountability for results, i.e. achieving 
pre-set goals and reporting accountability to someone; efficiency and performance 
management; austerity, i.e. cutting costs and doing more work with fewer resources or 
saving money; inclination towards market forces and customers, which is why public 
administration is outsourced or privatised. Fundamentally, NPM sees responsibility as 
something that can be managed in terms of rationality. In this case, rationality refers to 
instrumental rationality, i.e. seeing public administration as an input-output system in the 
context of productivity thinking. 
NPM represents a minimalist view of responsibility. Within this framework, responsibility 
issues are translated back into effective action at the individual and organisational levels. 
The social responsibility of public organisations is based on efficiency through competition 
and customer service. Within the NPM framework, competition in the (quasi-)market is 
thought to enable public organisations to be efficient. Internal accountability mechanisms 
are primarily based on economic criteria and the achievement of results. This undermines 
accountability for issues that are not assessed within the processes. Of all the 
administrative doctrines, NPM requires the least ethical motivation from the civil servant. 
What distinguishes NPM from bureaucratic compliance is the demonstration of 
accountability through result-orientation and financial metrics. However, the problem is 
that accountability is influenced by many phenomena that cannot be easily measured. In 
the past, the criteria were based on bureaucratic administration and its hierarchical 
principles, and on the relatively limited discretion of officials. At the same time, and 
contradictorily, NPM stresses the need to increase the autonomy of public managers, while 
emphasising a more minimalist conception of moral agency than bureaucratic theory. The 
question arises as to what criteria can be used to guarantee more autonomy to public 
managers if they do not have the conditions for ethical behaviour. 
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Figure 7. Risks of accountability for results 
On the basis of the literature review, public management under NPM can pose the 
following risks for accountability. First, public management for results leads to 
outsourcing and contracting. As Habermas (1996: 216) writes: "the principle of freedom 
of contract, and hence the liberal vision of society as a regulated competition between 
private persons acting in a purposive-rational manner, is upheld". The communication 
between agents is based on the principal-agent relationship and the utilitarian mentality 
with the growth of opportunism. Consequently, the agent's opportunistic behaviour is 
likely to lead to a loss of trust between the agents (if it is not already weak). 
In a situation of low trust, accountability mechanisms are formal and financial. The vicious 
circle is complete and the same methods are being used to improve the situation. 
Accountability for results leads to new outsourcing and contracting, defined by principal-
agent relationships and lower levels of trust. Moreover, it is difficult for the public manager 
to check that the outsourced service has been provided in a responsible manner. He or she 
can demand accountability within the terms of the contract, but does not have a direct link 
with the activities of the external organisation. Thus, communication between 
management and production is technical and becomes more complex. 
The vicious circle illustrated above shows only one side of market relations. For example, 
the relations could be based on high trust and the creation of innovative solutions. 
However, the vicious circle is defined by NPM ideals of economy and efficiency, which have 
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confidence lead to increasing opportunism. This makes it increasingly difficult for public 
management to convey public or collective values in its actions. 
The market orientation found in NPM shows how a moral phenomenon such as 
responsibility can be assessed in terms of an “economic yardstick”. Accountability is a 
management tool that does not require philosophical argumentation or a sense of moral 
consciousness to make the “right decision”. This reflects the influence of the economic 
world in determining individual action, so that individuals judge themselves by their own 
market value and what they are they learn from how they fare in economical thinking 
(Horkheimer & Adorno 2008: 274). 
Hence, criteria for public management are sought from technical values and do not have 
to be intrinsic or moral. Questions of responsibility and accountability return to rational 
and economic measures of performance accountability. The evaluation of the performance 
of public management is based on clear standards measured by economic figures. At the 
same time, the autonomy of the public manager is emphasised (Pollitt 1993: 1–3). The 
concept of agency is framed in terms of economic theories and perspectives that highlight 
the importance of individuals and their selfish preferences. 
Whereas bureaucratic theory stresses the primacy of duties over consequences, NPM sees 
things the other way round. Ultimately, responsibility in public management comes back 
to the measurable consequences of the action. In terms of duties, a conflict arises between 
private and public values. The actions of public officials are still based on a number of 
values that emphasise duty, such as the principle of legality, impartiality and 
independence. If civil servants pursue their own selfish preferences, what is the role of 
public values? The principles of duty are difficult to quantify in economic terms, as they 
must be present in public life all the time (at least ideally speaking). 
5.6 NPM's communicative responsibility  
5.6.1 Principle of openness 
In NPM, the principle of openness is limited by a concept of agency based on technical 
rationality. Communication between actors is instrumental and strategic, rather than 
consensual. Technical rationality offers the tools for accountability for results. The 
administrative doctrines represents a market-liberal view of public agency in which 
democratic will formation is conceived as a mediation of individuals' self-interests and as 
a phenomenon parallel to the market (Habermas 1996: 268–269). 
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It is not possible to talk about NPM without management practices in the private sector or 
the use of (quasi-)markets, as accountability for results has led to managerialism and the 
outsourcing of public services. In NPM, the responsible actor is homo economicus, who is 
acting in a cost-effective way on the basis of economic indicators. NPM thinks of 
arrangements as improving the accountability of public administrations through the 
principle of frugality (more results with fewer resources). In the markets, arrangements 
are based on buyers and sellers, economic information and the added value of the 
relationship. In the market, accountability is minimal: it is the realisation of the individual 
preferences of actors and the resulting cost-effectiveness. This is reflected in public choice 
theory and principal-agent theory. 
In markets, the key role is negotiation, which usually excludes parties and stakeholders 
affected by externalities. Here, the activity of market participants is based on the amount 
of value added to the relationship. The activity of market participants is constrained by 
capital, supply/demand ratios, product prices and transaction costs. Lack of information 
also plays a crucial role in making optimal decisions. 
NPM is defined by the phenomenon of outsourcing, which does not simply complicate 
accountability relationships. Outsourcing also means a weakening of the principle of 
transparency in public administration, as, for example, the incorporation of public 
enterprises places resources outside public control. Transparency has also been 
undermined by the values of the economic world, which are at odds with the public service 
ethos. 
5.6.2 Principle of freedom of speech  
In NPM, communication is understood in terms of economic criteria, the negotiation 
situation and the autonomy of the manager, which makes implementing the principle of 
freedom of speech difficult. In this way, the administrative doctrine reproduces the 
hierarchical nature of bureaucratic theory, although the methods are partly different. 
Negotiation is rarely between two equal partners, economic criteria are determined from 
the top-down – and the manager even has the right to make decisions without consulting 
the other parties. Collective acceptance does not come about except through negotiated 
agreements. The market situation is also based on the conditions and price mechanism 
created by supply and demand. On the other hand, the price mechanism is challenging to 
operate in a quasi-market situation. 
Public-private partnerships make it more difficult to monitor public management 
responsibility and accountability. The contractual terms that define partnerships 
undermine the communicative nature of the activity, as they often require technical 
expertise to interpret. In contractualisation, managing responsibility can be reduced to 
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contract management and the maintenance of a low level of trust. This is particularly the 
case when a public organisation seeks cost efficiency through the outsourcing of public 
services. 
In a quasi-quasi market situation, operators are at least in principle on an equal footing as 
buyers and sellers. This is at least a liberal view of the nature of the market since each agent 
has equal freedom to buy or not to buy a service or product (Habermas 1996: 44). However, 
it is obvious that there are inequalities of wealth and opportunity. As Habermas states, 
“[t]he liberal market model tends to ignore and trivialize actual inequalities” (Habermas 
1996: 424). Of course, everyone has the freedom to interpret and criticise market relations, 
but there is no mechanism of communication other than through price. Differences in 
knowledge also lead to different transaction costs and hence to inequalities between actors. 
5.6.3 Principle of authenticity  
According to the principle of authenticity, actors express their beliefs, desires and needs. 
The NPM's accountability for results inevitably leads to a situation in which the rationality 
of agency is based, at least in part, on dishonesty when it makes sense from the view of 
economic effectiveness. Accountability for results has meant a loss of trust and an increase 
in opportunism in public administration. However, in the context of accountability for 
results, it can be argued that opportunistic behaviour can also be beneficial, as long as it is 
carried out in a market towards other actors. 
The relationship between buyer and seller is built on trust or lack of it. In general, market 
activity is based on low levels of trust. This also comes back to the issue of 
contractualisation. For example, in a partnership, contractuality is based on consideration 
of the other party and an equal relationship between the parties, with the aim of sharing 
risks and benefits. On the other hand, the relationship is always built on self-interest. Trust 
exists as long as the partnership serves this principle. This is also a prerequisite for 
dialogue leading to concrete action. 
NPM seeks clarity through the unambiguity of economic criteria: responsibility equals 
cost-effectiveness and the private sector management practices that rely on it. Public 
managers demonstrate their accountability for results through the achievement of 
financial indicators. However, the clarity of the discourse is challenged when the principles 
of the economic world are applied to public management through simple assertions. The 
context of public administration is different from the economic context. There are more 
forms of accountability in public administration than in the economy – and many of them 
do not follow economic principles. In terms of discursive honesty, it can be argued that the 
principles of NPM have not produced the results that they are claimed to have produced. 
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NPM has not simplified accountability and transparency in public administration, but has 
made them more complex. 
The managerialist talk of managerial omnipotence ("let managers manage") in a discourse 
where the pursuit of selfish interests is the central assumption of agency can also be seen 
as dishonest. In market relations, the pathologies of responsibility largely follow the same 
lack of moral agency. The emphasis on managerial autonomy can lead to opportunistic 
behaviour on the part of management. 
The legitimacy of NPM is problematic, as it seeks its legitimacy in a different context – the 
values of the private sector. This means that public sector values are somewhat neglected. 
This, in turn, narrows the scope of public responsibility, such as the public interest and the 
extent of social responsibility. Citizens may not be seen as subordinates, but is mere 
customer discourse much better? The question is also ideological in nature. In terms of 
truthfulness, the NPM can be said to be coloured by political-ideological premises. This 
raises a number of questions. Why is accountability for results the most important of all 
forms of responsibility? Why should those values and principles of governance that cannot 
be measured in financial terms be secondary to this kind of accountability? 
Habermas (1984b) links the economic system to the colonization of the private sphere and 
the administrative system to the colonization of the public sphere. “As the private sphere 
is undermined and eroded by the economic system, so too is the public sphere by the 
administrative system” (Habermas 1984b: 325). The situation, however, is more complex 
than this. Also, there is internal colonization between the economic and administrative 
systems. As a result of administrative reforms, the economy plays an increasingly 
important role in administrative norms and practices. This is not a new situation, since the 
monetisation of social communication has influenced public administration, for example 
in the form of taxation (Habermas 1984b: 267). However, the forms of internal 
colonization have changed. The techniques used have become more sophisticated methods 
of management, influencing the norms and policies of public administration. 
NPM obliges civil servants to act according to externally imposed financial standards, 
which undermines moral agency and personal accountability. At the same time, incentives 
are based on individual goals. Although the scope of personal accountability may be wider 
than in hierarchical relationships, it is primarily based on the demonstration of 
accountability for results. This undermines the importance of values outside the process. 
Although individual responsibility is lower in hierarchies, they also legitimise action on 
the basis of collective principles. 
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5.6.4 Principle of reciprocity  
NPM is not an effective administrative doctrine for questioning authority. This is reflected 
in managerialism and the notion of managerial autonomy. In a quasi-market, contracting 
can be a means where everyone has, at least in principle, equal opportunities to 
demonstrate accountability and in turn to hold others to account. However, the contract 
only covers the parties that have signed it. This is one of the most obvious weaknesses of 
NPM accountability. Contractualism easily leads to complicated, let alone controlling, 
accountability relationships. The doctrine is based on the principal-agent theory, in which 
the actors do not, in principle, require reciprocity from each other. The principal's control 
over the agent's action is sufficient, and there is no normative element in the agent's 
interests. As such, market relations cannot be based on reciprocity in the first place. 
5.7 Conclusions 
Public management is influenced by the organisational values of the private sector, with a 
focus on productivity, efficiency, economy and customer service. These often give way to 
the values that guide work in civil service, such as equity, fairness, independence and 
transparency. (Viinamäki 2013: 43, 173, 175–178, 180; Frederickson 1997; Brady 2003.) 
Public management is not fully comparable to management in the private sector, as public 
administration has its own specific characteristics. The management doctrines of the 
private sector do not work in a straightforward way in public administration. Public 
administrations implement public policies and public tasks, and therefore have a wider 
range of responsibilities than the private sector. Public management is also a public 
function, which from time to time faces harsh public criticism. (Virtanen & Wennberg 
2005: 49.)  
Although NPM has not earned the uncritical approval of the administration or the 
scientific community in Finland, its ideas play a significant role in the development of 
public administration (Rannisto 2005: 34). In public organisations, attention is paid to 
measuring the impact of the results achieved and to the organisational structures. Market-
driven service models are being developed and new contractual partnerships are being 
created between the public and other sectors. Public organisations are making use of 
different management ideas originally designed for the private sector. (Virtanen & 
Wennberg 2005: 46.) 
However, one may question whether public organisations have changed in a more 
democratic direction. It is widely believed that companies are undemocratic places, where 
management is accountable in principle only to the owners. The assumption that 
management practices adopted from the private sector automatically make public 
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administration more democratic or responsible – is questionable. (Virtanen & Wennberg 
2005: 47; Bakan 2004.) The achievement of democratic, fair, equal or transparent 
operations is of secondary importance for the performance of companies. Despite this, 
concepts imported from the business world are repeated in administrative doctrines 
without any further critique of their applicability to the public sector. 
Although NPM is above all a management doctrine, it does not pay attention to the 
importance of subjective responsibility. On the contrary, within the doctrine, agency is 
seen as a selfish pursuit of self-interest, which is why a consideration of accountability 
presupposes conformity. On the other hand, the doctrine contradictorily emphasises 
managerial autonomy, which reduces the impact of accountability mechanisms in practical 
management work. 
Individualistic values in society undermine the understanding of responsibility and 
injustice in public administration. Individualism assumes that individuals are free, 
autonomous and independent of social relations. Also, individualistic values make it 
difficult to understand group and organisational dynamics, which play an important role 
in human behaviour. When group or organisational dynamics are not understood, evil is 
often reduced to a single individual, a “manifestation of evil”. (Adams 2011: 282, 284.) 
More than just financial or other measurable incentives are needed to motivate and engage 
staff. It is often more effective to replace governance and regulation with values that guide 
and motivate staff towards shared goals and results. (Viinamäki 2012: 41). Leading 
through organisational values can be seen as one form of organisational regulation from a 
rational culture, where the subjective value orientations of actors do not play a major role 
in the organisation's operations. 
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6 NPG: RESPONSIBILITY AS ACCOUNTABILITY IN NETWORKS  
In public management, we talk not only about administration and management – but also 
about governance. Governance was first discussed by World Bank (1992) in politics and 
public administration. According to the report, governance is the exercise of power 
through which the economic and social resources of the state are used to promote overall 
development. The definition of governance is used in several different senses, depending 
on the concept of governance that is sought to justify it. Governance can cover, for 
example, the institutions of public administration, management methods and techniques, 
as well as issues such as relations between government and citizens, the interaction 
between business and citizens, and the role of the state. 
In a certain sense, NPG can be understood as a continuation of the NPM reforms. There is 
much more to modern governance than efficiency. Also, governance is about democratic 
participation, accountability and empowerment: the idea is that governance must 
maintain its legitimacy with the consent of those it governs. (Lähdesmäki 2003: 35; Jessop 
2000: 11–12.) NPG further expands the accountability issues of public management. 
Where bureaucratic theory and NPM focus primarily on processes within an organisation, 
NPG shifts the focus to networks between different actors and their complex accountability 
relationships. 
Osborne (2010) argues that NPM can be seen as a transient administrative doctrine 
towards NPG. NPG has its theoretical background in organisational sociology and network 
theory, which makes it able to respond to the new challenges and uncertainties in public 
management in this century. According to Osborne, NPG combines the strengths of 
bureaucratic theory and NPM in its understanding of legitimacy and the interactive 
relationship between political practices and service delivery. However, there are also 
opposing views to this. Bovaird and Löffler (2003: 8) argue that characterising NPG is akin 
to opening a kind of “Pandora's box”, as there are a considerable number of definitions for 
the doctrine. 
NPG continues certain themes that NPM started with. One of these is contracting and the 
outsourcing of public services. Contractualisation can be divided into horizontal and 
vertical, with the former referring, for example, to cooperation between municipalities and 
the latter to performance contracts between the ministry and universities. (Hyyryläinen 
2000, 2004.) New definitions of political governance often approach governance with a 
rejection of authoritarianism and refer to a change in governance, with top-down 
management moving towards public-private partnerships and combining resources. 
(Tiihonen 2008: 32.) On the other hand, NPM reforms have led to fragmentation of 
governance and weakening of central control. In the post-NPM era, the opposite has 
happened: attention is now focused on the administration as a whole and its horizontal 
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relations. In turn, NPG seeks a balance between decentralised management and control. 
(Halligan 2010: 235.) 
NPM and the NPG share views on the diminishing role of policymakers. If so, what does 
this mean for responsibility in public administration? In governance, policymakers have a 
responsibility to develop networks and mobilise public and private resources. Political 
leadership is less linked to formal status. In NPM, the role of politicians is more 
minimalist. Politicians define the longer-term objectives of the public sector, while public 
managers who implement the objectives have wide discretion. However, a question arises. 
If politicians have little control over public managers, how can they be held accountable 
for their decisions? (Peters & Pierre 1998: 227–228.) 
In principle, NPG is seen as an administrative response to the problems of post-industrial 
society. However, in the internal world of public organisations, bureaucratic management 
is still the dominant model. For example, municipal organisations are often described as 
rigid and slow, with decision-making power concentrated in the hands of a few 
(Strandman 2009: 208; Hamel 2007). Although the management of public organisations 
is still based on bureaucratic and rational principles, their structural blurring may mark a 
broader change. In public administration, change can be partial. A radical shift towards 
networks is at least not yet possible: for example, municipalities are still slow to move 
between markets, hierarchies and networks. Public service provision is mainly driven by 
hierarchies. This also means the persistence of traditional forms of responsibility in public 
management practices. (Nyholm 2008: 223–225.)  
6.1 Defining governance  
In governance, the idea is that policy and administration should focus on a phenomenon-
based assessment of social problems between different actors. Dialogue between different 
sectors of society is necessary, as there are wicked problems in society that are very difficult 
or impossible to solve (Vartiainen et al. 2013). Taming or coping with wicked problems 
becomes much more difficult if efforts to find solutions are siloed to follow a particular 
institutional or organizational logic. Given the intersectional nature of social problems, 
cooperation between the public, private and third sectors is required – not to forget the 
importance of citizens. 
The complexity of governance can be unpacked through informational, institutional and 
strategic uncertainty. Informational uncertainty addresses the question: how can we be 
accountable if there is no information to support our decision-making? Too little is known 
about the nature of the problems that determine decision-making. Information is in the 
hands of many different actors. Information on the phenomenon may not even exist. 
Institutional uncertainty relates to the question: How do institutional arrangements 
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enable responsible action? Social problems do not follow the form of existing organisations 
or networks. Decision-making requires the interconnection of different arenas within 
networks. Governance is increasingly contextualised. Institutional arrangements depend 
on negotiations, interests and resources between actors. Strategic uncertainty is based on 
the question: how to be accountable for strategic action between multiple actors? Strategic 
interactions can lead to unforeseen consequences, as numerous actors from different 
interpretative frameworks and interests are involved in shaping the strategy. Hence, it is 
increasingly difficult to predict behaviour. (Klijn 2002: 152–153; Peters & Pierre 2008: 
245.) 
Governance is about the realisation of collective interests where the state pursues a goal in 
cooperation with other social actors (Peters & Pierre 2008: 242). Hence, governance is a 
broader term than administration because it is not based solely on the state or its 
institutions. Governance is based on a shared set of goals and actions, which do not 
necessarily arise from a legal and formal authority. 
One of the challenges of governance systems is the relationship between the national and 
international levels. Current changes in national governance are part of growing 
interdependence and interaction between international, national and local actors. The 
transformation of closed national governance systems is now defined by multi-level 
interactions. (Bevir 2013: 1–2; Tiihonen 2008: 21–23.) Governance can be approached 
from many different levels, such as international, state or municipal. According to Peters 
and Pierre (2008: 238–240), the first wave of governance was concerned with the state, 
globalisation and international cooperation: the second wave put much more emphasis on 
society. 
March and Olsen (1995) have created a framework for democratic governance from the 
perspective of new institutionalism. They argue that improving democracy also improves 
political governance. March and Olsen emphasise the development of democratic 
identities and the ability to create meaningful political action among citizens, groups and 
institutions. Democratic governance requires political decisions as they determine the 
options and possibilities for action in a democracy. Finally, the political system must be 
adaptable, so that it can cope with changing demands and a changing environment. Hyden 
(1992) argues that governance as political legitimacy is concerned mainly with the rules of 
political power. Therefore, governance is the deliberate management of the administrative 
system to enhance the legitimacy of the public sector. 
According to Rosenau (1992, 1995), governance is a wider phenomenon than just state 
power. It is influenced by non-governmental institutions and informal mechanisms that 
carry out their objectives. Governance can be understood as the process by which an 
organisation or society governs itself. At the global level, governance is a myriad of millions 
of different control mechanisms, making it impossible to identify hierarchical authority 
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structures. The exercise of authority is based on traditional norms and customs, informal 
consensus, shared premises and other practices that lead to consent in accordance with 
their rules of conduct. 
The concept of governance is defined from several different perspectives. For example, 
Rhodes (1996) argues that the term governance is used in six different senses: governance 
as a minimal state, corporate governance, New Public Management, good governance, 
socio-cybernetic system and self-organising network. 
Furthermore, the governance of the minimal state can be opened up from two different 
perspectives. From the perspective of NPM, governance reforms have led to a situation 
where a large amount of public service delivery is outsourced to private organisations. At 
the same time, public policy is based on cost savings and cuts. From this perspective, 
governance should be based on contracts and other market mechanisms. From the 
perspective of NPG, “the hollowing out of the state” is a consequence of the complexity of 
society, since the pursuit of public goals requires public organisations to demonstrate their 
dependence on other actors. From this perspective, governance should be based on 
strategies and network management (Rhodes 1996: 653–654; Klijn 2002: 150–151; Peters 
& Pierre 1998: 223–224). 
Kettl (2000, 2010) has used the concept of management to assess the internal processes 
and results of NPM. Contractualism as a new way of organising management and services 
is a consequence of both neo-managerialism and management theory (Rhodes 1996: 655). 
Kettl (2010) argues that contracting will lead to major management problems if it is not 
managed well in the public sector: contracting would be essential to take into account the 
nature of goods and services, monopolies, monopsonies and the integration of services. 
6.2 Principles of responsibility according to NPG 
Osborne (2006, 2010) defines NPG in five different areas: 
1. Socio-political governance. Governance as a clarifier of the institutions that 
influence society. The legitimacy of public administration is based on the fact that 
it takes into account other social actors in public policy. 
2. Public policy governance. Governance as the understanding of how political elites 
and networks interact and control the public policy process. 
3. Administrative governance. Governance as a means of improving the efficiency of 
public administration and taming complexity. 
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4. Contract governance. Governance of public service tendering and contract 
management. 
5. Network governance. Governance as the operation of self-organised networks and 
the delivery of public services, with or without public administration. (Osborne 
2010: 6-7.) 
The principles of NPG can be viewed in terms of communicative action in the following 
way. First, NPG sees the provision of services as possible without public administration. 
Service delivery without public administration usually means outsourcing and private 
service provision, which undermine the communication and accountability of decision-
making.  Also, governance cannot tame or cope with complexity if its underlying motive is 
efficiency and economic logic. Nor should governance be based on (power) relations 
between political elites and networks, but on the communicative features of networks. 
NPG can improve socio-political governance if networks genuinely take citizens and 
democratic principles into account. 
According to Haveri and Anttiroiko (2009: 201), the NPG's relationship with public 
management can be categorised by four different themes. In terms of management and 
governance relations, NPG emphasises market- and competition-oriented governance 
relations, whereby services and goods in their most central form are procured from outside 
the government. Competence in these governance relationships requires specific 
procurement and tendering skills. Market mechanisms have led to the use of networks and 
partnerships in development policy and investment financing. In addition to market and 
network governance, governance is also linked to citizen participation or control. In 
addition to these relationships, the municipality also has upward networks, for example 
with the government or international organisations, which is referred to as international 
governance. 
NPG relies on the self-management of social and economic organisations through 
feedback and self-correction. NPG is based on the principles of transparency, 
accountability, trust and networking. In its ideal form, authoritarian management would 
be abandoned altogether and market regulation would be collaborative. State intervention 
in the management of national affairs would be based on the joint action of the market and 
civil society. NPG is a step towards finding a “balance” between the state and civil society 
and towards increasing autonomy for organisations. Although the interactive and 
network-based form of governance is challenging some traditional forms of state 
governance, the political sphere remains a key principle of leadership. NPG does not 
remove the responsibility of the state to maintain the well-being of citizens or to create 
positive conditions for the economy. Government leadership retains its role as a key driver 
of governance processes. (Tiihonen 2008: 32–33; Dunsire 1993: 21–33; Dunsire 1996: 
299–334.) 
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NPG poses new challenges for understanding public participation. While attempts have 
been made to interpret bureaucratic behaviour within the framework of public choice 
theory and market-driven governance within the framework of principal-agent theory, 
these theories are rather incomplete in networked settings. Theories of agency in networks 
have been explored, for example, through post-foundationalist theories in philosophy and 
sociology. In these theories, agency is based on sense-making in a network situation 
influenced by the social context (Bevir 2013: 35–37). 
In terms of accountability, NPG is a doctrine that places great emphasis on horizontal 
accountability. However, horizontal accountability mechanisms occur more in the internal 
processes of public administration than in external relations with society. This is 
particularly the case at the meso and micro levels. The horizontal accountability of public 
organisations to citizens relies on media attention and the publication of information in 
annual reports and on the internet. Public organisations are accountable to specific 
interest group organisations, such as consumer organisations and user groups. They are 
also accountable to accountability forums such as ombudsmen and external performance 
evaluations. At the micro level, internal horizontalism is based on peer review, team 
consultation and consultation with colleagues. In the case of external horizontalisation, 
accountability mechanisms at macro level may include annual reports to the general public 
on themes such as social and environmental issues. At the meso level, external 
horizontalisation would mean direct accountability to policy-relevant groups. At the micro 
level, attention would focus on the direct accountability of civil servants and their 
interaction with society. However, no accountability mechanisms are found at meso and 
micro levels.  (Michels & Meijer 2008: 168–169.) 
At a micro level, changes in society have an impact on how employee responsibility is 
understood in the organisation. For individuals, network organisations and network-like 
relationships are partly reshaping the power positions maintained by the modern 
organisation. With more individualistic values, individuals become differentiated from the 
roles and rules imposed on them by society. The last decades have seen a shift in the way 
management and employees are perceived. Employees are expected to take more 
responsibility for themselves and their development. Individuals seek security through 
skills development and growth opportunities rather than a permanent job. (Nyholm 2008: 
52–54.) 
6.3 NPG as broader social responsibility  
Public responsibility can be approached from a narrow and a broad perspective. Whereas 
the narrow perspective refers to the responsibility of civil servants for their work and 
results, the broad perspective refers to the relationship between public administration and 
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citizens (Lähdesmäki 2003: 76). In the broad sense, responsible public management takes 
into account the stakeholders relevant to public action. In the public sector, these include 
citizens, communities, non-profit organisations, businesses, the media, public 
organisations and policymakers. Naturally, the composition of stakeholders varies greatly 
depending on time and place (Löffler 2003: 170). 
The widening scope of public responsibility is understandable from the NPG's perspective, 
which argues that responding to the complexity of society requires the involvement of 
citizens and stakeholders in public decision-making. The link between citizens and public 
administration is unbreakable in the sense that each requires the other: “The public 
opinion that is worked up via democratic procedures into communicative power cannot 
'rule' of itself but can only point the use of administrative power in specific directions” 
(Habermas 1996: 300). Thus, the legitimacy of the administration depends on the citizens, 
while the citizens depend on the power of the public administration to achieve results. 
Broadly speaking, responsibility in public management refers to the general social context 
and the fundamental values of community and social life.  While public responsibility is 
partly about governance and control, it is justified in terms of the boundaries and values 
of social life. (Anttiroiko 2004: 22–23, 29.) NPG also focuses on issues of social and 
environmental responsibility. Public management has a responsibility for the well-being 
of the people in the organisation's domain and their conditions. Similarly, environmental 
responsibility refers to the impact of an organisation's activities on the environment and 
natural resources and its critical evaluation. (Jussila 2010: 15–16.) 
NPG subscribes to the principles of collective and moral responsibility. The ultimate basis 
of the collective definition of responsibility lies in the community's moral standards and 
interpretation of responsibility. However, the process of modernisation has led to a 
situation in which collective responsibility has largely been replaced by technical criteria 
(as the colonization of the lifeworld shows). Moral responsibility, on the other hand, 
subscribes to the view that questions of responsibility are best understood from a moral 
perspective. The question is ultimately one of right and wrong or good and evil. The 
responsibility of an act goes back to the morality of the perpetrator or the moral nature of 
the act. (Anttiroiko 2004: 23–24.) 
Also, responsiveness in public administration is about taking citizens' needs into account, 
which in turn highlights the need for a broader social responsibility. In public 
administration, demands are easily perceived as somewhat irrational or without proper 
evidence. In order to increase and appreciate deliberation, we must speak of rational 
demands from citizens, based on rational arguments and evidence. Public management 
should also take into account those citizens who, for one reason or another, are unable to 
make their own demands. (Sheaff 2002: 435–436, 449.) 
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As was argued in the chapter about bureaucratic theory, the sheer compliance to norms 
guiding the action of public organisations is not sufficient. However, this is not all. It is 
also important to consider the impact of organisations and their moral evaluation in terms 
of systemic and societal thinking. The perspectives that further deepen responsibility can 
be divided into two main types, namely modern systems thinking and radical social and 
moral philosophy (Anttiroiko 2004: 27–28; Talvio & Välimaa 2004: 29–30; Mashaw 
1984: 55–57). 
In modern systems thinking, organisations are an integral part of society as a whole. Their 
responsibility cannot, therefore, be reduced to rational objectives or self-interest. The 
central issue is the legitimacy of organisations, i.e. their justification and public acceptance 
in society and among citizens. Modern systems thinking is present in NPG, as public 
management must take into account the overall benefits and well-being of society and its 
stakeholders. Radical responsibility, in turn, considers that morality determines the 
existence and functioning of an organisation. For this reason, an organisation must 
emphasise moral principles, which are present in its strategy and policies. (Anttiroiko 
2004: 28; Talvio & Välimaa 2004: 32–33.) 
NPG has partly led to the public sector sharing responsibilities with third sector 
organisations and non-profit organisations. This goes back at least in part to the fact that 
neither sector seeks to make a profit from its activities. Both the public and the third sector 
seek to serve people from a citizenship perspective. The third sector is also characterised 
by a broad sense of civic responsibility. In these organisations, responsibility is not limited 
to client groups – but is embedded in wider societal expectations. Therefore, public 
managers must serve and be accountable to the people, promote the public interest, act 
responsibly within the public organisation and to political authorities, and uphold the law. 
(Svara 2007: 3–5.) 
Denhardt and Denhardt's (2007) NPS, or New Public Service, outlines the role of public 
management through the roles of leader, steward and emissary of the public interest. 
Hence, NPS is close to what NPG means with social responsibility. The theory holds that 
legal and democratic principles are the primary values for responsible public action. The 
authority of public managers is based on citizenship rather than on individualistic 
premises. First and foremost, the accountability of public managers requires them to listen 
and interact with citizens. This reinforces and renews their role in democratic governance. 
This kind of accountability requires citizens to be seen as members of a democratic 
community, rather than customers. Responsibility and accountability are best achieved 
when public managers are aware of and responsive to the multiple values that influence 
their decision-making. Balancing the different value orientations is best achieved through 
civil dialogue. (Denhardt & Denhardt 2007: 133–135.) 
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6.4 Deliberative democracy  
Because of NPG, we talk about meta-governance – which is a kind of "governance of 
governance". Here, a large number of public organisations and processes have acquired a 
significant degree of autonomy, which in turn creates a problem of sustained control of 
governance (Peters 2010). The involvement of broader groups in political decision-making 
has consequences for what is meant by democratic processes.  In governance, we are 
talking about democratic network governance, i.e. how networks can achieve democratic 
goals. In particular, the definition of a democratic network, meta-governance, and norms 
of transparency and citizen participation become topics for discussion (Denhardt 2011: 
194.) 
Deliberative democracy is linked to NPG, which takes into account the citizen perspective 
in public responsibility. Deliberation inevitably leads to changes in the power relations in 
public organisations. Here responsiveness to citizens is based on collaboration, as 
common norms emerge through social interaction.  In a collaborative form, public 
organisations are ready to listen to new ways of thinking, generated through a consensus-
based debate among stakeholders. (Bryer 2007: 486–489.) 
NPG's conception of accountability is influenced by the fact that it is framed in terms of 
deliberative arrangements that limit and control the power of political authorities. The 
idea is that these arrangements enhance the accountability and responsiveness of those in 
authority to citizens. (Dubnick 2014: 29–30.) In concrete terms, the focus of decision-
making should be on information sharing, expertise and trust – not on formal or 
hierarchical positions (Nyholm 2008: 227). Techniques for participatory governance can 
include deliberative forums, citizen panels and citizen participation in decision-making 
bodies of public institutions (Newman 2005: 128–129). 
Accountability is linked to public dialogue and consequently to democratic principles such 
as deliberative democracy. Here, dialogue refers to the linguistic nature of accountability, 
rather than to institutional or motivational factors. Accountability is a dialectical activity 
in which the accountable are expected to answer, explain and justify their actions to the 
accountability forum. In turn, the accountability forum assesses, questions and criticises 
the positions of the accountable parties, taking into account the public interest. (Mulgan 
2000: 569–570.) 
Rawls's (1988) theory of justice represents a kind of philosophical example of the 
possibilities of deliberative democracy and dialogue. Rawls's theory is based on the notion 
of an imaginary original position that serves as the basis for the definition of justice. The 
initial position is understood as a hypothetical situation, a veil of ignorance in which no 
one knows his or her place, class or social status in society (Rawls 1988: 20; Svara 2007: 
54–55; Wenar 2013). According to Rawls, dealing with justice behind the veil of ignorance 
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creates two principles (Rawls 1988: 21). According to the first principle, the liberty 
principle, society should guarantee its members the maximum liberty possible, as long as 
it is compatible with the liberty of others. The second principle, the difference principle, 
argues that economic systems should be organized so that the least advantaged members 
are better off than they would be in any other arrangement. 
However, governance or communication in networks is not only seen in a positive light. 
Deliberative democracy is in a sense the opposite of the concept of governmentality. 
Whereas deliberation emphasises the potential of governance to produce democratic 
practices to support public decision-making, governmentality builds new forms of 
reflexivity in subjects that regulate and norm behaviour in society and networks. The ethos 
of the former is positive, the latter negative. (Torfing & Sorensen 2014: 338; Foucault 
1980; Alhanen 2007: 134–136.) In this sense, governance is a complex and difficult 
concept for accountability. Examples of behavioural norms include citizen participation 
and pseudo-influence (Arnstein 1969). Citizen participation can mean manipulation and 
the apparent consideration of citizens, rather than real influence. 
Therefore, there is a good reason to assess network arrangements and their actual impact 
in deliberation. According to Habermas (1996: 18), a conflict-free network is based on the 
ability of the participants to coordinate their activities from a common starting point. “As 
long as language is used only as a medium for transmitting information, action 
coordination proceeds through the mutual influence that participants exert on each other 
in a purposive-rational manner. On the other hand, as soon as the illocutionary forces of 
speech acts take on an action-coordinating role, language itself supplies the primary source 
of social integration. Only in this case should one speak of 'communicative action'" 
(Habermas 1996: 18). 
Network-like arrangements are no guarantee of freedom from conflict, not to mention 
communicative action. Nor do they automatically produce social integration in society. As 
long as the communication of a network is instrumental, its functioning will follow the 
ideals of technical rationality and economic utility. A network can only function as an arena 
for communicative action when its language is based on discourse ethics. In this case, the 
network can also be considered democratically accountable. 
Klijn and Skelcher (2007) argue that the democratisation of networks is usually assessed 
between two competing perspectives. These two competing perspectives complement 
Habermas' characterisation of instrumental and communicative action in networks. The 
first perspective sees networks as arenas from which citizens and key stakeholders 
influence public decision-making (communicative action). The second perspective sees 
networks as centralised bastions of power that provide structural privileges to private 
interests (instrumental action). The characteristics of the table below can be listed as 
principles of effective and democratic network governance, the latter embodying the ideal 
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of deliberation (Sorensen & Torfing 2009). The table assesses network governance 
through efficiency and democracy at the stages of planning, defining, management and 
participation: the challenge is how to manage networks on the values of effectiveness and 
democracy at the same time. 
Table 5. Effective and democratic management of networks (Sorensen & Torfing 
2009: 248) 
 Effectiveness Democracy 
Planning the 
network 
Precise focus on goals and innovative 
practices 
Setting clear time limits for practices 
Ending inefficient and failed 
networks 
Public information on the 
composition and results of the 
network 
Inviting relevant participants to the 
network 




Building coordination and consensus 
Creating interdependencies between 
participants to exchange resources 




Relating productivity to the 
conditions that define the network 




Ensuring adequate resources to 
reduce transaction costs 
Preventing negative tensions, 
sticking to the agenda, mediation 
Flexibility in methods to increase 
innovation 
Encouraging weak and marginalised 
participants to promote equality 
Improving transparency by sharing 
relevant information 





Shared ownership of quick results, 
which maintains cooperation 
Showing trust to earn trust 
Institutionalising good processes and 
learning from failures 
Maintaining a broad agenda, large-
scale storytelling 
Open and responsive deliberation of 
options 
Evaluating the results of the network 
in relation to democratic principles 
As the table shows, network design is based on effectiveness such as precise targets, time 
limits and the closure of inefficient networks. In contrast, a democratic approach sees 
planning as an activity in which all relevant participants are invited into the network. In 
defining the network, the efficiency perspective sees consensus and interdependencies as 
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a priority. More important for democratic governance is the communication of common 
norms of action to all participants. In network management, effectiveness means sufficient 
resources and reconciliation between competing points of view, while democracy means 
equality and transparency. Last, in terms of effectiveness, network participation means 
building trust through gains, while democracy emphasises transparency about the norms 
from which the network participates. 
There are many arguments in favour of networks. Interest groups and implementing 
organisations may influence policy practices together. The knowledge of as many 
participants as possible is applied. The participation of different individuals, groups and 
organisations is democratically a positive thing. Also, it is expected that social acceptance 
of public policies will increase. Despite their limited capacity, networks can reveal social 
needs and problems. Thus, the effectiveness of governance and problem-solving skills will 
improve. (Kickert et al. 1997: 171.) 
The network approach challenges the traditional view of governance as a guardian of the 
public interest. The public interest has become a somewhat fuzzy norm that is challenging 
to define. Also, it is difficult to identify the public interest in networks, where secondary 
interests, in particular, are pursued. The role of government is to ensure that collective 
values influence networks. Therefore, it has a dual role in the network. Public managers 
are network participants in the same way as others, as they seek to maximise their 
interests. On the other hand, they must ensure the presence of the values that are 
collectively most central. This normative dimension may conflict with network 
effectiveness. Thus, the public manager faces several dilemmas arising from the conflict 
between effectiveness and normativity (de Bruijn & Ringeling 1997: 159–162.; Klijn & 
Skelcher 2007: 603–604). 
However, in communicative terms, the public interest, both inside and outside the 
networks, is simple. The public interest should serve the democratic procedure, the results 
of which are based on sufficient knowledge and its factual communication (Habermas 
1996: 296): “According to this view, practical reason [...] resides [...] in the rules of 
discourse and forms of argumentation that borrow their normative content from the 
validity basis of action oriented to reaching understanding” (Habermas 1996: 296–297). 
The normativity of the public interest is based on the validity of its norms. It is therefore 
essential for accountability that the secondary interests of the public manager in networks 
do not harm the primacy of democratic will formation. 
In any case, public managers can neutralise many risks in networks, thus improving the 
conditions for the network to be communicative. For example, a manager can use his or 
her authority accountable by breaking up the power structures in the network or by 
exploiting them for the public good. The manager can make choices about whom to 
cooperate with and who not to cooperate with. The public manager can be a builder of 
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normativity by adhering to the ethical principles used in the network. The role of the 
manager is also to protect the nature of public decision-making, which risks becoming 
informal and unprincipled. (de Bruijn & Ringeling 1997: 161.) 
6.4.1 Stewardship theory as virtue-ethics 
The NPG's view of agency is based on the stewardship theory. In many respects, the 
stewardship theory is quite different from the principal-agent theory on which NPM relies. 
The stewardship theory is focused on the responsible and autonomic action, which reduces 
the need for hierarchical and institutional management practices. (Schillemans 2013: 
544–545.) 
Table 6. The principal-agent theory and the stewardship theory (Schillemans 
2013: 546) 













Consistency or alignment of interests 





As the table shows, the principal-agent theory conceptualises accountability through the 
selfish interests of the agent. In the stewardship theory, the agency is based on the pursuit 
of collective goals or the attempt to act as a steward based on the interests of the principal. 
Thus, there are no conflicting interests between the principal and the agent since interests 
can be reconciled or they are aligned. The focus of the steward is not so much on self-
interest, but on collective and social goals. In the principal-agent theory, in turn, the agent 
is motivated by external factors such as monetary incentives. In the stewardship theory, 
the agent’s incentives, praise, and reputation matter. 
Some might argue that the stewardship theory portrays a somewhat idealistic picture of 
agency. Indeed, the table indicates how there are several virtuous starting points in the 
stewardship theory. According to virtue ethics (Aristotle 2005), morality should be 
understood primarily through classical virtues of practical reason and justice (Aristotle 
1991, 2005; MacIntyre 1988).  
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Virtue ethics is based on the view that human beings need communities to live 
purposefully. In the context of public administration, responsible civil servants can use 
their practical reason and fairness to take account of different value orientations in 
changing contexts (Svara 1997). Hence, this means different interests can be aligned or 
reconciled. Virtue ethics works also as the starting point for practices that cultivate 
individual morality. Thus, virtue ethics and the stewardship theory subscribe to views of 
collective and social goals and the intrinsic nature of motivation. Virtue ethics emphasises 
management as close as possible to the “floor” and the staff: in this case, management 
focuses on tactical and operational decisions (Hyyryläinen 2010; Svara 2007: 10–11). This 
means that the exercise of power and authority is not so much institutional as personal. In 
networks, power distances are also small – at least ideally speaking. 
A responsible public administration based on virtue ethics promotes the capacity of its 
citizens to be virtuous and happy (Tholen 2018). Here, virtue is linked to social practices, 
which ethical governance should contribute to. Thus, virtue ethics and happiness depend 
on social institutions and the relationships between actors. 
Also, virtue ethics emphasises the development of moral and ethical judgment, which is 
thought to have a positive impact on responsible behaviour. Responsible public 
management takes into account environmental factors that contribute to moral 
development and enhance ethical discernment in public administration professionals and 
citizens. Public governance should be made up of high values that nurture society as a more 
civilised community. The goal or telos of public management is the public good. (Lynch 
2004.) 
Virtue ethics emphasises the importance of public service values in the responsibility of 
public management. The perspective helps to see how these values are contextualised in 
attitudes, skills and behaviours (Molina 2015). Virtue ethics does not look at individual 
situations or decisions. Rather, responsibility is based on an attitude to achieve something 
good (Tholen 2018). Virtue ethics in governance include demonstrating integrity and 
being respectful and consistent (Svara 2007: 15). 
6.4.2 Characteristics of the accountability forum 
Studies show that the relationship between the accountable agent and the accountability 
forum is far from always based on a principal-agent-like situation (Busuioc et al. 2011; 
Schillemans 2011; Schillemans 2013; Flinders 2001; Brandsma 2010). Hence, the 
stewardship theory might not be always far from the truth. Also, there are other reasons 
that mostly have to do with the characteristics of the accountability forum itself. 
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For example, the accountability forum is not necessarily interested in the delegated task 
or its effective implementation. Research suggests that a key problem with accountability 
lies in the activation of the accountability forum and its responsibilities. The accountable 
party may also be strongly committed to the performance of its task. In addition, the 
accountable party is much less autonomous than previously expected. Managing contracts, 
meeting the demands of external organisations and producing accountability information 
significantly reduces autonomy. The findings also show that the accountable party often 
shares information on its initiative and wants the accountability mechanisms to be active 
and supervised. On the other hand, the accountability forum may neglect information and 
accountability mechanisms – and may not correct the wrongdoings of the accountable 
party. (Schillemans 2014: 200–202.) 
Based on the social contingency theory, the practical arrangements of the accountability 
forum deserve critical attention (Schillemans 2015). For example, reputation affects the 
way in which the accountable party and accountability forum interact: accountability is 
about how an actor is able to improve its reputation in relation to different audiences 
(Busuioc 2016). It is assumed that reputation plays a greater role in networked 
arrangements, where authority is often based on informal terms. For example, it is not 
irrelevant for the reputation of the principal whether the agent goes out to challenge the 
relationship. Therefore, the maintenance and enhancement of reputation play a major role 
in what can be expected from an accountability forum. (Busuioc 2016: 92–94.) 
Accountability also produces negative consequences: the social contingency theory of 
organisations is that they seek to adapt to their environment (Tetlock 1992). Through this 
theory, accountability is viewed in terms of three strategies: acceptability heuristic, pre-
emptive self-criticism and defensive bolstering. According to the acceptability heuristic, 
the accountable party chooses the option that is cognitively easiest for it. In this way, the 
accountable party appears credible in the eyes of the audience, which is secondary to the 
achievement of accountability. According to pre-emptive self-criticism, the familiarity of 
the audience influences the choices made by the accountable party. If the accountable 
party is aware of the audience’s views, it is likely to act in accordance with the acceptability 
heuristic. On the other hand, if the accountable officer is not familiar with the audience's 
views, it is likely to be more critical of its positions. Last, the defensive bolstering is based 
on social psychological studies which show that people have a more or less natural 
tendency to defend themselves if they have had time to choose a decision or course of 
action that suits them in a given situation. Hence, it is of great importance whether the 
accountable party is confronted with the public before or after the decision has been taken. 
If the accountable party has taken decisions, it is more exposed to defending its positions. 
(Tetlock 1992: 340–346.) 
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Without a doubt, the characteristics of accountability forums alone do not determine 
whether decision-making has been responsible. The form of organisation also plays a 
crucial role. In an organisation, accountability of decision-making is underpinned by 
evaluation standards and process-based accountability that are unknown to the 
accountable party. However, applying such criteria to, for example, bureaucratic 
organisations is challenging. This is because for bureaucracies the clarity of evaluation 
standards is important. In contrast, in networked arrangements, there is more flexibility 
in the choice of standards. (Schillemans 2015: 9–12.) 
6.5 Criticism of NPG  
6.5.1 Network arrangements are not deliberative 
Networking is one of the core principles of NPG. For example, network scholars Friedland 
and others (2006) criticise Habermas' theory of communicative action for neglecting 
network arrangements in public discourse: “The political system does depend on the 
economic (functional) system and civil society, [...] [b]ut these functional systems are 
becoming reorganised as networks, and this reorganisation promises to change the extent, 
the degree, and the quality of their dependence” (Friendland et al. 2006: 10). Friedland 
and others argue that the subsystems of government are being reorganised as networks, 
which will be seen in the extent and quality of public debate, for example. According to 
them, the change is mainly positive: “Networked communication allows the public sphere 
to be organised distributively, [...] as active publics online form to read, discuss, argue, and 
challenge the assumptions of elites in the public sphere” (Friedland et al. 2006: 23–24). 
On the other hand, Habermas' thinking can be used to criticise network arrangements. 
This is because network arrangements are ambivalent in terms of communication criteria. 
For example, Friedland and others (2006: 18–19) use online discussion as an example of 
the democratic nature of these arrangements. Indeed, digitalisation is undeniably one of 
the major factors of our time – also in terms of reforming public administration. 
Unfortunately, the time has shown that the internet cannot be regarded as a haven of 
democracy. Its problems include cyberbullying, hate speech or the disproportionate power 
of a few large companies. Also, the question has arisen as to how rational public debate 
can be saved from the negative effects of online discussion. The question is far from simple. 
Under NPG, communication breakdowns are more informal than in bureaucratic theory 
and NPM. For example, the performance of networks is not judged by formal criteria such 
as economic efficiency or the achievement of political objectives. In governance, the main 
objectives are subject to constant negotiation and re-evaluation. Difficulties arise if there 
is no consensus on the main objectives between the different actors. (Jessop 2000: 14–
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16.) In networks, problems easily arise between effectiveness and the consideration of 
other values. (Provan & Kenis 2007: 242). 
Rehg (1996) writes how the administration cannot act independently of the needs of 
society and citizens. On the other hand, a situation in which informal relations are given 
too much space in public decision-making can also be seen as problematic from an 
accountability perspective. “[T]he political system (and the administration in particular) 
must not become an independent system, operating solely according to its own criteria of 
efficiency and unresponsive to citizens' concerns; nor must it become too subservient to 
particular interests that have access to administrative power through unofficial paths of 
influence that bypass the democratic process” (Rehg 1996: xxxi, italics added). Unofficial 
paths can be represented, for example, by old-boy networks based on the selfish gain by 
members (Heald 1983; Choi 2007). Of course, there are also less dramatic examples of 
network-like arrangements – but in any case, attention is drawn to the weakening of 
accountability. 
6.5.2 Contradictions in assessing accountability 
It can be argued that there is an obvious contradiction in the NPG's approach to 
responsibility. Indeed, the view of NPG as good governance is based on the principles of 
increasing administrative transparency and diminishing corruption (Lawton 2013: 112–
113; Peters & Pierre 2008: 245; Peters & Pierre 1998: 227–228). At the same time, the 
administrative doctrine risks undermining the transparency and accountability of public 
action (Sorensen & Torfing 2009). In this sense, NPG is similar to NPM, which was 
originally praised as a means of increasing accountability and transparency in public 
administration, although the opposite is often the case. 
For example, the problems in network arrangements can be summarised as neglect of 
collective interests, lack of transparency of processes, insufficient legitimacy and obstacles 
to policy innovation. Networks lead to negotiation and compromise, with the result that 
predetermined goals are not always achieved. This naturally prolongs decision-making 
processes. Also, informal interactions and overlapping administrative structures make it 
difficult to assign responsibilities, with the risk that no one is ultimately accountable for 
the collective responsibility for decisions. Interaction between public authorities and 
private interest groups undermines the influence of political representatives on policy. 
Political representatives are faced with compromises that can no longer be changed. 
Network arrangements also often prevent new problems from being solved and indicators 
from being implemented. (Kickert et al. 1997: 170–171.) 
Unlike in formal organisations, most networks do not have predefined decision-making 
rules. This, in turn, affects the conditions and quality of decision-making. Governance 
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leads to poor decisions or indecision if there are no clear ex-ante rules or informal norms 
in the network. Traditionally, networks are seen as a means to improve citizen 
participation or involvement. However, the extent to which networks serve societal 
interests is questionable. At a minimum, participation in networks requires some level of 
organisation, but the most disadvantaged in society tend to have the weakest 
organisational skills. Networks are also more difficult to coordinate than public 
organisations. As a result, networks undermine accountability and the ability to correct 
errors. In addition, it is important to remark that the new accountability mechanisms of 
networks cannot replace the primacy of political accountability in public action in the state 
system. (Peters 2010: 40–43.) 
Hence, networks can undermine accountability. Formal and structural accountability 
mechanisms that are considered traditional are often present in networks. This is not 
enough, as understanding cooperation between actors requires highlighting the impact of 
informal relationships (Romzek et al. 2013). One of the main problems of accountability 
in networks is based on the lack of an authority that would guide the network actions 
according to the political will. This has negative implications for the realisation of the 
public interest and the accountability that guides it. (Agranoff 2007: 191). According to 
Habermas (1996: 298), deliberation cannot be based on civic engagement alone, but on 
the institutionalisation of appropriate procedures and communicativeness. In networks, 
institutionalising practices is challenging due to the informality of networks. 
6.5.3 Are networks and democratic decision-making compatible? 
Klijn and Skelcher (2007) argue that the relationship between networks and democratic 
decision-making can be thought through four starting points. The first of these is based on 
the idea of incompatibility. The idea is that networks and democratic principles have 
conflicting institutional rules that cannot ultimately be reconciled. The second premise 
emphasises the complementarity of principles. Unlike traditional democratic decision-
making structures, networks involve different participants in solving complex problems. 
However, the second premise leaves unclear the relationship between complex problem 
solving and democracy. The third premise refers to the transition from centralised power 
to a decentralised model of governance. Here, an increasing amount of public decision-
making is organised through non-hierarchical arrangements. The fourth premise is 
obviously instrumental: the administration strengthens its capacity to implement public 
policies through the use of networks. 
These four starting points can be thought of in the context of accountability as follows 
(Klijn & Skelcher 2007). For example, under traditional accountability, the primary 
accountability is based on the position of elected politicians. Of course, accountability is 
by no means limited to this. Shared accountability takes into account the different starting 
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points and values of participants, complementing traditional forms of accountability such 
as economic indicators or governments. Accountability can also be conceptualised in terms 
of checks and balances, based on openness in decision-making and transparency in new 
forms of accountability. On the other hand, accountability can also be instrumental, with 
elected politicians ensuring accountability. In this case, politicians use other forms of 
accountability, such as economic indicators, to control other actors and decision-making. 
(Klijn & Skelcher 2007: 592.) 
6.5.4 Myriad accountability forms 
NPG is criticized for too many forms of accountability. Accountability requires transparent 
responsibilities, well-defined parties, information sharing, debate and, if necessary, 
sanctions. This is difficult to achieve in networks where none of the participants can order 
the other to act in a certain way. Thus, the impact of horizontal accountability in networks 
is a much more difficult subject than vertical accountability as such. (Michels & Meijer 
2008: 169–171; Mills & Koliba 2014: 6.) 
Governance refers to institutions and organisations both inside and outside the 
administration. It also recognises that the boundaries between social and economic 
responsibilities are blurred. Institutional power is dependent on collective action, while 
governance is about autonomous and self-directed network actors. Thus, the completion 
of affairs and decisions is not based solely on the power or authority of the public 
administration. The mechanisms of governance will inevitably become more context-
specific – and so will the forms of accountability. (Stoker 1998: 17–18, 26.) 
Taking into account network arrangements, the following shortcomings of current 
accountability mechanisms can be listed, as described by Michels and Meijer (2008). 
Horizontal accountability between civil servants may improve the quality of work, but it 
has no link with societal stakeholders. In this case, accountability to citizens is neglected. 
The nature of different responsibilities is an issue in its own right. Cooperation between 
public and private actors may provide performance-based information, but the 
accountability issues of such cooperation are not transparent. Also, organisations may 
produce too little information to be assessed in terms of social responsibility. Horizontal 
accountability at the macro level would require more information. In addition, public 
organisations often seek to be more accountable through their websites. However, not all 
websites offer citizens the opportunity to respond, or there is a reluctance to display 
responses. There are also shortcomings in sanctions and interventions. Although public 
organisations are accountable to their customers, it is unclear whether they are sanctioned 
for their improper actions. At the same time, it is often impossible to change the service 
provider to another public organisation. (Michels & Meijer 2008: 169–170.) 
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Willems and Dooren (2011) argue that collaborative arrangements between the private and 
public sectors lead to negative consequences for accountability. They are by no means 
alone in their argument (see e.g. Flinders 2005; Coghill & Woodward 2005). In such 
partnerships, public administrations can disengage from serving the public interest. 
Partnership agreements can be complex in form and difficult to interpret, increasing the 
relative power of economists, consultants and lawyers. (Greve & Hodge 2010: 150.) 
6.5.5 (In)effective network arrangements 
Provan and Kenis (2007) argue that the effectiveness of networks depends on trust, the 
number of participants, agreement on the goal(s) and the challenge of the task. Trust is 
reduced in a network where the number of participants increases, interests become more 
complex and the task becomes more difficult to define. The forms of governance can be 
assessed more precisely in terms of shared governance, lead organisation and network 
administrative organisation, each of which has its own starting point for networking. 
Shared governance is the simplest and most common form of management: it is managed 
by the network actors themselves, without the presence of a formal or administrative actor. 
Lead organisation refers to a situation where one organisation coordinates the central 
activities and decision-making of the network. In the private sector, a buyer may manage 
a large number of small sellers, or a regional hospital may assume the role of a 
management organisation in the social and health care sector. The idea of network 
administrative organisation is that an external organisation is set up to manage the 
network. Although the network participants interact with each other, the management is 
centralised. The management organisation can be public or non-profit – even in a situation 
where the network's objective is based on financial profit. It can also be created by the 
participants in the network. (Provan & Kenis 2007: 233–236.) 
Bureaucratic administration can undermine the network cooperation of public 
organisations with participants who are not used to hierarchical principles. The change in 
local governance and the networking of public organisations can create a chaotic 
atmosphere. In this case, public organisations have not been able to transform their 
activities into networked ones in a changing environment. Despite numerous 
administrative reforms, critics argue that they have changed little from the traditional 
prototype of a public organisation. Networking involves different participants, different 
interests and values – and more complex processes. This, in turn, creates a need for 
stronger leadership. (Nyholm 2008: 224–225, 228–229.) Public responsibility is also 
associated with the ability of public organisations to innovate and renew themselves in the 
pursuit of better productivity and economic solutions. This requires public organisations 
to have partnership and procurement skills and networking skills (Yliherva 2006: 11). 
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The responsibility of public management is defined by the arena between administration 
and policy. The arena is the space in which the public manager interacts with, for example, 
the organisation's staff, stakeholders and political leaders. Other participants determine 
the scope of the public manager's room for manoeuvre, either by limiting or enabling 
action. This interaction is based on a decision-making culture, which can be irregular and 
unpredictable in nature. The demands and expectations of citizens and the media create 
their own dynamics of interaction. Different rules, practices and strategies are present. 
Some of these are conscious and visible, such as legislation, management rules and 
commonly accepted operational norms, guidelines and policies. However, a large part of 
the interaction is based on implicit practices. Implicit practices also refer to shadow 
networks driven by the shared interests and objectives of the participants. These factors 
mean that the arenas are very different from one another, which means that the room for 
managing is relative. (Leinonen 2012: 192–194.) 
Research shows that transparency in networks requires the creation of new accountability 
mechanisms. Such mechanisms should take into account the main features of network 
structures. In the age of networks, organisations are expected to become flexible, informal 
and information and service oriented. In a network organisation, organisational 
boundaries become irrelevant, as their functioning is based on free decision-making, 
information sharing and trust. (Nyholm 2008: 52–53; Bevir 2013: 9–10.) 
6.5.6 Vicious circle of accountability in networks 
The problem with governance under NPM and NPG reforms is not that it is disappearing 
in favour of markets and networks. The main problem is that it is still regarded as 
ineffective and distrusted by the public. Both the market and governance undermine the 
role of public administration as a service provider and major social institution. 
Contractualisation issues such as outsourcing, networking and privatisation have had 
negative effects in many other countries. The accountability and reliability of public 
administrations in the provision of public services has been undermined, as has their 
responsiveness to the expectations and needs of citizens.  At the same time, cost-cutting in 
the public sector has led to more difficult monitoring of contracts concluded in networks 
and markets. This in turn has led to a loss of the most important aspects of administrative 
ethics, such as the public interest and fairness in the delivery of public services. (Adams & 
Balfour 2010: 619–621.) 
Overall, the NPG conceptualises accountability as: a responsibility to develop networks 
and harness the resources of all sectors in line with collective interests; a responsibility to 
develop political governance; a responsibility to listen to other participants, based on the 
constraints of a complex environment and uncertainty; and finally, a responsibility to 
increase transparency. The NPG's concept of responsibility has elements of broader social 
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responsibility and deliberation.  Within NPG, responsibility is conceptualised in terms of 
problematic accountability relationships and new governance mechanisms. Hence, it can 
be argued that accountability is a key problem for the overall success of NPG. Also, there 
is a risk that the NPG and new forms of governance will make traditional definitions of 
accountability look old or inadequate. (Plant 2018: 11.) 
 
 
Figure 8. Accountability risks for networks 
The risks of networks can be illustrated as above. Networks are based on cooperation 
between different sectoral participants. According to Habermas (1996: 18), the success of 
a network depends on whether its communication is based on a shared understanding or 
instrumental goals. The key to accountability is to reconcile the interests and starting 
points of the different actors so that networks serve the public interest. However, networks 
can be managed according to a variety of principles, such as effectiveness, economic value 
or social equity. In a network, some participants may be marginalised by stronger ones 
and achievements may not be shared by all. Accountability in networks is difficult to 
achieve simply because of the diversity of participants. For example, if there is no 
consensus on the rules of the network, sanctions may not be possible. Moreover, irrelevant 
participants may be involved in the network, and information sharing is not necessarily 
open. This can lead to a loss of legitimacy. For example, Habermas uses the term 
“bargaining network” to describe a network of economic interests, a bargaining network 
in which communication is based on instrumental language and strategic action (see e.g. 
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NPG requires the participant to take into account and reconcile conflicting values within 
networks. At the same time, the public manager should take into account the collective 
values and goals of public action. Of the three administrative doctrines, NPG requires the 
public manager to have the broadest moral autonomy. Managing in networks would 
require from the public manager ethical competence and even virtuous behaviour. 
Governance risks undermining transparency and accountability of public action. The risk 
of networks is that they do not necessarily pay attention to differences in power, 
information and norms. In an ideal network, participants recognise their role through 
equality. In networks, structural violence does not only mean technical, bureaucratic or 
economic communication. Communication in networks can be very informal and, at the 
same time, be based on significant power differences among participants. 
6.6 NPG's communicative responsibility  
6.6.1 Principle of openness  
In terms of accountability, NPG has the greatest potential of the administrative doctrines 
– but also the greatest risks. The reason for the risks is the non-binding nature of norms 
in networks. The opportunities for interaction, exchange of ideas and debate are widest in 
networks, but depend on the relationships within each network. It can be argued that in 
NPG, the public manager is a perpetual networker, exploiting network-like relationships 
under the cross-pressure of blurring accountability relations. Network relations cannot be 
considered monolithic, as social interaction is based on different types of social ties. 
Hence, the content of the social relationship determines the best network structure for the 
participants (Johanson 1998: 26). In networks, action is also justified based on 
contradictory premises: for example, the public interest, the pursuit of economic goals and 
the promotion of deliberation in governance. 
Participants' involvement in networks depends on the nature of the social interaction. The 
definitions of these responsibilities of participants set the starting points for networking. 
In this way, manipulation can be prevented by network management. The activity of 
participants in networks is also a context-dependent issue. In some participants may be 
equally active, in others the opposite may be true. The situation is determined not only by 
the individualistic interests of the participants, but also by the network context, such as 
power differentials and the existence of cliques. 
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6.6.2 Principle of freedom of speech  
The principle of freedom of speech is linked to the issue of power and knowledge 
differentials and their narrowing. This is also a contextual issue in networks. It is likely 
that in high-trust networks, power and knowledge differences are smaller than in low-trust 
networks. Compared to markets, and especially hierarchies, networks are more likely to 
have high levels of trust between participants. However, in practice, equality between 
participants is rare.  
The practices of each network set the conditions for the criteria for communication and 
their collective acceptance. Here the public manager has the key responsibility. For 
example, ensuring inclusiveness is an absolute starting point since all participants must 
feel part of the network (Lehto et al. 2019: 263). As in markets, the extent to which 
opinions are expressed in networks depends on the level of trust. Building trust between 
participants is one of the key objectives of a network manager. In networks, the public 
manager has greater autonomy to act from a wider range of starting points, as their 
legitimacy is less often decided in advance. On the other hand, they also have a greater 
responsibility to act ethically. 
6.6.3 Principle of authenticity  
The increasing complexity of accountability makes the principle of authenticity more 
difficult to achieve. In networks, the diversity of opinions and values is at its widest. Hence, 
different perspectives can be identified, but not necessarily in a way that influences 
decision-making. In addition, networks often lead to compromises that no one really 
intended. Dialogue may or may not lead to practical action. Differences of opinion and 
values are masked, for example, by powerful participants and cliques. Networks can be 
built on normative deliberation, where each party should be listened to. On the other hand, 
it can be based purely on economic efficiency. The risk is that decision-making is informal 
in nature. This undermines the collective acceptance of better ideas. In networks, opinions 
and arguments are diverse and take place in different arenas. Arguments can be made in 
informal arenas that are inaccessible to some participants. 
Authenticity in networks can be illustrated by the following (and classic) example of 
manipulation in civic participation: 
In the name of citizen participation, people are placed on rubberstamp advisory 
committees or advisory boards for the express purpose of "educating" them or 
engineering their support. [...] This style of nonparticipation has since been applied 
to other programs encompassing the poor. Examples of this are seen in Community 
Action Agencies (CAAs) which have created structures called "neighbourhood 
councils" or "neighbourhood advisory groups". These bodies have no legitimate 
function or power. The CAA's use them to "prove" that "grassroots people" are 
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involved in the programme. But the programme may not have been discussed with 
"the people". Or it may have been described at a meeting in the most general terms; 
"We need your signatures on this proposal for multiservice centre which will house, 
under one roof, doctors from the health department, workers from the welfare 
department, and specialists from the employment service." The signatories are not 
informed that the $2 million-per-year center will only refer residents to the same 
old waiting lines at the same old agencies across town. No one is asked if such a 
referral center is really needed in his neighbourhood. No one realizes that the 
contractor for the building is the mayor's brother-in-law, or that the new director 
of the center will be the same old community organization specialist from the urban 
renewal agency. (Arnstein 1969: 218.) 
In this example, civic participation is based on the idea of common interest. However, it is 
up to the participants to decide what is meant by this cooperation and on what basis they 
want to talk about it and push it forward. The different perspectives of the participants are 
recognised, but they are not recognised as part of the common goals to be pursued. In this 
example, public management is not honest: talk has been misleading and communication 
has been disingenuous (Forester 1980). As Arnstein shows, conflicts need not be visible, 
as they can only become apparent after the collaboration has taken place. In network-
based interaction, it is always up to the participants to decide what the network is aiming 
at and what they are willing to do within the network. The invitation to network 
collaboration is not necessarily based on honest motives. 
In terms of clarity, NPG is the most complex of administrative doctrines. On the other 
hand, what is clear is the partial withdrawal of the state and public administration in 
society. What complicates the administrative doctrine is the recognition of the multiplicity 
of institutional logics and value orientations. The consideration of different values and 
logics in networks makes it difficult to monitor the responsibility and accountability of 
public management. 
NPG requires networks to build trust between participants. In this case, trust is a social 
phenomenon that cannot be reduced to laws and norms or economic criteria. NPG and 
legitimacy are based on the assumption that the accountability and social acceptance of 
governance is enhanced by openness to the demands of citizens and network participants. 
Network relationships also raise questions. How transparent are the results achieved in 
networks? How can informal relationships be evaluated in a sustainable way from an 
accountability perspective? Is the public interest served by networked cooperation or are 
decisions based on sub-optimality? Do networks reflect a broader public perspective? Why 
should public organisations and citizens be satisfied with the outcome? Who is ultimately 
accountable? 
Finally, NPG is close to the accountability discourse of institutionalisation, with the 
promise of democratisation at its heart. NPG requires the public manager to consider 
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multiple types of accountability, which are consequences of both external and internal 
actions. 
It is in networks that the paradox of responsibility is most widely manifested. This is due 
to the context-dependence of networks, the ambiguity of participants' responsibilities and 
the lack of binding authority. Paradoxically, the pathologies of accountability can take the 
form of opportunism or the objectification of obligations, the denial of personal 
responsibility or the atrophy and defiance of political authority. The manifestation of 
pathologies in networks is influenced by the circumstances of the network and the moral 
premises of the participants, such as ethical principles and integrity. 
6.6.4 Principle of reciprocity  
In networks, the interaction between participants can be reciprocal, with attention also 
being paid to the authority. On the other hand, it can be something else entirely. In any 
case, the idea behind network arrangements is that the participants are, at least in 
principle, in a reciprocal position with each other. 
6.7 Conclusions 
Networks are context-bound interactions, which reduces the assessment of 
responsibilities in the context of universal obligations such as laws and norms. 
Accountability is currently assessed from a wide variety of perspectives. For example, 
Dubnick (2014: 33) identifies eight different types of accountability. The contextual nature 
of networks means that the consequences of public action cannot be given as much 
attention in the NPG as in other governance theories. For the public interest, actions are 
sub-optimised to take into account and reconcile the perspectives of participants in the 
network. On the other hand, sub-optimisation can be a matter of maximising the self-
interest of individual actors. 
NPG is a doctrine of governance where accountability should also be demonstrated 
through responsiveness, i.e. through citizens and political actors. However, the 
environment is not limited to citizens but is a broader social responsibility. Responsibility 
in public management can be thought of as having three levels: organisational role, agency 
and environment. The environment has given rise to new forms of responsibility, for 
example through outsourcing, where accountability is not dictated by hierarchy but by 
contractualisation. Demonstrating accountability requires extensive communication with 
public administrations, organisations and citizens. 
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Modern public management must pay attention to the tension between bureaucratic 
public organisations and post-industrial society. Social changes have made organisations 
flexible and informal. This makes it difficult to monitor accountability. Contemporary 
organisations are often approached through the concept of a network, which challenges 
the traditional understanding of what an organisation ultimately is. (Nyholm 2008: 52–
53.) 
Professional requirements are being replaced, at least in part, by competences based on 
personal qualities. This has implications for the issue of responsibility. Responsibility is 
not measured in terms of substantive competence alone, as the new responsibilities of the 
civil servant include continuous self-development and the improvement of interpersonal 
skills and intrinsic motivation. These requirements are therefore in line with the changes 
in management. (Demmke 2019; Kuokkanen 2015: 84.) 
This is also the case for public administration. For example, managing networks requires 
public managers and staff to have qualities such as social interaction and networking skills 
that would not necessarily be necessary in a traditional hierarchical-bureaucratic 
administration.  
Due to the informal nature of networking, the nature of accountability forums should be 
given special attention. For example, an accountability forum could assess the 
accountability of the accountable party before or after an activity. A related issue is that of 
unforeseen or anticipated accountability. Unforeseen accountability can also trigger 
defensiveness in the accountable party, even to a greater extent than in the case of ex post 
accountability. In contrast, anticipated accountability, under the right circumstances, 
induces preventive self-reflection on the causes and motivation of the action. 
Accountability is taken more seriously by accountable parties in a respected public 
accountability forum. Furthermore, accountability standards are taken more seriously in 
a situation where the forum itself is responsible for the norms and guidelines that define 
accountability. (Schillemans 2015: 9–11.) 
Accountability in the age of networks also touches on the problem of measurement. There 
are undeniable problems with measuring public performance. It is often thought that 
performance measures determine and control public management (Lähdesmäki 2003: 
78). In the age of networks, the situation is more ambiguous than before. For example, one 
can imagine a threatening scenario in which networks determine and control the use of 
performance indicators. This raises new questions of accountability previous principles of 
public management were unable to address. 
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7 CONCLUSIONS 
The study was based on an examination of responsible public management using the 
criteria of communicative action by Jürgen Habermas. The forms of responsibility in 
public management were examined through three administrative doctrines, namely 
bureaucratic theory, New Public Management (NPM), and New Public Governance (NPG). 
In this study, the forms of responsibility in public management were examined according 
to four principles: the principle of openness, the principle of freedom of speech, the 
principle of authenticity and the principle of reciprocity. The study was based on abductive 
content analysis (Karlsen et al. 2020). The study started from the observation that new 
waves of administrative reform have not improved the legitimacy of the administration. 
The abductive guiding principle of the study was that this is due to the efficiency-
centredness and technical rationality of the forms of responsibility in administrative 
doctrines. Administrative doctrines should be examined through discourse ethics. The 
idea follows Habermas' view of a system whose communicative structures technicalise the 
lifeworld. The study continues the Habermasian vision by taking the analysis to the 
discourses of administrative doctrines. The study uses Habermas' theory of 
communicative action as a theoretical lens for evaluating forms of responsibility in 
administrative doctrines. 
The research questions were: 
1. How has responsible public management been taken into account in the 
three administrative doctrines, namely, bureaucratic theory, New Public 
Management, and New Public Governance? 
2. How can the forms of responsibility highlighted in administrative doctrines 
be assessed using responsibility as understood in Habermas' 
communicative way as a starting point? 
The following observations can be drawn from these questions. 
7.1 Evaluating administrative doctrines  
7.1.1 Forms of responsibility in public management  
Administrative doctrines complicate the understanding, measurement and evaluation of 
responsibility in public management. The drive to improve the efficiency, economy and 
effectiveness of public administration has given rise to new forms of responsibility that 
both complement and complicate previous forms. For example, network accountability 
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looks at responsibility in a very different way from bureaucratic compliance. In 
bureaucratic theory, responsibility is achieved through formal tasks and well-defined 
compliance. NPM shifts responsibility towards accountability for results, contract 
management and outsourcing by autonomous managers. NPG further extends 
responsibility to the levels of network management and meta-governance. Administrative 
doctrines alone do not solve the problem of accountability and responsibility in public 
management. Sometimes the factors that make the form of responsibility work open up 
new problems for other administrative doctrines. 
In bureaucratic theory, responsibility is seen as a problem related to the compliance and 
integrity of the civil servant. In this administrative doctrine, control and compliance are 
thought to improve the efficiency and obedience of civil servants. Public administration 
also has a distinct identity, values and methods of operation, which are influenced not only 
by compliance but also by professional accountability. From all administrative doctrines, 
the bureaucratic theory requires the least attention to the external environment for 
responsibility to take place. 
NPM is broader in scope, focusing on private sector practices, problematising the nature 
of public administration and the emergence of new values. Accountability for results in 
public management has managerialist and Taylorist features: for example, increased 
managerial power and autonomy, economic values and performance-based rewards. 
Economic values make public organisations more efficient – or at least appear to be more 
efficient. This understanding of responsibility is seen in the increasing application of 
private sector management practices to public management.  
The result-orientation of NPM has led, for example, to outsourcing, which undermines 
accountability and transparency in public management. NPM reciprocity is hampered by 
the hierarchical nature of managerialism and the inherent inequality of market relations. 
As a doctrine, NPM pays little attention to subjective responsibility or innate sources of 
ethical behaviour, despite its idea of “letting managers manage”. Also, the doctrine has 
diminished the professional values of public administration. NPM accountability is also 
based on principal-agent theory, which focuses on the opportunistic actions of the agent. 
NPG emphasises broad horizontal accountability. In other words, for NPG, the focus is on 
networks of self-governing actors and their management (Rannisto 2005: 36). NPG also 
requires public managers to have a high degree of integrity, as their actions in a network-
like, norm-loose environment require them to adopt a public sector ethos. At the same 
time, the NPG shifts traditional responsibilities from the state to social actors. It thus 
challenges the identity of the public administration as a problem solver, thus extending 
accountability to a social and inter-actor phenomenon. 
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For bureaucratic theory, responsiveness to citizens has traditionally been low, which is 
reflected in its tendency to emphasise the dictated, limited and restricted form of 
responsiveness. This means that the doctrine is based on instrumentality in relation to the 
control of elected politicians, norm-centredness and professionalism. 
NPM has meant an increase in entrepreneurial responsiveness in public administration, 
whereby responsiveness to citizens is articulated through a discourse of clienthood. There 
is also a certain degree of negotiated responsiveness, i.e. the reconciliation of value 
orientations and a willingness to compromise. 
In the sense of negotiation, NPM has more horizontal accountability mechanisms than 
bureaucratic theory. On the other hand, negotiation can lead to horizontal as well as 
hierarchical accountability relationships – determined, for example, by power and 
authority relations between actors. However, horizontal accountability mechanisms are 
most prevalent in NPG. The doctrine also understands responsiveness through 
negotiation, but it is not limited to this. In networks, responsiveness also implies 
deliberation, i.e. social interaction and listening to and involving citizens in public 
decision-making. 
In bureaucratic theory, the law ultimately determines the responsible behaviour of a public 
manager. In contrast, NPM is based on the view that performance measurement and 
standards lead to improved accountability in the public sector. Similarly, NPG sees 
accountability forums and horizontal accountability as complementary to traditional 
forms of responsibility. 
Social responsibility in bureaucratic theory is technical, which emphasises the legal 
dimension of responsibility and the principle of compliance with norms. This more 
minimalist position is represented by NPM, which sees responsibility not only as a 
technical definition of responsibility but also as an economic one. For NPG, on the other 
hand, a community-based definition of responsibility is important, without forgetting 
modern systems thinking. Hence, public management has a social responsibility that 
cannot be superseded by economic or technical considerations alone. On the other hand, 
NPG can undermine accountability and responsibility, due to the complexity of 
responsibility and accountability mechanisms in networks. 
The problem with the conceptions of responsibility in administrative doctrines is a kind of 
relativism: a logic of action can be justified from one doctrine and criticised from another. 
This is demonstrated by the implicit contradiction in the conceptions of agency that define 
the doctrines. The divergent criteria of the doctrines make it difficult to implement, justify 
and monitor responsibility and accountability. If the question of public responsibility is 
complex, so are the means of demonstrating it. 
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The paradoxical nature of responsible public management in administrative doctrines can 
be illustrated by the following tensions. The public manager is expected to act as an 
autonomous agent driven by self-interest but obedient to the public administration. Public 
manager is both ethical and strategic. A public manager must take the public interest into 
account in his or her decisions, even if he or she is perceived to be selfish in his or her 
thinking. 
On the other hand, responsibility is associated with acting in accordance with the 
traditional public sector ethos, while new values, such as innovation, should be taken into 
account by civil servants. The responsible public manager is responsible for the public 
organisation, but makes use of outsourcing, with many accountability issues crossing the 
boundaries of the public organisation. This makes it difficult to monitor ethical and legal 
issues. Therefore, opportunities should be sought in the market while keeping the focus on 
the public interest. 
In addition, a responsible public manager should be neutral, but be aware of and benefit 
from political tendencies. They should lead hierarchically, influence networks, cooperate 
and seek partnerships. Public manager should play by the rules and remember the needs 
of customers. In this way, management enhances trust and the legitimacy of governance. 
On the other hand, trust is just a tool among others, for managing networks and operating 
in the market. 
The question arises as to how, in the light of administrative doctrines, the public manager 
can be regarded as a logically coherent or unified agent. Traditionally, the identity of the 
public manager is listed as integrity, the central feature of which is precisely coherence.  At 
the same time, however, it should be noted that values such as objectivity and 
independence are still listed as the most important values of public organisations, as in the 
case of bureaucratic theory. Thus, the claims of administrative doctrines do not directly 
correspond to practice – although there is a link between them. 
7.1.2 Communicative assessment of responsibility in administrative 
doctrines 
As administrative doctrines contain conflicting statements, there is a risk that there is no 
consistent set of criteria for assessing responsible public management. In this study, the 
responsibility forms found in the administrative doctrines have been assessed through 
Habermas' communicative criteria, represented by the principles of openness, freedom of 
speech, authenticity and reciprocity. From this perspective, the forms of responsibility can 
be opened up as shown in the following table: 
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Table 7. Administrative doctrines and principles of communication 
Principle/Doctrine Bureaucratic theory NPM NPG 






Limited by the 
accountability for 










The principle of 
freedom of speech 
Responsibility is based 
on the existence of 







Depends on the 
level of trust and 
network practices 
The principle of 
authenticity 
Objectification of rules 
undermines 
responsible behaviour 
Should you follow the 
rules or act according 










Problems related to 
validity requirements 

















Desirable, but not 
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Historically, public responsibility goes back to the theme of compliance. Today, however, 
responsibility is a wider problem than just that, and compliance is not seen as a sufficient 
form of responsibility. Historically, compliance has also meant immoral acts in which civil 
servants become blind to the wrongs they have committed. The bureaucratic apparatus 
can thus steal from civil servants the meaning of their actions (Habermas 1984b: 302). 
In bureaucratic theory, the principle of transparency is hampered by compliance and 
politics-administration dichotomy. In terms of freedom of speech, responsibility 
presupposes differences in knowledge and power between actors, in other words, 
hierarchy. Otherwise, Weberian principles, such as instructions from above, lack a basis. 
This bureaucratic doctrine, in Weberian terms, is based on ethics as a responsibility, i.e. a 
technically correct procedure, not on ends as such. Hence, hierarchy means responsibility 
based on control, i.e. the formality and objectivity of communication, which leads to the 
avoidance of personal responsibility and ultimately to overall ineffectiveness. 
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In terms of authenticity, the objectification of rules has consequences for responsible 
behaviour. Moreover, in bureaucratic theory there is an obvious tension between rules and 
agency, as illustrated by the contradiction between compliance and integrity. This can be 
seen in the way how top-down rules are set against professional assumptions. In 
bureaucratic theory, it is impossible to demonstrate reciprocity. 
In NPM, the principle of openness is limited by a concept of agency that communicates in 
an instrumental or strategic way, rather than seeking to build consensus. Instrumentality 
and strategicity are therefore ways of demonstrating accountability for results. Because 
NPM communicates in terms of economic criteria, negotiation and managerial autonomy, 
it is, like the bureaucratic theory, partly hierarchical. Indeed, the negotiation is rarely 
between two equal partners, the economic criteria are defined from above and the public 
manager can make decisions without consulting his or her subordinates. 
NPM's accountability for results undermines the principle of authenticity, since 
instrumental and strategic activities are based, at least in part, on dishonesty or the pursuit 
of economic value. The authenticity of management doctrine is undermined by problems 
of clarity, honesty, legitimacy and truthfulness, since its theoretical and ideological 
background is found in the world of economy. This, in turn, limits its understanding of the 
scope of the responsibilities of public administration. 
In NPG, the principle of openness is undermined by the contextual nature of cooperation 
and the many different interests from which, for example, networks are drawn. Thus, the 
principle of freedom of speech is equally dependent on the level of trust and the practices 
of the individual network. The principle of authenticity is obscured by the complex 
accountability relations and the conditions under which networked contexts operate, such 
as the existence of power differences or cliques. In the doctrine, there is a possibility for 
reciprocity – but no guarantee of it. In cooperation and networks, it is possible to act 
instrumentally, strategically and communicatively. Consequently, they are influenced by 
the most diverse conceptions of responsibility, which shape action between network 
participants. 
But does not NPG represent precisely the kind of administrative doctrine that approaches 
accountability through communicative rationality? The problem of legitimacy cannot 
therefore be reduced to a focus on efficiency or technical rationality, since governance has 
also been reformed from the opposite perspective. In terms of the “external” validity 
requirements of the discourse (clarity, honesty, legitimacy, truthfulness), one could think 
in this way, even though NPM influences are also present in NPG. Also, NPG has 
complemented some of the NPM reforms, such as the outsourcing and contractualisation 
of public activities. Thus, accountability for results also has an impact within NPG. 
Attention is not so much focused on the starting points and motivations from which this 
doctrine presents responsibility. How the discourse internally constructs responsibility, 
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however, poses problems. In other words, the doctrine fails to provide the tools to ensure 
the accountability of network participants in an increasingly complex environment.  
The realisation of the public interest in networks can sometimes be blurred, leaving plenty 
of room for opportunistic behaviour by the public manager. This changes the identity of 
the civil servant, which is traditionally based on obedience, apolitical and neutral 
competence. Opportunistic behaviour can result from the public manager’s efforts to 
mitigate network risk factors. It can actively influence the network's power structures and 
the involvement of its partners. The public manager is assumed to act in a generally 
normative way and as an enabler of collective values such as equality and justice. It is also 
assumed that the public manager takes into account public and self-interest. Of course, 
these two interests do not always mean the same thing. 
Since NPG's connection to deliberation was obvious, it was not surprising that its forms of 
responsibility followed the principles of procedural democracy. However, the results show 
that it was a good thing to keep the doctrine in the study. The analysis demonstrated the 
tension between NPG and discourse ethics in networks where accountability relations and 
norms of action can become blurred. Hence, it is useful to continue to explore NPG 
principles through communicative criteria, as the forms of communication it mediates are 
also vulnerable to communicative distortions. 
Moreover, the forms of responsibility in administrative doctrines can create vicious circles: 
in the discourses they convey, negative consequences are contradictorily resolved by the 
very factors that have created the negative situation in the first place. The justification for 
this can be found in the internal logic of administrative doctrines – and in the values of 
what is considered administratively “rational”. 
7.2 Reflection  
The study is based on responsible public management. But what is it in practice? Some 
universal criteria can be given, which can be found in both the private and public sectors. 
First, modern management is not based on coercion. Employees have a shared 
understanding of the structure of the organisation, the division of tasks and their 
acceptability. Central to a public organisation is its legitimacy, i.e. the acceptability and 
credibility of its activities and authority structures. The authority of the manager is 
accepted without any real threat of punishment, although the modern organisation has 
ways of improving its authority and compliance. In general, different administrative 
doctrines imply that the choice of a particular management model is based on clarity and 
rationality in doing things right – in other words, they do not want to acknowledge the 
possibility that things could be done differently. (Kuokkanen 2015: 37–38; Scott 2001: 58–
59; Weber 1922; Pollitt 1993: 1–3.) 
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The question of the ways in which technical rationality is insufficient to achieve 
responsibility in public management represents a direction for further research. This 
theme also comes back to the topic of the role of rationality in society and its effect on 
maintaining the relationship between the system and the lifeworld – not to forget the 
legitimization crisis of public institutions. 
The technical rationality of administrative culture is not a new topic. It is a Weberian “iron 
cage”, and can be seen historically as one of the roots of administrative evil. Different 
doctrinal perspectives respond to the problem of legitimacy with conflicting views. 
Whereas for market-driven reforms, administrative legitimacy is a matter of fiscal balance 
and austerity, network-based reforms seek legitimacy through cooperation between 
different societal actors. Hence, there is no equally comprehensive “Weberian” theory of 
modern bureaucracy. Instead, changes in the rational criteria of knowledge, or what is 
considered rational in general, have led to constant waves of administrative reform. 
The broad scope of administrative doctrines is obvious. Their practical implementation is 
also influenced by societal factors such as fundamental cultural values, the extent of the 
moral universe, attitudes towards equality and inclusion, and the degree of 
democratisation of public administration. It is likely that a broader approach to public 
management will undermine traditional public values. The integration will be challenging 
as long as doctrines and structures remain incoherent and inconsistent. The identity of the 
public manager is not coherent in the light of management doctrines and narratives, 
making it difficult to implement and monitor accountability. 
From the perspective of Public Administration education, responsibility in public 
management should be considered in a broader context of social, philosophical and 
ideological debate. Ideas and practices in the field of governance do not come out of thin 
air. They are often cloaked in apparent objectivity, transforming forms of responsibility 
into technical tools of universal managerialism. Therefore, the public managers of the 
future will have to be self-reflective in their ethical behaviour and able to communicate in 
accordance with the principles that guide public action. The task will be more difficult if 
the links and contradictions between administrative doctrines remain unclear to the public 
manager. 
Also, responsibility is already affected by issues of digitalisation and AI. The application of 
AI in governance is rapidly driving public management in a more digital direction. Public 
management is required to embrace digital practices – and not at least as a result of the 
Covid-19. In the case of AI, responsibility issues in public management are once again 
facing new challenges. Many questions arise. How far can AI be applied to public 
management? For example, can AI be considered a responsible agent? One obvious answer 
to the latter question is: of course not. Only humans can be responsible for their actions 
because they are able to distinguish right from wrong. 
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Another answer to the question could be: maybe. In this case, responsibility is not viewed 
through agency but action. Public managers, administrative experts and researchers have 
an interpretation of what is generally considered to be publicly accountable. An action can 
be judged as either responsible or irresponsible, regardless of whether it is a human being 
or an AI behind the action. Moreover, it is quite clear that the issue of accountability and 
AI is too large not to be critically examined. 
It can be argued that the forms of responsibility identified in this study apply to AI with 
varying degrees of success. This is due to AI's limited ability to perceive the human 
lifeworld as a whole. For example, compliance and accountability may be more amenable 
to AI than responsiveness to citizens, as they are more mechanistic forms of responsibility 
and require less perception of the context. The broader the view of responsibility, the more 
difficult it is for AI. Examples of broader responsibility include communicative action, 
deliberation, dialogue and social equity. In this case, the application of AI is likely to be 
very limited. 
This study has represented the tradition of Critical Management Studies (CMS). Overall, 
CMS is a somewhat contradictory set of different background theories. Of course, there are 
also worthwhile and coherent features to strive for. One of these is the reflexivity of 
research (Fournier & Grey 2000). Management research should make its position clear in 
terms of how it approaches the preconceptions of management studies and what are the 
possible philosophical shortcomings of the research. Such criticism of research in the field 
is justified in the light of good scientific practice. Criticality as such does not follow the 
principles of any other philosophical school, nor does it follow the philosophical 
assumptions of science in general. Ideally, critique is part of all disciplines, so that its 
possible neglect says something about the research practices and a priori assumptions 
about the object of research in a given discipline. The lack of scientific criticality can also 
arise from the social phenomena that affect scientific practices. 
According to Lintula, when assessing the practical benefits, CMS can support the 
continuity and profitability of the organisation and the promotion of a worthy life at the 
same time (Lintula 2010). However, Lintula goes on to say that this goal is quite utopian, 
for example, in Finnish working life, which is still too bureaucratic and hierarchical. 
Also, the responsibility of public management should be examined more closely from an 
integrity perspective. According to OECD (2018), behavioural science can enhance 
integrity in many ways, as ethical behaviour never takes place in a vacuum, but as part of 
social interaction. The first way is to rethink existing practices and systems. Negative 
behaviour can be anticipated by identifying responsibilities. Structures that obscure 
responsibility can pose risks to integrity. Such structures include, for example, involving 
too many actors or ensuring integrity only based on formal criteria. Ethical reflection can 
increase integration in an organisation. It is even thought that personal signing of 
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documents encourages individuals to behave ethically. The second tool relates to time-
limited interventions based on knowledge of people's biases, cognitive constraints and 
social preferences. The intervention acts as a kind of nudge, a subtle guide to ethical 
choices. An example of such nudging can be a quiz on ethical rules. (OECD: 2018: 7–8.) 
However, integrity is not just an individualistic issue. In addition to the integrity of 
individuals, it is necessary to talk about the integrity of institutions. Integrity can be 
considered in the context of an integrity framework, which aims to improve public 
integration by taking into account the institutions, practices and instruments that serve 
the task (OECD 2020; Hoekstra & Kaptein 2012). The national integrity system is often 
described through the 11 pillars of the Greek temple, such as legislation, governance, civil 
society and media (Pope 2000). The pillars rest on public awareness and societal values. 
The integrity system is not based solely on the internal practices of public organisations, 
but aims to link the organisational level with the social institutions that reinforce integrity. 
According to Kirby (2018: 14–29), the integrity of individuals and institutions is based on 
purpose, legitimacy, pursuit, consistency with commitments and robustness. First of all, a 
public institution must have a well-defined purpose. If it has several purposes, the 
relationship between them must be disclosed. Also, the purpose must be legitimate. A 
public institution can have a legitimate purpose, but if it does not pursue that purpose 
legitimately, it loses its integrity. A public institution must pursue its legitimate purpose 
to the best of its ability with the resources at its disposal. Public institutions have 
obligations both to society and to their members as employees. It must, therefore, be 
committed, consistent and trustworthy at all levels of its activities. A public institution 
must be strong, i.e. able to withstand time and changing circumstances. Interestingly, 
administrative doctrines have challenged the purpose, coherence and robustness of 
institutions, not to mention the legitimacy of government and the trust of citizens. Perhaps 
the pursuit has come at the expense of these principles. 
In public management, individual and institutional integrity is undermined by many 
different elements. First, the purpose of public action should be legitimate. However, 
administrative doctrines have divergent views on the purpose of government. Although 
similarities exist, the purpose of public action is not well defined. The purpose should also 
be legitimate, but each doctrine has reservations about the principles of the other. 
Individual and institutional integrity would require consistency, i.e. commitment and trust 
at all levels of action, which is not currently the case. In NPM, for example, communication 
is consistent, committed and trustworthy only in a given market situation. Integrity also 
implies strength, i.e. the individual and the institution must be able to withstand time and 
changing circumstances. However, governance has been subject to constant reform – 
meaning the process of modernisation is ongoing. 
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For Husserl, the philosopher behind the concept of the lifeworld, science is in crisis when 
it produces knowledge that is alienated from life. This insight can be applied to the lessons 
of public administration. On the one hand, public administration is supposed to be 
alienated from life, technical and efficiency-oriented – but, paradoxically, it respects the 
living and communicative basis on which it is founded as a scientific discipline. All 
research in public administration refers to pre-scientific life and the interpretative 
horizon. The administrative scientist must therefore respect the communicative criteria of 
the lifeworld in order not to continue to alienate and colonize his or her discipline. The 
accountability of public management must be critically assessed, for the alternative is only 
to blindly follow the negative aspects of Enlightenment. “Enlightenment doubts everything 
that cannot be measured in terms of calculability and utility, and if it can only proceed free 
of external shackles, nothing will stop it” (Adorno & Horkheimer 2008: 24). 
7.3 Limitations of the analysis  
In the abductive content analysis, the four principles of discourse ethics appear 
counterfactual and ideal in relation to the concepts of responsibility in administrative 
doctrines. This is both the strength and weakness of the content analysis. On the other 
hand, the counterfactuality of the principles provides a convenient yardstick against which 
to normatively assess the doctrines of governance. This is particularly the case if 
administrative science is understood as a democratic theory (Waldo). Technical rationality 
can unnecessarily marginalise questions of administrative ethics in particular. The 
principles show which factors limit the accountability of management theory. 
Although the study has not followed a traditional hermeneutic reading, a more 
hermeneutically in-depth reading would have required a smaller literature review. The 
hermeneutic dimension of the research has been represented by the researcher's internal 
interpretative process – on which all qualitative research is based. It has therefore been 
justified to argue that the research has been based on hermeneutic principles, as it has 
been qualitative, theoretical and content-analytical. 
Over the last century, the hermeneutic tradition has moved from a purely textual method 
to include (scientific) philosophical principles of interpretation. Indeed, hermeneutic 
principles have been applied in many abductive and theory-based content analyses 
(Karlsen et al. 2020). In any case, a traditional, hermeneutic reading approach could have 
been implemented by a careful and in-depth reading of a few sources. This could be a good 
option for further research, as it could fill gaps in the research on this topic. 
Another key question is how Habermas' discourse ethics have been applied. This is because 
Habermas himself has not provided precise guidelines for the application of his 
philosophy. Consequently, discourse ethics has been applied from different angles. In this 
Acta Wasaensia     141 
study, it was decided to approach discourse ethics through the four principles of the ideal 
speech situation (openness, freedom of speech, authenticity and reciprocity). This choice 
has been justified by the choice of the research topic, the forms of responsibility in 
administrative doctrines, where agency has played a crucial role. The principles of the ideal 
speech situation have thus provided a set of criteria within which agency has been assessed 
within the discourses of the doctrines. However, the principles of ideal discourse have been 
complemented by four validity criteria, which have opened up more discursive background 
assumptions in the doctrines, such as value assumptions or ideological views. In this study, 
the validity claims are embedded within the principle of authenticity. It has also been 
possible to assess the facticity and validity of the forms of responsibility through the ideal 
speech situation, as these also represent discursive ethical and universal criteria of 
communication. The principles and validity requirements of the ideal speech situation are 
not contradictory but complementary. 
The content analysis used in the study is based on abductive reasoning. In this case, the 
research begins with the researcher's preliminary understanding or a preliminary review 
of the research literature, which leads to the generation of a guiding idea. The aim is to 
draw attention to elements in the research data that would allow existing theory to be 
formulated in a new thematic area. It should be noted that the main idea of abductive 
reasoning is not necessarily easy to test, despite the fact that the whole study proceeds 
according to its logic. In theory, even the intuition of the researcher is sufficient as a 
guiding principle for the content analysis. This can be seen as a weakness of theory-based 
content analysis. The guiding idea used in this study is that the technical rationality of the 
forms of responsibility in administrative doctrines has undermined the legitimacy of 
public administration. Of course, this is really difficult to prove. The study has also 
assumed that the forms of responsibility must be evaluated in terms of discourse ethics. 
The premise is also based on Habermas' work on the distortion of communicative 
structures, and can therefore be justified according to previous research. 
This research has been close to CMS in the sense that it has criticised the shortcomings of 
administrative doctrines in terms of responsibility. This evaluation has been done through 
Habermas' theory of communicative action, which also represents the Critical School. 
However, whether the defence of procedural democracy makes the research “critical” is a 
question of its own. Democracy has always been at the heart of governance, and defending 
it is not necessarily ideological, for example. Habermas himself considers his discourse-
ethical procedural democracy neutral to different value orientations (Habermas 1996: 
288). Moreover, Habermas' work is thought to be situated somewhere between social 
democracy and political liberalism (Huttunen 2014). 
On the other hand, the study can be defended by the relatively uncritical attitude towards 
the forms of responsibility found in the administrative doctrines. Indeed, Pollitt and Hupe 
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(2011) speak of magical concepts in administrative science that are general in nature and 
normatively loaded. One of these is accountability. They argue that magical concepts blur 
traditional social science concerns about conflicts or divergent interests. If one seeks to 
understand governance in uncritical terms, the legitimacy of governance will erode over 
time – as will the credibility of public administration as a discipline. 
There is no single answer to responsible public management, which is why this study has 
examined the topic within the framework of three administrative doctrines. The study has 
also simplified the overload of accountability and responsibility, which are complex to 
analyse from the very outset. In the past, management methods in the private sector have 
been alien to public administration. However, over time, they have become permanent 
tools of public management. This is also true of NPG, which has led to a broadening of the 
scope of responsibility. Either case, the question is what will be the next lesson after NPG 
– a doctrine that is already 20 years old (which can also be seen in the references of this 
literature review). This would provide an answer to how responsibility in public 
management is changing even further. 
The values and principles present in the administrative doctrines show why they are not 
theories in the strict sense of the word. Rather, they consist of scientifically untested beliefs 
about responsible public management. The subject cannot be studied in an exclusively 
objective or neutral way, since questions of responsible public management are also 
political and ideological. 
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